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Energy and carbon markets in transition 
Energy and carbon markets are in transition. Whereas utilities used 
to have steady businesses, their opportunities and threats have undergone 
dramatic changes – not only in the last decades, but even from the start of 
this research project. These have been unleashed through regulatory 
changes (e.g., the liberalization of markets), technologies (e.g., 
breakthroughs in information technology, geology, and materials science), 
and their interactions through market behavior forces (e.g., finance and 
logistics). The available variety in the generation, transmission, and usage 
of energy have become unprecedented compared to mere decades ago. For 
example, ever more households produce (solar-powered) electricity 
themselves, electricity may soon be transmitted from Norway to the 
Middle-East and back (e.g., via the European Union (EU) Ten-Year 
Development Plans), and nuclear fusion may arrive within a decade 
(Economist, 2014). 
These achievements are astonishing given the nature of the energy 
business itself. Demand is by the millisecond (although gas molecules 
move slower than electrons). And this demand needs to be met with an 
exact equal supply to prevent malfunctions or breakdowns, requiring both 
predictive capacities and available installations with varying lead times. 
Energy provision is considered essential (i.e., a basic necessity), and EU-
wide ‘public service obligations’ guarantee energy for every household. It 
is delivered primarily through fixed networks, requiring tight coordination 
in terms of its transmission, construction, and maintenance. And because 
demand has been large and is still growing, sufficiently powerful fuel 
sources are required (i.e., mostly fossil-based). Given that these sources 
are not spread equally across the world, they are paid for dearly, and 
typically involve state-level politics. The prevailing approach to secure 
supply while saving costs has therefore been to increase the scale of 
production and transportation, to vertically integrate at least the 
coordination-prone industry links, and to have the host governments 
involved to obtain the (fuel) resources. 
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From the end-1980s, policymakers became convinced, through 
breakthroughs in technologies and theoretical insights, that markets can 
have a complementary role in the energy value chain (e.g., Talus, 2013). 
With integrated energy firms, this market orientation led governments to 
question the sector’s openness to competition and the related pressure to 
innovate. Among others, tariff regulation has been imposed in preventing 
monopoly prices. Gas and electricity sectors have been gradually opened 
to competition, among others through ‘unbundling’, where firms or 
governments are either to own the energy to be transported or to control 
the grids, but not both (see e.g., Pollitt et al., 2007).1 Several EU Member 
States decided to (partly) privatize the (non-grid) generation and retailing 
segments, and have the grid segment state-owned to guarantee public 
interests (e.g., the security of supply). 
The resulting market processes allowed for multiple stakeholders 
and their interactions, where no single player controls the system. Even if 
interactions may be brought about by developments outside grid 
operators’ scope of competences (e.g., other geographical markets), these 
operators (jointly) need to guarantee the safety for both security of supply 
and flexibility purposes. This has become complicated, for example, 
because trade is not only physical but also virtual, and because supply is 
increasingly provided through short-term (spot) contracts. 
Besides the resulting complexity from these market processes, 
energy firms also need to reckon with resource depletion. One ‘resource’ is 
the carbon budget, or the maximum amount of carbon-equivalent 
emissions below which anthropogenic interferences with the climate 
system will be prevented. The majority of energy processes release such 
emissions. Because of the European Union’s signing and ratifying of the 
1997 Kyoto Protocol, it has introduced the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS) in 2005, which has put a price on carbon since then. Other 
resources being depleted are the non-‘renewables’, such as nuclear and 
fossil fuels (e.g., gas, coal, oil). Regulations require and/or facilitate the 
production of renewables, such as wind, solar, and bio-based energy. This 
challenges energy systems management even further, because many 
renewable supplies are intermittent by nature and are thus less 
predictable. 
                                                        
1 Minimum requirements for distribution grids are less strict than for 
transmission grids. 
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2.1 Research question 
Given the increasingly complex design and performance of energy 
and carbon markets, it is important that public interests (e.g., limiting 
market failures) are aligned with private ones (e.g., profit or output 
maximization). Specifically, it is in the interest of consumers, firms, and 
policymakers that supply of energy is guaranteed while its production, 
trade, and consumption occurs efficiently (e.g., at the lowest possible 
transaction costs), and that scarce resources are optimally used (e.g., that 
resource depletion matches its accumulation). It therefore makes sense to 
find out if regulation-market connections are economically rational, both 
separately and jointly, because spillovers may affect ‘neighboring’ 
regulatory regimes. 
This Ph.D. research applies Law and Economics, a sub-discipline of 
both law and economics, which analyzes the economic causes and effects 
of laws and regulations. Hypotheses are derived from property rights 
theory and tested using econometric techniques. The overall research 
question is: Are property rights regarding EU carbon and energy markets 
valued, used and traded, and restricted in an economically efficient way? 
To that end, three EU-wide empirical studies have been conducted: 1) how 
shareholders value the EU ETS impact on firms, 2) how energy firms used 
and traded carbon allowances, and 3) whether the legal competences of 
National Regulatory Agencies (NRAs) are aligned to the public interests of 
the energy markets they supervise. 
This Ph.D. research is part of a larger project granted by the Energy 
Delta Gas Research (EDGaR) consortium: ‘Understanding Gas Sector 
Intra- and Inter-Market Interactions’.2 Its objective is to explore such 
regulation-market connections, and find out how energy and carbon 
markets can be improved upon from an integrated perspective. Since the 
project partners apply diverse tools and assumptions, these research 
findings are complementary to their contributions in meeting the EDGaR 
project targets. 
                                                        
2 The project partners are Delft University of Technology and Energy research 
Centre of the Netherlands (ECN). DNV GL is an associate partner with a role in 
providing advice and information. 
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2.2 Thesis outline 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 explains the economics 
of property rights and transaction costs, the applicability and limitations 
of this approach, and how the three empirical studies fit into this 
framework. Because the first two studies are based on the same data source 
of EU ETS transactions, the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL), 
Chapter 3 elaborates on data problems when applying the EUTL and 
comes with recommendations on how these can be mitigated. Chapters 4 
to 6 contain the aforementioned three EU-wide empirical studies. The 








Property rights theory 
The connecting theoretical thread between the studied cases in this 
research is ‘property rights theory’.3 A crucial element of property rights is 
for them to internalize ‘externalities’. External effects (or: 'externalities') 
occur if actors, due to significant transaction costs, will not account for the 
benefits or damages of their property rights usage, which positively or 
negatively affect the property rights they do not own, respectively.4,5 For 
example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change provides 
increasingly significant evidence that mankind emits greenhouse gases, 
and thereby cause the climate to change. By and large, these climate effects 
have adverse impacts on people’s property globally. If few private actors 
are involved with these climate effects, transaction costs are low for them 
to bargain and/or to contract who is allowed to pollute and who is excluded 
from polluting. Yet, with carbon emissions being a global pollutant, 
transaction costs are too high due to the many actors involved, rendering 
it difficult to establish the exclusivity of who is allowed to pollute.6 
                                                        
3 Foss (2010) extensively reviews the literature about the similarities and 
differences between property rights and transaction costs approaches. The 
evidence is inconclusive which one is superior from conceptual and empirical 
viewpoints. The choice for one approach or a combination thereof should 
ultimately depend on the research question posed. However, property rights 
theory is relatively strong in analyzing the multifaceted nature of property rights, 
their economic incentives, and the institutional barriers and opportunities for 
moving towards more efficient outcomes (e.g., Kim and Mahoney, 2005). 
4 Indeed, the Hohfeldian paradigm (Hohfeld, 1913) implies that “a legally 
enforceable right presumes a corresponding legally enforceable duty” (Cole and 
Grossman, 2002). Hence, the existence of property rights is secure if non-owners 
respect the property of the owners.  
5 Transaction costs are, for example, the costs of information, the search for 
contractual partners, the bargaining, the drawing up and upholding of contracts. 
This concept has been introduced by Coase’s classical paper on the Nature of the 
Firm (Coase, 1937). 
6 Given the Hohfeldian paradigm of footnote 4, for property rights it is necessary 
to being able to exclude others from its usage as input (e.g., resource) and as 
output (e.g., theft) (e.g., Hotte et al., 2013). As to sanctions and enforcement and 
their expectations function toward exclusivity, the legal base can rely on codified 
law but also on societal customs and mores (Demsetz, 1967). 
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As argued by Demsetz (1967), “when net gains from exclusivity are 
positive” (Müller and Tietzel, 2005), existing property rights can be 
adjusted for this exclusivity, for example, who will be restricted in 
pollution terms.7 Also new exclusive property rights can be introduced. An 
application hereof is the European Commission’s launch of the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in January, 2005, which 
introduced EU Allowances (EUAs). These are tradable property rights, 
each representing one metric tonne of carbon-equivalent emissions. This 
new property right lowered the transaction costs on the carbon emissions 
attributes of property subject to the EU ETS.8 The lower transaction costs 
enable these owners to bargain who will own the right to pollute and who 
will not (e.g., via exchanges or over-the-counter).9 Because the total 
number of EUAs declines every year (i.e., the ‘cap’), the scarcity of these 
rights forces firms to weigh up whether or not to produce and to emit, 
and/or to invest in low-carbon production processes. According to the 
Coase theorem (Coase, 1960; Stigler, 1966), with negligible transaction 
costs the efficient allocation of legal entitlements will become observable 
which, if carried out through allowance trades, will imply that the non-
owners of EU allowances will be most efficient at abating the carbon 
emissions.10 
                                                        
7 According to Calabresi and Melamed (1972), three ownership rule types affect 
the compensation of damage. With 1) the property rule, only those owning the 
right may cause harm, for example, to pollute. Only state intervention is required 
to decide upon and enforce the initial entitlement of rights, while subsequent 
bargaining realizes the final ownership allocation. With 2) the liability rule, 
damage may be allowed or prevented only in exchange for an objective 
compensation (i.e., through the judiciary). And with 3) the inalienability rule, 
other actor’s rights may not be tampered with, for example, human rights. With 
low (high) transaction costs, the property (liability) rule should lead to efficient 
outcomes – if the judiciary adheres to the efficiency principle. 
8 There are multiple selection criteria for property to be part of the EU ETS. The 
industry sector is one, for example, the New-Zealand ETS includes the transport 
sector while the EU ETS does not (it does include aviation). Another criterion is 
the installation size; the EU ETS imposes a total thermal input minimum of 20 
MW (EC, 2009a: Annex I). 
9 Firms in aggregate would trade until the net value of reallocating the abatement 
of pollution is zero. Stavins (1995) shows that the deadweight losses from 
transaction costs make the initial allocation of rights relatively more important 
toward the efficient allocation of abatement. 
10 With the setting in Pigou (1932), such situation is also realized with an emissions 
tax equal to marginal damages. However, his framework implicitly assumes that 
polluters are exactly those which are most efficient at abating pollution. Coase 
CHAPTER 2 
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In essence, with the zero-transaction costs benchmark by Coase, for 
everything carrying a non-zero value the efficient allocation will be 
observable. Individuals will all measure, restrict, and bargain about any 
value flowing to and from their individual property. Coase’s Nature of the 
Firm (Coase, 1937) implies that, through such bargaining, infinite hybrids 
of efficient collaborative relationships will dynamically evolve – which may 
be substantially different than the more rigid and typical entities as ‘firms’ 
and ‘markets’. Moreover, these efficient allocations concern not only the 
attributes of property, but also the multiple rights attached to it (e.g., 
Merrill and Smith, 2011). Property consists of 'bundles of rights' which 
generally define what you can and cannot do with it. In general, they 
consist of: the right to transfer some or all of the rights to others 
(transferability), the right to use the assets (usus), the right to its returns 
(usus fructus), the right to change their form and substance (usus abusus), 
the right to exclude others (excludability), and the right to sell or lease 
some or all of these rights to others (alienation) (e.g., Müller and Tietzel, 
2005).11 
Moving toward a situation of positive transaction costs, impacts on 
property are less measurable, and restrictions on property cannot be 
perfectly determined or enforced. To prevent adverse externalities and 
encourage beneficial ones, governments should 1) establish the default set 
of property rights restrictions, and 2) given these property rights 
restrictions, secure the contractual restrictions which parties agree upon 
(e.g., MacKenzie and Ohndorf, 2013). In such setting, and given the 
imperfect measurability of the value flowing to and from the property’s 
attributes, the proposition as advanced in Barzel (1997) is that those 
contracting parties which are best able “to affect the mean outcome [of the 
                                                        
showed that this polluter-pays asymmetry excludes cases where ‘pollutees’ may be 
more efficient at limiting the damage. Coase emphasized that property effects are 
mutual, and that they are borne through the allocation of rights. By applying 
economics to law, he contributed toward the foundation of Law and Economics. 
11 For example, only under certain circumstances are operators in EU gas and 
electricity sectors allowed to exclude access to their transmission and distribution 
grids, restricting their ‘right to exclude’. And since the EU ETS is not ‘linked’ to 
the U.S. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) scheme, for instance, the 
‘right to use’ of the assets is restricted. 
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value flows] will tend to assume the associated variability [i.e. the known 
and unknown risks]” (Barzel, 1997).12 
For example, in an energy supplier-customer relationship, the best 
measurable unit of energy is its transmitted quantity. It is not (yet) 
completely measurable which customer consumed the energy from which 
source, because electrons or gas molecules cannot be directed in a network 
with multiple connections (e.g., Kirchoff’s law).13 If energy firms have exact 
estimates of energy consumption at the district level but not at the 
household level, households are incentivized to consume more and thereby 
externalize these costs to the energy firm and/or the other district’s 
households. One way in limiting such energy variability is the restriction 
that customers regularly need to convey their energy usage.14 Also the 
timing of energy consumption can be variable and involve costs. Uniform 
household demand generally peaks during mornings and evenings, for 
example, when people are not at work. During non-uniform hours, peak 
demand (e.g., the afternoon) can be costly if expensive backup-capacity 
needs to deliver this energy. If the timing of consumption is not exactly 
measurable, contracts (and dual energy meters) can therefore charge peak 
and base-load tariffs to discourage the externalities arising from such non-
uniform demand.15 
Moreover, since the quantity of energy is a per time-unit product of 
the number of charged elements times their charge, energy generators are 
expected to benefit by varying these two elements (i.e., while meeting 
demand). The scope thereof is limited because systems need to be in 
balance: 1) across time where, at least for now, especially electricity is 
difficult to store, and 2) across space, where transmission and distribution 
                                                        
12 A caveat is that it depends on how risk averse the parties are. For example, 
parties are less risk averse with softer budget constraints (e.g., state-owned) and 
when input and output risks of their generating business offset one another 
(Meade and O’Connor, 2012).  
13 The timing of energy consumption will be measurable with ‘smart meters’. The 
EU’s aims that, “where roll-outs of smart meters is assessed positively, at least 
80% of consumers shall be equipped with intelligent metering systems by 2020” 
(EC, 2009b). 
14 Energy firms’ inspectors will then occasionally come by to validate this 
information. 
15 These sources of variability can be categorized under the technological element 
of energy. In essence, “each party prefers a contract that follows their own load 
profile [i.e., the supply-side, including outages and fuel risks] and demand swings” 
(Meade and O’Connor, 2012). 
CHAPTER 2 
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bandwidths are narrow because overheated lines or over-pressured pipes 
increase asset depreciation and raise safety concerns. This generally 
explains why consumer appliances or installations are restricted with 
standard energy quality settings. Large energy consumers such as 
aluminum manufacturers, however, may value energy quality differently. 
For meeting their continuity of supply, considered a quality by itself, they 
may install their own specialized energy transformers or facilities and, 
thereby, opt for different contractual restrictions.16,17 
These examples show that valuations and restrictions mutually 
affect property rights. First, “the more valued transactions are, the more 
attributes are expected to be priced” (Barzel, 1997). Second, “the more 
valued transactions are, […] the more comprehensive the restrictions [and 
the units of exchange] are expected to be” (ibid.).  
1. Case I: Property valuation 
The first study, Jong et al. (2014), provides an evaluation of carbon 
property attributes and restrictions. Its aim is to test whether theoretical 
expectations on the effects of property rights changes are actually to be 
found in share prices, because prices and property are intrinsically related: 
“When [private property] rights are well defined and enforced, 
property is exchanged at prices reflecting its highest-valued use. 
Through these market prices people communicate clear, accurate, 
and constantly updated information to each other on the values 
they place on the resources they own and those owned by others” 
(Lee, 2004). 
 
We conducted our empirical analysis with respect to regulatory impacts on 
the value of the shares of energy and other carbon-intensive firms. The 
value of shares reflect the discounted future profitability of exchange-listed 
firms as expected by shareholders. Indeed, “property rights have an 
inherently forward-looking dimension [as to] how actors value their 
expected opportunity set of property rights” (Foss, 2010). 
                                                        
16 Industry consumers can get discounts on their energy supply costs, for example, 
through backup-capacity for purposes of ‘peak-shaving’, ‘valley-filling’, or 
interruptible energy delivery (i.e., less than full continuity). 
17 Conversely, households and small enterprises are legally safeguarded against 
non-continuous supplies via Public Service Obligations (e.g., EC, 2009b). 
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This study’s focus is on the April 2006 news that EU ETS industries 
had received too many environmental property rights, referred to as 
emission allowances. This ‘over-allocation’ effect is not only directly 
discounted in the price of CO2 and other commodities, but also had an 
effect on the companies’ market values. The study finds that firms with 
relatively high carbon-intensities and lower allowance holdings were 
‘punished’ with lower share prices. EU ETS property rights are therefore 
valued as a restriction on pollution. 
2. Case II: Property use and trade 
One of the main property theory propositions on property use and 
trade originates from Coase’s ‘Nature of the firm’ (Coase, 1937). Firms exist 
to lower transaction costs among their production factors, including 
workers and capital. The activity of these production factors is coordinated 
through (employment) contracts and management fiat, and the resulting 
output value is shared through, for example, profits, wages, bonuses, and 
company shares.  
Yet, as mentioned above, valuations and restrictions mutually 
impact property. Productive capital or workers are more likely to be 
employed outside firm boundaries to prevent that their larger-than-
average productivity gains are captured by the less productive 
counterparts. However, such (new) contractual setting raises transaction 
costs, since specific contractual agreements need to be made for the risks 
which were previously internalized in the firm. This trade-off is referred to 
as the ‘make-or-buy decision’, because transactions take place within firm 
boundaries (i.e., ‘make’) when transaction costs are lower vis-à-vis the 
market (i.e., ‘buy’). 
The second empirical study, Jong and Zeitlberger (2017) parallels 
this firm-market interaction. Examined is whether firms behave self-
sufficiently by first allocating production, emissions, and, hence, 
allowances within firm boundaries before opting for the carbon market. 
Contrary to our expectations, we find that self-sufficient firms conducted 
less allowance trade across their subsidiaries than on the carbon market. 
Pollution abatement capacity outside firm boundaries may therefore be 
less expensive and/or more cost-effectively coordinated through the 
market. The allowance trades of self-sufficient firms also point to carbon 
risk hedging, which allows them to reap further cost savings. Altogether, 
CHAPTER 2 
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self-sufficient firms may therefore depend more on the EU ETS market 
than less self-sufficient firms. 
3. Case III: Property restrictions 
Finally, as postulated above, firms take restrictions of their property 
rights into account when contracting for the known and unknown risks 
(e.g., of their outputs). From the institutional economics literature the 
‘alignment hypothesis’ comes forth, which states that the more 
transactions are frequent, uncertain, and involve sunk costs, the more 
these should be shifted away from market-based mechanisms toward 
those that involve vertical integration, long-term contracts, and/or public 
ownership (e.g., Williamson, 1979; Mulder, 2011).18 In other words, 
ownership structures will change from private via common to public 
ownership. 
The ‘hold-up’ problem is a key example on the necessity of such 
ownership changes (e.g., Klein et al., 1978). Parties can contract ex-ante 
that investments by one party will be reimbursed through cost-markups, 
for example, for fixed assets or labor specialization. Yet, ex-post, these 
investment returns or sunk costs can be creamed off by reneging on the 
contract.19 Because if ownership in asset-specific investments is private 
and the counterparty’s (unilateral) objective is to maximize profits, 
contracts may not prohibit the counterparty from behaving 
opportunistically in trying to capture the investment value.20  
To overcome such issue, property can be shared and/or made less 
exclusive (i.e., by changing the ownership structure). Since objectives are 
then multilaterally determined, property usage will be optimized across 
                                                        
18 Künneke (2008), Couwenberg and Woerdman (2006), and Woerdman (2004) 
elaborate on this framework for the electricity, gas, and carbon markets, 
respectively. 
19 Through backward induction, it is not (game-theoretically) optimal to commit 
to such investments. 
20 The literature is extensive how commitments can be made credible to sustain 
investment incentives. For example, Miceli (2014) suggests to let 1) a property rule 
govern the transaction, 2) contracts avoid “the holdup-problem under ordinary 
circumstances” (Miceli, 2014), and 3) a liability rule to govern breaches of contract 
in case a contracting party reneges. In containing the hold-up problem, 
contracting parties can decide on commitment devices, such as ‘bonding’ (Davis, 
2015) and ‘hostages’ (Williamson, 1983). There is an additional risk when 
contracting with government-affiliated entities, namely that governments can 
capture rents through property rights changes (e.g., Spiller, 2013). 
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the involved parties so that property investments and returns can be 
shared. This explains why pipelines and transmission lines are often 
realized through shared property settings such as joint-ventures (e.g., 
Garcia et al, 2014; Boffa and Panzar, 2012; Energy Charter Secretariat, 
2014). The safeguarding of public interests is also a case where objectives 
are multilaterally determined, hence, where property is made less 
exclusive. For example, EU regulations require the energy sector to 
account for the public interests of energy security, competitiveness, and 
climate change (Haney and Pollitt, 2013).21 However, accommodating 
qualitative and/or more public aspects will come at the cost of industry 
performance such as profits (e.g., Schmitz, 2000).22 And, property rights 
which are less private bring in additional coordination costs since parties 
will become incentivized to capture the property value.23 
In relation to this, the third empirical study, conducted by Jong and 
Woerdman (2016), focuses on an increasingly important element of EU 
Member States’ energy regulations or property rights restrictions, namely 
the legal competences of National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs). These 
include the extent to which NRAs have the power to intervene in 
contractual freedoms such as price setting, sales and investment decisions. 
Specifically, the study examines whether legal competence differences in 
European gas and electricity sectors are significant, whether they are 
aligned to the corresponding countries’ divergent levels of 1) security, 2) 
competitiveness, and 3) carbon-neutrality of energy supply. Although 
more secure, competitive, and carbon-neutral energy supply levels should 
reduce the need for regulatory intervention and thus legal competences, it 
appears that this does not hold for most policy objectives. This result is not 
                                                        
21 The EU ETS can be considered a privatization (i.e., into tradable rights) from a 
resource which had been publicly-owned before (Cole, 1999). These exclusive 
rights aim at preventing the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ (e.g., Hardin, 1968), where 
the incentive is to deplete the fully-accessible resource before others prevent them 
from doing so through their ‘rivalrous’ consumption (i.e., my consumption 
decreases yours). 
22 Profits maximization is usually considered the prime objective if property rights 
were purely private. 
23 This trade-off is mentioned in Cole (2012). In fact, the first and third element 
correspond to ‘non-exclusivity’ and ‘non-rivalry’, respectively, from which four 
(classical) goods classifications can be set up: rival goods are labeled as 1) private 
(exclusive) and 2) common (non-exclusive), while non-rival goods are labeled as 
3) club (exclusive) and 4) public (non-exclusive). 
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intuitive, because NRAs should be less ‘equipped’ with legal competences 
when energy supply criteria are (sufficiently) met. Furthermore, the 
intrusiveness of legal competences varies substantially among NRAs. 
Intrusive competences may be effective, but they are also costly to exercise. 
Rescaling the legal competences according to this trade-off may therefore 
result in a more cost-effective enforcement of property rights. 
4. Property rights theory limitations 
This subsection discusses several limitations on the property rights 
methodology. A first limitation relates to the targeting of efficiency rather 
than equity by the property rights framework. Despite that redistributions 
of property will not affect the efficient allocation (e.g., Stigler, 1966), there 
will be distributional and, hence, equity effects among those demanding 
the same resources.24 For example, the Coase framework is more 
consequentialist than deontological (Roberts, 2014). Some transactions 
may then be deemed contrary to moral or societal norms, for example, 
when efficiency requires firms to violate human rights in order to improve 
productivity. Such distribution issues can be mitigated by changing the 
above mentioned ‘bundle of rights’, for example, by curbing the 
transferability or alienation of property rights (cf. footnote 7). 
Second, when transaction costs are high and/or valuations on 
property attributes are low, there are always some attributes which will not 
be perfectly included, leaving some externalities unaccounted for. Parties 
may actually be incentivized to create and thereby redeem valuable 
externalities by increasing transaction costs. For example, this enables 
them to deplete funds or resources they should ordinarily be excluded 
                                                        
24 Among the attempts with positive transaction costs to “replicate the outcomes 
of [zero transaction costs] hypothetical Coasean bargaining” (Parisi, 2008) is the 
‘single owner test’ by Epstein (1993). The idea is that the legal arrangement should 
[…] “mimic the solution that would be chosen by the single owner of interfering 
resources” (ibid.). Yet, relying on such checks exposes the regulator to asymmetric 
information issues (i.e., the regulated may not truthfully reveal their property 
valuations) and/or to rent-seeking behavior. The resulting sub-optimal regulation 
may end up impacting transaction costs differently among property owners, again 
raising distributional concerns. For example, Lawson-Remer (2012) shows that 
countries may secure resource rights differently among indigenous inhabitants 
and foreign and elite investors. It typically results in adverse income consequences 
for the indigenous inhabitants. 
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from.25 In addition, externalities that have been contracted for may not 
yield welfare-optimal allocations. For example, sub-optimal institutional 
designs might become locked-in as a result of path dependence (North, 
1990). Lock-ins appear when sub-optimal rights or contracts prevail in the 
presence of a superior alternative. Increasing returns, learning effects, 
sunk costs, and switching costs, for instance posed by legal inertia, may all 
cause such lock-ins.26 An example is the exclusive entry of GasTerra, the 
trade branch of former Dutch company Gasunie, to the Groningen gas field 
in the Netherlands, which was given to Gasunie in the form of a legal 
concession in the 1960s and to some extent still limits competition today. 
Third, welfare sub-optimal allocations may also persist if property 
restrictions unintendedly introduce new (perhaps more costly) 
externalities. For example, since the gas and electricity’s network 
structures are subsets of one larger energy network, restrictions could have 
upstream as well as downstream consequences (i.e., from the gas sector 
towards the electricity sector, et vice versa) (Meade and O’Connor, 2012). 
This may be the case if price regulations on grid segments differ between 
the gas and electricity sectors, as is the case for the Netherlands.27 On the 
face of it, this is understandable as the two products are different. 
However, such differences may affect the gas-electricity chain, thereby 
contributing to the sub-optimal organization of firms with respect to 
ownership, fuel mix, security of supply, and sustainability. 
                                                        
25 For example, when drawing up contracts, lawyers may structure a financial 
product to be a (near) substitute of the income or risk transfer which would 
normally have involved (higher) regulatory costs (Fleischer, 2010). Through the 
transaction costs they increase (e.g., through vague and/or lengthy contracts), 
value can thus be captured between the explicit restrictions and the ‘spirit’ of the 
law.  
While the typical objective for regulators is to limit transaction costs, 
another option at their disposal is to lower property valuations. For example, Allen 
(2002) names dehorning of rhino’s as an example of mitigating hunting 
incentives. 
26 According to Hovenkamp (2011), with sunk costs the efficient allocation does 
not only depend on zero transaction costs. Even if transaction costs are zero and 
bargaining is costless, resources locked in investments cannot easily be 
redeployed to the allocation where these resources were more efficiently used.  
27 Examples are differences in the application and determinants of the 
benchmarks; that the level of tariffs can be location-dependent for the gas 
transmission system operator (TSO) but not for the electricity TSO; and that gas 
faces entry-exit tariffs for cross-border transport but not electricity, where 
congestion and thus scarcity determines costs. 
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Yet, any theoretical framework will be limited given the 
multidimensional aspect of property rights. Empirical analyses can 
facilitate less-than-multidimensional patterns (i.e., the error term 
captures the remaining dimensions), but data sources typically do not 
contain the realized transactions and contractual clauses because these are 
predominantly limited to the private sphere. This makes our second study, 
Jong and Zeitlberger (2017), relevant through a micro-economic analysis 
on the actual EU allowance transactions. Moreover, if empirical analyses 
focus on property rights restrictions, it may not necessarily imply that 
owners make complete use of their unrestricted rights (e.g., Voigt, 2013). 
For example, this holds for our third study, by Jong and Woerdman 
(2016). The legal competences of NRAs are analyzed here, rather than 
which competences have actually been applied. 
Analyses on property rights can therefore only partially contribute to 
our understanding of inefficiencies in the regulatory system. This explains 
why case studies are applied in this Ph.D. research, and are empirical 
rather than theoretical.28 Before discussing these cases, the next section 
elaborates on the data source of the first two case studies, the European 
Union Transaction Log (EUTL), namely what data problems will need to 
be tackled when applying this data source, and how researchers and 
policymakers can mitigate these issues.  
                                                        
28 Case studies are also in line to what Coase advocated (Frischmann and 









Emissions Trading Registries and Data 
Problems29 
1. Introduction 
Registries are crucial for emissions trading. Any emissions trading 
scheme needs an emissions registry to record the allowance transactions 
and to check compliance of the regulated entities. But emissions trading 
registries are not problem-free. This chapter discusses the registry of the 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). We focus on data problems that 
arise when monitoring transactions and checking compliance in this 
particular scheme. Particular attention is paid to the difficulty of linking 
data from this registry to other relevant data, such as firm ownership 
information. Some recommendations for improvement of the EU registry 
are also provided. 
With the foundation of the EU ETS, all Member States had to set up 
their national emissions registries.30 Regulated firms need to hold an 
account at these registries and to make sure that at the end of the annual 
compliance cycle (April 30th) their accounts contain the necessary number 
of allowances which are at least equal to the past calendar year’s verified 
emissions – so that authorities can bring these allowances out of 
                                                        
29 This section does not only draw on my first-hand experience with the EUTL. I 
am also indebted to my colleague-dataset researchers: Jurate Jaraitė, Andrius 
Kažukauskas, Aleksandar Zaklan, and Alexander Zeitlberger, and to stakeholders 
involved in the dataset project (in alphabetical order): Nicolas Berghmans, 
Raphael Calel, Denny Ellerman, Claudio Marcantonini, Vincent Martino, Damien 
Morris, Andrei Mungiu, Olivier Sartor, Raphael Trotignon, Ronald Velghe, and 
Stefano Verde. I am also grateful for the useful comments I received from 
presenting this research at the Dutch Energy Law Association membership 
meeting (26 October, 2015) and the FSR Climate 2015 Annual Conference (22-23 
October, 2015). 
30 Not all Member States started on time with a registry. Among the countries 
which were part of the EU before the launch of the EU ETS, the first to have an 
operating registry was Denmark (Ellerman et al., 2007); the last was Poland in 
July, 2006 (Convery and Redmond, 2007). 
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circulation.31,32 These allowance surrenders are subsequently subject to 
and constrained by the Kyoto Protocol, the international climate treaty to 
which the EU has committed itself. 
The registry accounts are made available online at the EU 
Transaction Log (EUTL).33 Information on these accounts can be 
downloaded in batches and, hence, empirically analysed. Next to the 
names and account codes (i.e., ‘identifiers’), the EUTL provides the 
installations’ annual number of allowances received (i.e., ‘allocations’), 
their annual emissions (both ‘surrendered’ and ‘verified’, the latter of 
which is checked by independent verifiers), as well as the conducted 
intraday allowance transactions (the amounts settled, the timestamp, and 
the involved purchasing and selling parties’ account identifiers). A ‘simple’ 
compilation from this data shows the intraday transactions at Member 
State level, and annual compliance figures at installation, industry sector, 
and Member State level.34 
Whereas statistics at these levels may be insightful, a crucial yet 
unavailable level is that of the firm. Firms own and use these EUTL 
accounts and, as such, influence how the EU ETS is run. These accounts 
                                                        
31 Emissions not accounted for through allowances are financially penalized: € 40 
Euro per tonne in Phase I (2005-2007), € 100 Euro per tonne in Phase II (2008-
2012). As of 2013, the penalty increases annually with the Euro-wide rate of 
inflation. Next to paying the fine, the insufficient allowances still need to be 
surrendered the year after. 
32 From Convery and Redmond (2007): “The Emissions Trading Directive 
requires that installations participating in the trading scheme report their actual 
CO2 emissions for the calendar year to their respective national authorities by 
March 31st of the following year. All emissions reports must be approved by an 
independent verifier. Installations are then given until April 30th to ensure that 
they have a sufficient quantity of allowances in their national registry accounts to 
cover their verified CO2 emissions for the previous calendar year, which indicates 
their compliance with the EU ETS. The annual compliance cycle of the EU ETS 
closes with the publication of emissions data and surrendered allowance 
information on May 15th, together with the cancellation of surrendered 
allowances, which must occur by June 30th.” 
33 The EUTL website is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/. The 
EUTL was previously named the ‘Community Independent Transaction Log’ 
(CITL). And as of 2012, some of the national registries’ duties have been 
centralized at EU-level: the ‘Union Registry’. National registries still have an 
important role, for example, for issuing emission permits, for supervising, and 
informing and advising on emissions trading. 
34 Compliance data is made available annually. Transactions data used to be online 
after 5 years, while nowadays it is 3 years (Regulation 389/2013). 
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can be, for example, owned by family-owned businesses, conglomerates, 
or government-affiliated agencies. Rather than the account level, it is likely 
that transaction decisions are made at the parent company level, or by 
entities holding controlling stakes. The data indeed shows many 
transactions taking place within rather than between co-owned entities 
(Jaraitė and Kažukauskas, 2014; Jong and Zeitlberger, 2017). 
At its start, the EUTL did not provide details on account ownership. 
Prof. Denny Ellerman, at the time affiliated with the European University 
Institute (EUI), found and brought together researchers which immersed 
themselves in this challenge. Through their team efforts, they could cross-
check EUTL account-to-firm linkages and realize a publicly available 
database: the ‘Ownership Links and Enhanced EUTL Dataset’ (Jaraitė et 
al., 2013b).35 Those coordinated efforts were supported by the European 
Commission (DG Climate Action), and this dataset was provided by the 
EUI.36 The societal aim of this end-result is to avoid further duplication of 
efforts by other researchers, and to enhance EU ETS ex-post research. 
So far, documentation on how the EUTL works is limited.37 A place 
to start is the EU Emissions Trading System section on the DG Climate 
Action website. Although it lacks a discussion on EUTL technicalities, this 
gap is partially filled through the European Environment Agency’s EU ETS 
data viewer and manual. Further literature provides details, for example, 
Delbosc and Trotignon (2008) and Martino and Trotignon (2014), as well 
as our technical report (Jaraitė et al., 2013a) and YouTube video on the 
EUI’s Ownership Links and Enhanced EUTL Dataset’ website.38 
Additional information is available from emissions authorities and their 
websites, for example, the Netherlands Emissions Authority (NEa) section 
called ‘CO2 registry’. 
Moreover, there are few specific evaluations on allowance registries. 
Lile et al. (1996) evaluates the EPA’s SO2 emission allowance tracking 
                                                        
35 This database has already been taken up in several analyses: Jaraitė and 
Kažukauskas (2014), Betz and Schmidt (2015), Coria and Jaraitė (2015), Jong and 
Zeitlberger (2017), Naegele (2015), and the Enipedia database (available at: 
enipedia.tudelft.nl). 
36 The EUI dataset is not further maintained. Yet, with this accounts-to-firms list, 
identifying new accounts or account name changes is much easier. 
37 For example, EUTL website links to the Frequently Asked Questions and Help 
section are broken. 




system. McGuinness and Trotignon (2007) assess the EUTL, and their aim 
is aligned with this chapter’s. They focus on three deficiencies, namely 
that: 1) power sector installations cannot be precisely separated from the 
EUTL industry category ‘Combustion of fuels’ category – a point which we 
confirmed in Verde et al. (2016), 2) EUTL allocations do not reflect New 
Entrant Reserve allowances or other allocation adjustments, and 3) the 
EUTL-specific industry categorization can attribute installations to 
industries different than those of their parent companies. 
The setup of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 explains the online 
EUTL information and how it is exactly categorized. Section 3 discusses 
issues in determining EUTL account ownership by firms. Section 4 
presents topics on interpreting EUTL transactions: Section 4.1 explains 
how they are recorded how they need to be regarded with derivative 
transactions; Section 4.2 illustrates that, due to the closure of EUTL 
accounts, different statistics can be obtained on the same time period; and 
finally, Section 4.3 demonstrates that applying daily transactions or 
annual installations data will matter when analysing compliance. Section 
5 provides suggestions for improvements on the current EUTL structure. 





























Table 1: Categorization of EUTL information 
 EUTL compliance EUTL transactions 
 Allocations to 
Stationary (1) and 
Accounts (1),  
Operator Holding Accounts (2), 
Transactions 
 Aircraft (2) 
Operators 
Compliance (3)   
1   Year2,3 transactionDate 
2 NationalAdministrator NationalAdministrator(Code2) acquiringRegistry(Code) 
 NationalAdministrator NationalAdministrator(Code2) transferringRegistry(Code) 
 NationalAdministrator NationalAdministrator(Code2) originatingRegistry 
3 ETSPhase CommitmentPeriod1 applicable(original)PeriodCode 
4 InstallationName1 InstallationNameOrAircraftOperatorCode2,3 
 InstallationID1 (Related1)InstallationAircraftOperatorID2,3  
 AircraftOperatorCode2 InstallationNameOrAircraftOperatorCode2,3 
 OperatorID2 (Related1)InstallationAircraftOperatorID2,3   
 PermitOrPlanID1 PermitOrPlanID2,3 (Date2)  
 MonitoringPlanID2 PermitOrPlanID2,3 (Date2)   
5 AccountHolderName AccountHolderName2,3 acquiring(transferring)Holder 
6 AccountStatus AccountStatus  
  AccountOpeningDate1,2  
7 
 MainActivityTypeCode
2 (Lookup2)  
8   AccountType1,2(Code2)(Lookup2) acquiring(transferring)AccountTypeCode(Lookup) 




























10   transactionID 
   blockSize 
     (supp)unitTypeCode 
     (supp)transactionTypeCode(Lookup) 
11    ComplianceCode2,3  
 Allocation Allowance(In2)Allocation2,3  
   Free(Reserve2)Allocations2  
   (TotalOf3)AllowancesSurrendered2,3  
   UnitsSurrendered2  
   CumulativeSurrenderedUnits2  
   (Total3)VerifiedEmissions2  
   CumulativeVerifiedEmissions2  
12   Name1,2  
   Main(Secondary)AddressLine1, Address2  
 AddressCity City1,2  
   ZipCode1,2  
   CountryCode1,2(Lookup2)  
   RelationshipType1,2(Lookup2)  
   CompanyRegistrationNo1,2  
   EPRTRIdentification2  
   Parent(Subsidiary2)Company2  




2. How EUTL information is categorized 
The reason for creating Table 1 is to show how the EUTL website and 
its data elements can be categorized. The upper row shows the two main 
EUTL ‘data pillars’: 1) compliance, namely on the greenhouse gas emitting 
installations, and 2) transactions from and to all accounts, including those 
not linked to installations.39 The second row of Table 1 ‘folds out’ these 
pillars into the main underlying EUTL website sections, for example, 
‘Allocations to Stationary Operators’. 
Specifically, this table shows which of these EUTL sections share the 
exact same information contents. In a couple of categories all three 
sections do so. For example, row number 2 shows that in all EUTL sections 
and, hence, with all downloaded data the national registry’s Member State 
is provided. In most cases, however, there is an empty cell which implies 
that this information is not provided. For example, in row number 11 the 
compliance-related EUTL sections contain information on allocations. 
Given the empty cell in ‘Transactions’, allocation information is not 
provided when downloading transactions data. 
The shaded rows in Table 1 show which sections overlap between the 
compliance and transactions pillars. However, the shaded rows 1-3 and 8 
are not specific enough to bring about unique links between the two pillars 
(more details are provided in this section below). Most specific is 
‘AccountHolderName’ from row 5. Given its pivotal status, much of 
Section 3 discusses issues with this identifier in determining EUTL 
account by firms. 
To further elaborate on Table 1, the variables are superscripted with 
(1), (2), or (3). These numbers coincide with the EUTL sections (i.e., those 
mentioned in the column’s second row). And, if the variable contains some 
text in brackets, it implies that both the variable with and without this 
bracketed text can be found. For example, with 
NationalAdministrator(Code) the EUTL section provides both 
NationalAdministrator (e.g., the Netherlands) and the 
                                                        
39 This overview is applicable to the EUTL as in mid-June, 2015. Left out from 
EUTL section ‘Allocations to Stationary (1) and Aircraft (2) Operators’: 
‘International Credit Entitlements’, ‘LatestUpdate’ (i.e., when the record is 
updated) and ‘Status’ (i.e., if the permit is active or revoked). Left out from EUTL 
section ‘Operator Holding Accounts’: ‘CallSign’ (i.e., the Aircraft Registration 
code).  
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relatedNationalAdministratorCode (e.g., NL). To provide some row-
specific information: 
- Information contained in row 1 relates to time: through Year (i.e., 
annual) and transactionDate (i.e., daily); 
- Row 2 refers to the Member State of the installation. For example, 
OriginatingRegistry indicates where the allowances have originated. Also 
countries outside the EU ETS can be mentioned here (e.g., for the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM)); 
- Row 3 refers to the EU ETS Phase. It is possible that the applicable 
period differs from the original one (e.g., banked Phase II allowances can 
be used in Phase III and later); 
- Row 4 refers to the installation or aircraft identifiers. These 
identifiers are Member State-specific; 
- Row 5 provides what names the owners assigned to their accounts. 
These are called ‘AccountHolders’, and will be further discussed below; 
- AccountStatus in row 6 classifies whether accounts are open or 
closed; 
- With row 7, ‘MainActivityTypeCode’ refers to the installation’s 
EUTL industry category (e.g., ‘Combustion of fuels’, ‘Refining of mineral 
oil’). As mentioned above, McGuinness and Trotignon (2007) shows that 
this EUTL industry categorization does not allow unique identification of 
the power sector installations (i.e., from the ‘Combustion of fuels’ EUTL 
industry category); 
- AccountType in row 8 refers to the EUTL account type – of which 
there are several. For every installation there should be an ‘Operator 
Holding Account’ (OHA: registries assign these with number 120). OHAs 
are the ‘main’ accounts which operators use for compliance purposes. As 
provided on the Netherlands Emissions Authority (NEa) website ‘Account 
types’ section:40 
"Every Dutch company that has to participate in the EU ETS must 
have an OHA in the CO2 registry. This is the account into which 
NEa will transfer the allocated emission allowances and from 
which the company must surrender sufficient allowances. 
Furthermore, the OHA can be used for doing transactions with 
emission allowances from and to other accounts.” 
 
                                                        
40 Available on: http://www.emissionsauthority.nl/english/eu-registry/accounts 
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OHAs can be used for allowance trading, as mentioned in the above quote, 
but the EU ETS also introduced private non-installation accounts or 
‘Person Holding Accounts’ (PHAs: registry code 121):41 
“A Person Holding Account (PHA) can be opened by organisations 
that want to trade emission allowances, [and by] operators and 
aircraft operators which are obligated to participate in the EU 
ETS. A PHA can only be used to trade or to voluntary cancel 
allowances. A company cannot use this account to surrender 
allowances."42 
 
Not only EU ETS regulated firms made use of these accounts (e.g., to trade 
with these accounts). The PHA-group also consists of entities which 
acquired permits to trade allowances (e.g., brokers and banks). Finally, the 
remaining accounts are government-affiliated, the main category of which 
is called ‘Holding Accounts’ (registry code: 100). Through government-
affiliated accounts, allowances are issued, allocated (e.g., free allocations, 
auctions and/or installations openings or closures through the New 
Entrants Reserve), cancelled and/or retired (for the emissions) (main 
registry codes: 230 and 300). 
- Per EU Member State there are many OHAs and PHAs. For unique 
identification within national registries, an extra AccountIdentifier is 
therefore introduced, as shown in Table 1 row 9; 
- Row 10 contains transaction-specific information. It includes the 
unique (country-specific) transaction identifier (i.e., transactionID), the 
exchanged number of allowances (blockSize), and the transaction's type 
                                                        
41 I do not further discuss 1) Aircraft Operator Holding Accounts, which are similar 
to OHAs, but specifically for aircraft operators, 2) Trading accounts, which are 
similar to PHAs but facilitate quicker transfers of allowances, and 3) Kyoto 
accounts, which are similar to PHAs but configured specifically for Kyoto 
allowances, such as Assigned Amounts Units (AAU) which countries need to meet 
their Kyoto targets, Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) from the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) from the 
Joint Development (JI) mechanism). 
42 As mentioned above (footnote 33) as of 2012, accounts moved from national 
registries to the Union Registry. Since not all allowances could be automatically 
moved over to the Union Registry (essentially the CERs and ERUs), 
accountholders got a ‘duplication’ of their accounts. This explains the labels of 
‘Former’ Operator Holding Accounts and ‘Person Account in National Registry’. 
While these accounts may create some confusion, the intention is to prevent that 
allowances got lost when old accounts were cancelled. 
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(e.g., an allowance issuance, whether the transaction is within or between 
registries, an allowance cancellation); 
- Row 11 is related to compliance. ComplianceCode categorizes 
whether: the total of surrendered allowances is more (code: A) or less 
(code: B) than the verified emissions, whether reports on verified 
emissions were not entered until April 30th (code: C), whether verified 
emissions were corrected by the competent authority after April 30th and 
decided to be (code: E) or not to be (code: D) in compliance, and whether 
accountholders could not enter their verified emissions and/or surrender 
allowances until April 30th (code: X). Moreover, note that there are two 
ways to check the compliance of firms. The first is via Table 1 row 11, 
namely via the verified emissions and the allocated and surrendered 
allowances. The other is to select the transactions transferred between the 
OHAs and the national registries' accounts. If such allowances are received 
by OHAs (national registries) they can be characterized as allowance 
allocations (surrenders) (more in Section 4.2 and 4.3 below); 
- Row 12 includes CompanyRegistrationNo, the national company 
register code.43 This information is important for linking the transactions 
and compliance-related EUTL pillars, as will be explained next. 
3. Issues in determining EUTL account ownership by 
firms 
As mentioned above, the pivotal identifier in linking compliance with 
transactions is the ‘AccountHolderName’ from row 5. When looking into 
the EUTL data, a quick glance over the accountholder names will reveal 
that several are affiliated to the same company, for example, as with ‘RWE 
Power Aktiengesellschaft’ and ‘RWE Energiedienstleistungen GmbH’.44 
But in many cases the accountholder names do not point toward an 
affiliation, apparently since EU ETS users are given leeway in naming their 
EUTL accounts and their installations. Next to the company names, 
accountholder names may also include those of cities, simple digits, 
abbreviations, or even simply ‘CHP plant’. Clearly, this complicates 
assigning firm ownership to the EUTL accounts. For example, the 
                                                        
43 In row 12, E-PRTR stands for the ‘European Pollutant Release and Transfer 
Register’ which, for each industrial facility, provides information on air, water, 
and land pollutants. As with Parent(Subsidiary)Company, this information is not 
fully one-on-one available through the EUTL.  
44 And, apparently many transactions are conducted among them. 
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accountholder ‘Lazzerini’ is affiliated to many Operator Holding Accounts 
(OHAs) named ‘Dalkia France’.45 ‘Lazzerini’ is one of many EUTL accounts 
where the name refers to the (likely) employee’s surname controlling it. 
Google searches often reveal such people’s names and their (emissions 
trading) professions (e.g., on LinkedIn profiles). However, there are 
several OHAs which had ‘untraceable’ accountholder names. Some were 
later renamed to their operators’. For example, OHAs of the former 
accountholder name ‘Harish Mistry’ were later renamed to ‘District Energy 
Limited’ and ‘EDF Energy (West Burton Power) Limited’.  
By tracing firm ownership, issues relating to accountholder and 
operator name differences can be overcome. For example, with 50-50% 
joint ventures, 50% of the installation’s or account’s activity can be 
allocated to either party (e.g., the Dutch ‘Nederlandse Aardolie 
Maatschappij’ joint venture of ExxonMobil with Shell). Drawing 
boundaries along firm ownership may then be a better solution than 
considering it to be a separate entity.  
Firm ownership information can also facilitate linking multiple 
(different) accountholder names with multiple OHAs. Firm-level analyses 
will also be possible on the affiliated installations (e.g., on allocations and 
emissions), at higher levels of controlling shareholders, and on 
transactions since also PHAs can be easily included in the firm ownership 
structures. In Jaraitė et al. (2013a) we show that many firms control 
multiple PHAs.  
However, adding ownership to the equation introduces several 
difficulties. First is the identification of ownership in itself. On the one 
hand, the operator names can be obtained by looking up the 
AccountHolderName from the Accounts section (i.e., Table 1 column 2) 
and CompanyRegistrationNo, the national company register code. 
Although the latter category was not available when the EUI team and I 
were identifying the EUTL accounts operators, these national company 
registration codes are not available for all accounts: the majority of codes 
are not provided (e.g., due to administrative law reasons) or cannot be 
found in the Bureau van Dijk (BvD) company database ‘Amadeus’ or 
                                                        
45 These OHAs can be found when looking up this accountholder in the EUTL 
transactions search option ‘AcquiringAccountHolder’ or ‘transferringHolder’(cf. 
Table 1).  
CHAPTER 3 
Emissions Trading Registries and Data Problems 
29 
 
‘Orbis’.46 Moreover, firm ownership details are provided at the European 
Commission DG Climate website (e.g., the MS Excel files in the 
Documentation section).47,48 Yet, these details are only provided for a few 
EU Member States, and on EU ETS installations (i.e., OHAs) but not for 
the Person Holding Accounts (PHAs). PHAs are frequently used for 
conducting transactions, for example, by energy firms and the financial 
industry. 
Hence, and especially given the above mentioned time-inconsistent 
and/or incomplete ownership details and ambiguous accountholder 
names, automation of ownership identification is effectively hindered.49 
Inserting a text in the Orbis search function provides multiple results 
which resemble the requested phrase; company names may be registered 
in Orbis through different accentuations, abbreviations, or parts of the 
company names are missing or wrongly spelled.50 It was more the 
exception than the rule that EUTL company names exactly matched those 
from Orbis. Hence, a sizeable share of accounts needed to be manually 
looked up to codify these with their unique Orbis-identifiers (i.e., BvD 
                                                        
46 A plain lookup of these national IDs through the Orbis national ID lookup 
function results in only 227 Global Ultimate Owners (i.e., these are the parent 
companies: more in Section 3) over all EU ETS accounts as available in mid-June, 
2015. In contrast, with the EUI team we found around 3,646 Global Ultimate 
Owners. 
47 These online available Excel sheets relate to the National Allocation Plans 
(NAPs). For EU ETS Phase I (2005-2007) and II (2008-2012), EU Member States 
had to provide these plans for approval to the European Commission. These plans 
contained the allocation methodology including the installations selection 
criteria, the subsequent list of regulated installations, and the allocations they 
were supposed to receive during the concerned EU ETS Phase. As of Phase III, 
there are no NAPs anymore since allocations are determined at the EU level (and 
through EU-wide benchmarks). 
48 Instead of these Excel files, installation-level data may better be downloaded 
from the online registry (from ‘Operator Holding Accounts’ > ‘Details All – All 
periods’ > ‘Export’). This data is directly obtained from the online registry so it is 
more recent and, through identifiers, better linked with the remaining registry 
data. 
49 Helpful, although soon withheld for privacy purposes, was that the EUTL used 
to provide the e-mail addresses of the persons responsible for the accounts. Most 
had the company name in their e-mail address, for example, @rwe.com. 
50 Online search engines were also consulted. For example, (as a non-Germany 




codes).51 Especially for the non-automated work, the cross-checking of the 
researchers’ account-to-firm linkages contributed toward identifying the 
links and completing the unidentified ones.52,53 
A second reason why including ownership introduces difficulties is 
that ownership depends on how it is exactly defined. Ownership does not 
necessarily imply control, since these two aspects can be separated.54 The 
EUI dataset applies ownership as provided in Orbis.55 Orbis accounts for 
both direct and indirect ownership (e.g., via 50%+1 shareholding-
cascades) but does not distinguish control from ownership. In our 
application of the ownership data, operators’ control is therefore implicit 
in ownership. For example, we assume that the French Engie (formerly 
GDF SUEZ) not only owns but also controls Electrabel (Belgian) and 
International Power Limited (UK). 
                                                        
51 A possible quicker route would have been to request from BvD all firm names 
and identifiers, and to use a lookup function (e.g., in MS Excel). Yet, this approach 
is unfeasible with Orbis 60 million registered ‘firms’ in the EU28 and its limit of 
100,000 per download, as well as Excel’s row limit of about 1 million. Moreover, 
Excel’s lookup function is not useful as it requires perfect matches, and other 
approaches I found online were not user-friendly or useful either. 
52 The resulting ‘Ownership Links and Enhanced EUTL Dataset’ includes all 
available OHAs until spring 2013, excluding the aircraft OHAs: we identified 
13,217 out of 13,512 OHAs. The dataset further includes all PHAs which conducted 
at least one transaction between 2005 and December, 2007: we identified 679 out 
of 725 PHAs. Among the unidentified accounts, several were not registered in 
Orbis (i.e., company-related information was lacking). For example, this applies 
for universities, hospitals, district heating, or private individuals. And the 
reasoning behind the Phase I emphasis (i.e., on PHAs) is that, when working on 
the EUI data project, EUTL transactions data were publicly available 5 years after 
the closing of calendar years (currently after 3 years). The identifying, cross-
checking, and finalizing of the dataset were the further time-consuming elements. 
53 It further appears some installations’ accounts prevail in the transactions data 
but not in the NAPs, or the other way around. One reason is that NAPs registered 
installations and their allocations ex-ante, while the EUTL website subsection 
‘Allocation / Compliance’ provides ex-post data. For example, installations may 
be shut down or may have received opt-outs from the EU ETS (e.g., the Dutch 
greenhouse sector). And especially at the start of the EU ETS, discussions were 
looming on the regulatory definition of an ‘installation’, thereby determining 
whether installations opted into the EU ETS or not. 
54 The Economist Special report on ‘Family companies’ (April 18th, 2015), for 
instance, shows that statistics on family-owned businesses can differ given 
ownership and control assumptions. 
55 More ownership details are provided in the Bureau van Dijk’s (BvD) Orbis help 
section. 
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Third, accountholder names may change.56 This is what happened 
with the above mentioned case of the ‘Harish Mistry’ accountholder which 
controlled several OHAs. Later on, new separate accountholder names 
were introduced for these OHAs which matched their operator names. The 
trickiness with such accountholder name changes is that these also have 
retroactive impacts on the data, while the EUTL does not exactly specify 
what changes are introduced when EUTL updates take place. For instance, 
Orbis specifies that not all OHAs affiliated to the ‘Lazzerini’ accountholder 
name were owned by the same ‘predominant’ owner (i.e., Dalkia France).57 
With such cases, I decided to let the accountholder labels overrule the 
operator ownership indications. For example, I let ‘Lazzerini’ be ‘owned’ 
by Dalkia France including the OHAs which, according to Orbis, are not 
affiliated to Dalkia France.58 And, it cannot be deduced whether 
accountholders which control multiple accounts, use one account to 
conduct transactions for another account. Such linkages may get broken if 
a ‘strict’ ownership pattern is followed. 
A fourth issue in determining account ownership is that ownership 
itself may change over time. This affects the identification of EUTL 
account-to-operator links in two aspects. The first aspect is that the EUTL-
provided operator names may change retroactively. For example, Gaz de 
France (GDF) and SUEZ merged in 2008. Yet, the majority of OHAs 
indicate GDF SUEZ rather than either GDF or SUEZ.59 As a result, it 
becomes impossible to find out whether allowance transactions before 
2008 are actually conducted by GDF or by SUEZ. So by updating account 
names which are linked to historical transactions, the EUTL thwarts the 
correct indication of ownership. 
                                                        
56 Less prone to EUTL changes is ‘AccountIdentifier’, the unique identifier for each 
nationally registered EUTL account (cf. Table 1). These codes may thus facilitate 
identifying accountholder name changes. 
57 Other tricky cases are where accounts are owned by one conglomerate while 
only one or a few are owned by foundations – although these foundation-owned 
accounts share the conglomerate’s name. 
58 The reason is that it is unlikely that ‘independently’ owned operators (e.g., 
Dalkia and non-Dalkia) pool from the same accountholder (e.g., ‘Lazzerini’). CEC 
(2008) argues that, at least over EU ETS Phase I, allowance pooling has hardly 
been used by operators. “This may relate to the need of having a legal entity to 
take responsibility for all pooled emissions” (CEC, 2008). 
59 Four of its OHAs have only GDF in its name. 
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A second aspect on ownership changes affecting EUTL account-to-
operator links is that, if empirical analyses also include the parent 
companies and/or the firm networks of operators, information on such 
past ownership is also required. Since EUTL data is historical by definition 
(i.e., it can only be acquired ex-post), past parent companies need to be 
looked up, for example, due to possible mergers and acquisitions. The 
Orbis parent company type we selected for the ‘Ownership Links and 
Enhanced EUTL Dataset’ (Jaraitė et al., 2013b) is called the ‘Global 
Ultimate Owner’ (GUO). These controlling units are the operators owning 
the ‘ultimate’ 50%+1 of shares.60 However, Orbis only provides the GUO 
which currently owns an operator, not the past ones. Besides providing the 
account-to-firm linkages and the ‘current’ GUOs, the joint dataset’s other 
innovation lies in how we constructed such ‘past’ GUOs.61,62 Our Technical 
Note provides more details on how we looked up the historical owners of 
these operators (Jaraitė et al., 2013a).63 
In general, the GUO or ultimate owner can be found by finding the 
50%+1 owner of the 50%+1 owner, until no further 50%+1 owner can be 
found. Orbis does provide the past shareholders which control ‘the first’ 
50%+1 shares but not the ‘ultimate’ 50%+1 shares. We therefore created 
past GUOs from past shareholders ourselves.64,65 Moreover, by mapping 
shareholder hierarchies ourselves, a good circumstance is that we could 
check when we reached shareholder levels of individuals, families, or of 
public organizations such as governments.66 The database information of 
                                                        
60 In Orbis’ records there is, by definition, always just one GUO controlling 50%+1 
of the controlling owner, via both direct and indirect ownership. If no GUO is 
mentioned, the firm in question is the GUO – implying that it owns 50%+1 of its 
shares. 
61 The ‘current’ ones refer to the firms’ GUOs acquired from the Orbis database in 
spring 2013 (i.e., when the dataset was constructed). 
62 This approach may be promising for future research to allow for dynamic rather 
than static ownership analyses. 
63 Another limitation is that Orbis only provides past shareholder information at 
a monthly basis. With the EUI team, we traced the GUOs based on the month 
being in the middle of EU ETS Phase I (2005-2007), namely December, 2006. 
64 We encountered shareholder hierarchy-layers which reached in the tens before 
ending up at the ultimate owner. Moreover, for 6,197 and 5,384 OHA accounts, 
current and past GUOs were found, respectively. For 4,907 OHAs we found both 
current and historical GUOs, whereas for 3,111 OHAs no GUO-change took place. 
65 We fine-tuned this algorithm by first creating the current GUOs from the 
current shareholders. 
66 We called this penultimate layer the top-1 ownership level. 
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these entities is generally limited. For example, the GUO of Volkswagen 
AG is the Porsche/Piech family for which clearly no company information 
is available. Another benefit, of using the shareholder level just below the 
GUO, is that this may prevent that characteristics of state-owned entities 
will be conflated with other owned assets subject to the EU ETS. For 
example, assets of EDF, Dong Energy, or Vattenfall are then mixed with 
the remaining ownership of the French, Danish, and Swedish 
governments, respectively. In such occasions, the penultimate owner as 
the controlling unit will better represent the entities’ compliance and 
transactions. 
4. Interpreting EUTL transactions 
When downloading and/or analysing the transactions, it becomes 
clear they consist of multiple blocks. For example, transaction number 
AT3683 shows there are two allowance blocks: 21,278 and 3,722.67 The 
sum or the total transacted amount, however, is exactly 25,000. Indeed, 
allowances can be split up into any tradable amounts, clearly a feature 
making them tradable. This aspect is made clear with the following text 
from a report prepared for the City of London Corporation:68 
"Each tonne of CO2 equivalent in a unit is represented by a unique 
serial number, giving information about the country of issue, the 
type of unit, year of issue, project information (if a CER/ERU) and 
a number representing which actual tonne of CO2e it represents. 
So, for example, if CERs are created representing a saving of 
100,000 tonnes of CO2e, are issued, the 100,000 tonnes are 
represented by a single entry in the register of a block having a 
start block value of 1 and an end block value of 100,000. If 50,000 
units are then transferred, the block is broken into two new blocks, 
one having a start block value of 1 and an end block value of 
50,000, the second having a start block value of 50,001 and an 
end block value of 100,000. These blocks can further be broken 
down by subsequent transfers, but blocks can never be increased 
in size by subsequent amalgamations. Over time, the blocks get 
                                                        
67 This transaction can be found via the EUTL ‘Transaction ID’ search option, and 
then ‘Details All’. 
68 CO2e stands for CO2-equivalent. Given equal volumes, methane, 
perfluorocarbons or nitrous oxide have larger impacts on the greenhouse effect 
than CO2 (i.e., the benchmark). 
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smaller and smaller. In order to make a large transfer, several 
transactions may need to occur to meet the value of the transfer". 
(Bourse Consult, 2010, p. 35) 
 
Since 2012, the EUTL does not show the start and end-block values 
anymore (primarily due to privacy concerns) but the difference between 
these values, which thereby constitutes the number of allowances 
exchanged. Yet, the pattern of ever smaller exchanged allowance blocks is 
clearly observable when more recent EU ETS transactions are considered. 
This also implies that, when downloading the transactions, the files 
become ever larger and smaller time periods need to be selected given the 
EUTL download limit on the number of observations.69 
 Quite a few transactions show that accountholders acquire from or 
transfer allowances to accounts with exactly the same name. Among 
government-held accounts (i.e., all accounts not coded 120 or 121) such 
transactions are often categorized as allowance issuances, whereupon 
national administrators allocate allowances to EU ETS installations. And 
among private accounts, such transactions may take place to move 
allowances from one national registry to another, for example, if exchanges 
require allowances to be nationally registered before they can be 
transferred. From a total perspective, however, there is thus no real 
exchange. This is why we left out such identical-counterparty transactions 
from our analyses (e.g., Jong et al., 2014; Jong and Zeitlberger, 2017). 
4.1 No derivatives but spot trades70 
Transactions from the EUTL are the settlements as recorded in the 
EU ETS allowance registries. A limitation is that the EUTL only provides 
the names of the purchasing and selling parties, the amounts settled, and 
the time-stamp of the settlement, but not the underlying price and the 
nature of the contract. This makes it almost impossible to distinguish spot 
transactions from Over-the-Counter (OTC) or exchange-based derivatives 
                                                        
69 For example, XML-files containing all EUTL transactions from 2005 to the most 
recent available data (i.e., until April 30th, 2012) require 4.2 GB of hard disk space. 
70 This subsection cites Jong and Zeitlberger (2017: footnote 22), but which 
excludes Figure 2. 
CHAPTER 3 
Emissions Trading Registries and Data Problems 
35 
 
which initiated, intermediated, and finalized the EUTL settlements.71,72 
From a research point of view this is regrettable. Figure 2 shows that 
during Phase I (2005-2007) allowance derivatives, the middle line, made 
up the largest share of trades in the EU ETS.  
 
Figure 2: Monthly volumes (in millions) per contract modality: options, 
spot, and futures 
 
Source: Kossoy and Ambrosi (2010) 
 
Forwards and futures allow firms to flexibly upgrade or downgrade 
the exposure they consider optimal. For example, exposure can be lowered 
by adjusting it with the corresponding derivative positions (e.g., going long 
while maintaining an overall short position) whereby exchanges of 
allowance ownership can be cancelled. EUTL transactions are allowance 
ownership exchanges, which must have been beneficial to both transacting 
parties. With Chapter 5, or Jong and Zeitlberger (2017), we therefore 
consider EUTL transactions to be spot trades – although they may well 
                                                        
71 An indication on the delivery of futures can be obtained by identifying the trade 
activity of EUTL exchange clearing accounts (Martino and Trotignon, 2013), but 
since most Phase I trade took place OTC, this identification would capture a small 
share of futures trades). 
72 NASDAQ OMX (which took over Nord Pool) and EEX derivative deliveries are 
1) at the last exchange days of November, and in mid-December, and 2) at the last 
Mondays of March, June, September and December. 
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originate from derivatives.73 However, without the initiated and 
intermediated transactions, the ‘unobserved’ observations (i.e., the latent 
demand) cannot be estimated. The observed transactions are thus where 
the net benefits are positive for both purchasers and sellers to exchange 
ownership.74 As inferences on the firms’ decision to trade are difficult to 
make, Jong and Zeitlberger (2017) is limited in using the volume and sign 
of the observed transactions only. 
4.2 Closure of EUTL accounts 
In the EUTL ‘Accounts’ section it is shown whether accounts are 
closed or not. It is understandable that accounts get closed (and opened) 
given the EU ETS scope across EU Member States and, hence, the many 
involved firms and their accounts.75 Yet, due to (retroactive) EUTL updates 
not all historically closed accounts are provided, and so not all past 
transactions are shown. Before showing what impacts this can have on the 
data, this subsection explains how the EUTL transactions are selected. 
Transactions from two different download-vintages are compared. 
The first is downloaded on September 24th, 2013, and are labelled as ‘Old 
transactions’.76 The second is downloaded on May 27th, 2015, and are 
labelled as ‘New transactions’. The transactions are considered on the 
same time period, namely the start of the EU ETS or January 1st, 2005, 
until April 30th, 2008. Specifically, it is checked whether transactions with 
the same TransactionIDs appear in the other dataset (i.e., these are unique 
transaction-specific identifiers, cf. Table 1). 
 
                                                        
73 Parties take on derivatives to cover for their expectations on future prices, but it 
is then still unknown with respect to which day in the past a company had this 
price expectation (relative to the then prevailing spot price). 
74 Hence, if the net benefits were negative for either of the two, the contract would 
have been cancelled. 
75 Also non-EU countries joined the EU ETS: Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.  
76 These transactions are applied in Jong and Zeitlberger (2017). 
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Table 2: Categorization of national registry transactions 
# (code)transactionType (code)suppTransactionType Category 
1 (1) Issuance - Initial creation of a unit (0) no supp Intra-registry 
2 
(3) External - External transfer of unit 
between registries (0) no supp [accountType] 
3 
(3) External - External transfer of unit 
between registries 
(21) External transfer 
(2005-2007) [accountType] 
4 





(10) Internal - Internal transfer of 
unit/supplementary program transaction (0) no supp [accountType] 
6 
(10) Internal - Internal transfer of 
unit/supplementary program transaction 
(1) Allowance cancellation 
(2005-2007) [accountType] 
7 
(10) Internal - Internal transfer of 
unit/supplementary program transaction (2) Allowance surrender Surrenders 
8 
(10) Internal - Internal transfer of 
unit/supplementary program transaction 
(52) Allowance issue 
(2008-2012) onwards Intra-registry 
9 
(10) Internal - Internal transfer of 
unit/supplementary program transaction (53) Allowance allocation Allocations 
10 
(10) Internal - Internal transfer of 
unit/supplementary program transaction 
(55) Correction to 
allowances Intra-registry 
11 
(10) Internal - Internal transfer of 
unit/supplementary program transaction (93) Correction [accountType] 
 
In order to compare the two download-vintages, it is useful to 
understand the two ‘main’ ways that transactions are categorized. First is 
via the main and supplementary (i.e., ‘supp’) transactionTypes (for 
transactionTypes see Section 2). The second and third columns of Table 2 
provide these along with their EUTL codes (i.e., between brackets) and 
which prevail on the selected time period. Based on these 
transactionTypes, some but not all transactions can be categorized. For 
example, the 10-0 category in Table 2 row 5 is rather ambiguous (i.e., 
‘Internal - Internal transfer of unit/supplementary program transaction’ 
and ‘no supp’). A second way to categorize transactions, and which 
explains why [AccountType] is mentioned in Table 2 column 3, is by 
utilizing the direction of allowances between acquiring to transferring 
accountTypes (e.g., the 100 and 120 codes). For instance, allowances 
transferred from 100-accountTypes to 120-accountTypes are most likely 
allowance allocations (or related). 
Hence, in order to compare the two download-vintages, the 
transactions are categorized and labelled as follows. Next to applying the 
transactionTypes, ‘Intra-registry’ are transactions between government-
owned accounts (i.e., mainly registry codes: 100, 230, 300), ‘Allocations’ 
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are transactions from governments to private accounts (i.e., registry codes: 
120, 121), ‘Surrenders’ are transactions from private to government 
accounts, and ‘Transactions’ are transactions among private accounts.  
 
Table 3: Comparing transactions data across two different vintages but 
over the same time period  
 2005 -- April, 2008   Intra-registry  Allocations Surrenders Transactions 
(1) Old transactions  9,138.22 6,067.34 6,524.24 3,653.88 
(2) 
Deleted 
transactions - 3,059.98 6.15 957.09 52.71 
(3) Added transactions + 5,337.44 269.13 289.48 29.09 
(4) 
Amounts 
differences + -344.20 -26.06 -62.13 -324.29 
(5) New transactions = 11,071.47 6,304.26 5,794.49 3,305.97 
 
Table 3 shows the categorization across the two vintages of 
transactions.77 Row (2) shows the deleted totals, namely those appearing 
in the old but not new transactions. Row (3) show the added totals, hence, 
which appear in the new but not old transactions. And row (4) captures the 
difference in totals over the same selection of transactions. Table 3 
suggests that transactions can differ substantially across different 
download-vintages. Proportionally, ‘Intra-registry’ transactions show 
largest changes (i.e., row 1 vs. row 5, or +21%), then ‘Surrenders’ (-11%), 
‘Transactions’ (-10%), and ‘Allocations’ (+4%).78 
This example emphasizes the importance to be transparent when 
data has been downloaded (i.e., its ‘vintage’). A cautionary note is that 
replications of analyses will be possible when possessing the exact same 
data, for example, if the acquired data has the same EUTL update 
timestamp, or if it is made available by the researcher. Moreover, advisable 
                                                        
77 Only excluded are transactions when 1) the accountType (e.g., OHAs and PHAs) 
is missing from both the acquiring and transferring parties, and 2) the transaction 
purpose cannot be deduced from transactionType. 
78 We double-checked this analysis with newly downloaded data (downloaded at 
October 30th, 2015), and found the new transactions still diverge from the old 
transactions: ‘Intra-registry’ +37%, 'Allocations' +4%, 'Surrenders' -5%, and 
'Transactions' -9%. Part of the problem can be that the website does not 
completely transfer the data from the EUTL archive to the files to be downloaded. 
When we randomly checked separate transactions, the EUTL did show these 
transactions.  
CHAPTER 3 
Emissions Trading Registries and Data Problems 
39 
 
for EU ETS analyses on compliance is therefore to use or (at least) double-
check with the annual compliance or installation level data (i.e., hence, 
Table 1 row 11 rather than row 10). The next section provides further 
discussion on the transactions versus annual allocations and emissions 
data. 
4.3 Using transactions or compliance data? 
When comparing transactions with compliance data, we need to 
account for the fact that 1) firms receive their allocations no later than end-
February, and 2) that at end-April, allowances need to be surrendered in 
accordance with the verified emissions from the previous calendar year. 
And since the annual EUTL statistics on Phase I (2005-2007) were 
approved in 2009, also the transactions until end-April, 2009, need to be 
considered for possible allowance corrections. 
In the selection of transactions, we first exclude those among private 
parties, and to or from non-EU ETS countries. Generally, the latter type of 
allowances originates from CDM projects, but CDM credits are not 
necessarily used for compliance purposes. This selection leaves us with 




Table 4: Selection of transactionType from the national registry 
transactions 
# (code)TransactionType (code)suppTransactionType In/exclude? 
1 (1) Issuance - Initial creation of a unit (0) no supp fully excl. 
2 
(1) Issuance - Initial creation of a unit 
(52) Allowance issue 
(2008-2012 onwards) fully excl. 
3 (10) Internal - Internal transfer of 
unit/supplementary program transaction 
(51) Allowance issue (2005-
2007) fully excl. 
4 (10) Internal - Internal transfer of 
unit/supplementary program transaction (0) no supp 
excl. missing 
AccountType 
5 (10) Internal - Internal transfer of 
unit/supplementary program transaction 




6 (3) External - External transfer of unit 
between registries (0) no sup 
excl. after 
Apr. 30, ‘08 
7 (3) External - External transfer of unit 
between registries 
(21) External transfer 
(2005-2007) 
excl. after 
Apr. 30, ‘08 
8 (10) Internal - Internal transfer of 
unit/supplementary program transaction (0) no supp 
excl. after 
Apr. 30, ‘08 
9 (10) Internal - Internal transfer of 
unit/supplementary program transaction (53) Allowance allocation 
excl. after 
Apr. 30, ‘08 
10 
(4) Cancellation - Internal transfer of unit (0) no supp 
excl. after 
Apr. 30, ‘08 
11 
(4) Cancellation - Internal transfer of unit 
(3) Retirement (2005-
2007) fully incl. 
12 (10) Internal - Internal transfer of 
unit/supplementary program transaction 
(1) Allowance cancellation 
(2005-2007) fully incl. 
13 (10) Internal - Internal transfer of 
unit/supplementary program transaction (2) Allowance surrender fully incl. 
14 (10) Internal - Internal transfer of 
unit/supplementary program transaction 
(55) Correction to 
allowances fully incl. 
15 (10) Internal - Internal transfer of 
unit/supplementary program transaction 
(92) Reversal of allowance 
surrender fully incl. 
16 (10) Internal - Internal transfer of 
unit/supplementary program transaction (93) Correction fully incl. 
 
As with Table 2, Table 4 shows which transactions are further in or 
excluded, based on the main and supplementary (i.e., ‘supp’) 
transactionTypes and the accountTypes of the acquiring and transferring 
parties. Allowance issuances or rows 1-3 are excluded, since they do not 
affect compliance per se. Also excluded are transactions when 1) the 
accountType (e.g., OHAs and PHAs) is missing from both the acquiring 
and transferring party, and 2) the transaction purpose cannot be deduced 
from transactionType (cf. footnote 77). These cases are specified in rows 4 
and 5. With row 4, for example, ‘supp’ in suppTransactionType does not 
tell whether the transaction concerns an allocation or surrender. 
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Moreover, when looking into the transactions with row 5 (i.e., ‘(41) 
Cancellation and replacement’) will reveal that all have missing 
accountTypes as well (i.e., OHAs and PHAs). Allowance cancellations and 
replacements are likely to be among national registry accounts only, and 
are therefore ‘safe’ to exclude (i.e., they also do not affect compliance per 
se).79 
Further excluded are the transactionTypes from rows 5-8 for 
allowances after April 30th, 2008. It cannot be deduced from the 
transactionTypes whether these allowances are conducted for Phase I 
(2005-2007) or Phase II (2008-2012). After April 30th, 2008, allocations 
are excluded since they are likely for Phase II (i.e., ‘(53) Allowance 
allocation’ or row 8). Transactions with ‘(4) Cancellation - Internal transfer 
of unit’ or row 9 are also excluded; the data specifies these are all voluntary 
cancellations, and are deposited at national registry accounts with 2008-
2012 labels. Finally, transactions with ‘(2) Allowance surrender’ (i.e., row 
12) and with ‘(92) Reversal of allowance surrender’ (i.e., row 14) are still 
included after April 30th, 2008. These are likely to be conducted for Phase 
I. 
As with Table 2, the transaction purpose could be further deduced 
from the accountTypes of the acquiring and transferring parties. When 
national registries receive (hand out) allowances, Table 4 considers these 
as allowance allocations (surrenders).80 This applies to ‘(92) Reversal of 
allowance surrender’, which are labelled as allocations, and to ‘(1) 
Allowance cancellation (2005-2007)’ and ‘(55) Correction to allowances’, 
which are labelled as allowance surrenders. Finally, ‘(3) Retirement (2005-
2007)’ and ‘(55) Correction to allowances’ are only intra-registry. These 
are considered to have no impacts on allocations and surrenders. 
 
                                                        
79 All transactions with AccountTypes and ‘3) Retirement (2005-2007)’ or row 10 
are among national registries. For transactions where AccountType is missing we 
therefore assume these are also among national registries. 
80 If possible, this is also applied for transactionTypes which are not specific 
enough (e.g., ‘no-supp’). 
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Table 5: EU ETS Phase I (2005-2007) allocated allowances per EU 
Member State. Numbers are in million tonnes of CO2-equivalents, and 
based on data obtained in June, 2015, and compliance data obtained in 
August, 2015 
 initial: ultimate: initial: ultimate: initial: ultimate: 
Country 2005 2005 2006 2006 2007 2007 
AT 8.04 32.41 41.74 65.06 103.37 97.79 
BE 45.86 58.31 118.30 118.26 179.73 178.69 
CY 0.00 n.a. 11.08 n.a. 16.98 n.a. 
CZ 88.79 96.92 194.07 193.84 291.51 290.76 
DE 0.23 493.48 506.99 988.97 1038.13 1486.27 
DK 0.09 37.30 31.23 65.21 85.58 93.11 
EE 16.74 16.75 35.13 34.95 66.28 56.29 
ES 124.70 172.16 337.16 338.37 675.34 498.11 
FI 0.10 44.67 45.77 89.28 127.80 133.90 
FR 77.70 150.41 232.28 300.38 387.92 450.15 
GR 0.00 71.16 142.27 142.32 213.43 213.49 
HU 0.00 30.24 62.13 60.47 94.52 90.71 
IE 19.15 19.24 43.91 38.47 66.97 57.71 
IT 0.00 216.15 409.59 421.20 669.17 624.46 
LT 13.50 13.50 24.91 24.08 36.79 34.39 
LU 0.00 3.23 6.47 6.46 9.71 9.69 
LV 4.07 4.07 8.70 8.13 13.36 12.16 
MT 0.00 n.a. 0.00 n.a. 6.54 n.a. 
NL 0.11 86.45 87.06 172.84 177.88 259.32 
PL 0.00 237.56 341.35 475.12 714.84 712.66 
PT 18.29 36.91 73.80 73.82 113.82 110.73 
RO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 74.34 74.34 
SE 2.62 22.29 25.65 44.77 48.67 67.62 
SI 9.14 9.14 17.94 17.83 26.28 26.08 
SK 24.16 30.47 60.97 60.96 91.50 91.44 
UK 9.91 206.07 228.83 412.08 464.03 627.95 
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Table 6: EU ETS Phase I (2005-2007) surrendered allowances per EU 
Member State. Numbers are in million tonnes of CO2-equivalents, and 
based on data obtained in June, 2015, and compliance data obtained in 
August, 2015 
 initial: ultimate: initial: ultimate: initial: ultimate: 
Country 2005 2005 2006 2006 2007 2007 
AT 33.37 33.34 65.76 65.12 100.29 97.52 
BE 55.42 54.91 110.11 110.10 168.90 162.65 
CY 5.08 n.a. 10.34 n.a. 15.73 n.a. 
CZ 82.48 6.34 166.17 165.92 254.51 253.62 
DE 485.59 465.95 984.18 950.29 1568.66 1431.52 
DK 26.48 35.24 60.71 69.65 90.53 87.54 
EE 12.62 12.61 34.35 15.04 49.68 40.06 
ES 184.02 159.63 363.06 362.55 550.90 546.63 
FI 33.20 33.03 77.90 77.74 121.38 115.81 
FR 131.53 19.27 258.62 257.56 389.00 384.32 
GR 142.66 71.32 282.55 141.22 359.19 213.84 
HU 26.06 25.39 51.93 51.44 79.40 76.81 
IE 22.40 22.40 44.16 44.12 66.64 66.44 
IT 227.29 90.35 453.60 438.34 699.51 672.94 
LT 6.64 6.63 13.15 13.02 19.14 19.13 
LU 2.60 2.60 5.32 5.32 8.56 7.88 
LV 2.83 2.85 5.78 5.80 10.01 8.61 
MT 0.00 n.a. 3.96 n.a. 5.98 n.a. 
NL 80.35 80.14 157.28 155.50 236.98 236.60 
PL 137.61 204.42 414.22 412.33 620.65 617.91 
PT 36.43 34.09 69.49 69.59 100.98 100.79 
RO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 69.70 69.70 
SE 19.41 19.38 39.25 38.26 58.48 58.44 
SI 8.74 8.72 17.58 17.43 26.62 26.50 
SK 25.24 0.60 50.87 50.99 77.92 75.35 
UK 242.95 241.29 494.55 493.48 755.88 749.66 
 
Table 5 and 6 provide the EU Member State-specific annual tCO2 
amounts of allowances allocated and surrendered for Table 5 and 6, 
respectively. Per Phase I year, the columns provide the ‘initial’ and 
‘ultimate’ tCO2 amounts. The ‘initial’ numbers are based on the EUTL 
transactions. For Table 5, ‘initial’ represents the amounts transferred from 
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national registries to installation accounts (i.e., allocations), and the 
transfers are opposite for Table 6 (i.e., surrenders). ‘Ultimate’ tCO2 
amounts are instead taken from the annual statistics, or the EUTL 
compliance section.81 Furthermore, the amounts in Tables 5 and 6 are 
cumulative. This cumulative view allows for a more balanced view toward 
the end of Phase I (more below). Such cumulative view is also in line with 
EUTL statistics (e.g., see Table 1 row 11).82 
For the majority of cases, the transactions-based (i.e., ‘initial’) and 
compliance-based (i.e., ‘ultimate’) columns deviate from one another. 
Table 5 shows all Member States except Lithuania start with less ‘initial’-
allocated amounts than ‘Ultimate’ amounts in 2005. In all cases, 
differences between ‘initial’ and ‘ultimate’ decrease or (even) switch sign 
from one year to the next. About two-third (one-third) of the Member 
States ends up in 2007 with more (less) ‘initial’ than ‘ultimate’ allocations. 
For the surrendered amounts, Table 6 shows that almost all have more 
‘initial’-surrendered than ‘ultimate’ amounts in 2005. In 2007, all end up 
with more. Half of the Member States increase (decrease) the difference 
from 2005 to 2006, while about two-third (one-third) increase (decrease) 
the difference from 2006 to 2007. 
Some caution is needed before interpreting these results. As shown 
above with the selection of transactions (e.g., Tables 2 and 4), the EUTL 
does not always label for which administrative purpose transactions were 
conducted. Transactions to and from national registries may be ‘late’ 
allowance surrenders, ex-post emissions adjustments, or voluntary 
allowance surrenders. An issue is therefore how to allocate the intra-Phase 
transactions, hence, which transactions pertain to which Phase I calendar 
year (2005-2007) and/or if transactions may actually belong to Phase II 
(i.e., possibly 2008). Even if these transactions are properly allocated, it is 
the question whether all transactions are taken into account. Table 3 from 
Section 4.2 shows that the EUTL does not show (anymore) a substantial 
number of public transactions. When analysing EU ETS compliance, 
transactions data can thus give a distorted picture. 
                                                        
81 Moreover, these statistics are from a closed EU ETS Phase. These numbers are 
further ex-post checked and formally approved. For Phase I this approval is 
timestamped in 2009. 
82 Moreover, allowance surrenders for calendar year t take place in t+1, which is 
applied in Table 6. 
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Furthermore, ‘inconsistencies’ may be handled differently since the 
interpretation of requirements concerning verifiers can be different from 
one EU Member State to another.83 For example, some national authorities 
may penalize every tonne of insufficient emissions imbalances, while 
others may allow imbalances to be settled with the next annual compliance 
round. Such imbalances can occur if monitoring reports, upon which 
verifiers base their approval, may not have adequately covered the 
installations’ production processes. These above issues may be mitigated 
through the cumulative view in Table 5 and 6, although it cannot be 
determined how much so. For example, it is well possible that the 2007 
imbalances in Table 5 and 6 are actually incorporated in 2008. 
That the ‘initial’ and ‘ultimate’ statistics converge over 2005-2007 
may relate to the start of the EU ETS when not all national registries were 
operational – but steadily became so as time progressed.84 Yet, in 2007 
most Member States ended up with deviating numbers. With allocations 
in Table 5, the average is that ‘initial’ is -1.41% less than ‘ultimate’ 
(calculation not shown). With surrenders in Table 6, the average is that 
initial’ is +6.82% more than ‘ultimate’. The overall view is, hence, and 
compared to transactions (i.e., ‘initial’), that compliance-based (i.e., 
‘ultimate’) allocations are ex-post ‘upscaled’ and surrenders are ex-post 
‘downscaled’. Compliance-based data are checked and formally approved 
after EU ETS Phases are closed. This ex-post rescaling therefore appears 
twice favourable to firms (i.e., both higher allocations and lower 
surrenders). Also Table 3, which compared the data from two download 
vintages, shows this upscaling and downscaling of allowance allocations 
and surrenders, respectively. But with the information as provided by the 
EUTL it is impossible to pinpoint whether ex-post corrections were 
actually on the part of the firm (e.g., by being non-compliant) or the 
national registry (e.g., by a reinterpretation of monitoring reports) and, 
hence, led to ex-post benefits or losses for firms. This also implies that if 
transactions-compliance differences are found negligible in next EU ETS 
                                                        
83 As Article 16 par. 3 of EU Directive 2003/87 (EC, 2003) could conflict with 
Article 12 par. 3. We are grateful to the Dutch Emissions Authority (NEa) for 
pointing this out. Verschuuren and Fleurke (2014) evaluate EU ETS enforcement 
differences across Member States. 
84 Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, and Poland had their first 




Phases (i.e., expected, given that Phase I (2005-2007) is considered the 
pilot or start-up Phase) it may be too quick to conclude that compliance 
was really flawless. 
To err on the ‘safe’ side, most researchers opt for the formally 
approved data (e.g., Verde et al, 2016; Jong and Zeitlberger, 2017).85 The 
implicit trade-off is that, indeed, these ex-post readjustments are taken 
into account when analysing EU ETS impacts, for instance, on the 
installations. In fact, the transactions may in fact better reveal firm 
behaviour since these allowances were truly acquired or transferred. 
5. Recommendations for improving the EUTL 
This chapter concludes with suggestions for improvements on the 
current EUTL structure. Mainly, these improvements will be conducive to 
transparency, enable third-party monitoring, and in so doing, improve the 
integrity of the scheme. The recommendations are the following: 
1) Besides this text, some additional guideline(s), Frequently Asked 
Questions (FAQ), and/or website Help-functionality will be useful for 
EUTL users; 
2) Allowance transactions are made in increasingly smaller batches. This 
is less an issue with standard download queries, since these only provide 
the total amounts of allowances exchanged. It is an issue with detailed 
queries given the EUTL's download limit. Fewer transactions can then be 
downloaded since the files become ever larger. Research on EUTL data will 
be facilitated if, for example, the total exchanged amounts can be enabled 
with detailed queries. With other allowance aspects, standard and detailed 
EUTL queries also differ, for example, on allowances from Joint 
Implementation (JI) or Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects. 
Simple enable-disable information options in the search criteria will thus 
be useful for cross-validating purposes; 
                                                        
85 The literature’s preference for the ‘formal’ numbers is also expressed through 
the choice of verified emissions rather than the surrendered allowances. At Phase 
I totals, out of the 11,563 installations there are 22 where verified emissions were 
‘Not Calculated’ and 133 where either verified or surrendered emissions were 
missing. Excluding these cases (i.e., with 11,408 installations), 92.83% have equal 
verified-surrendered emissions, 6.38% with more surrendered allowances 
(average: 15,171 surplus), and 0.78% with less surrendered allowances (average: 
51,733 shortage). Within Phase I, 29% and 3% of installations have insufficient 
surrendered allowances in 2005 and 2006, respectively, while 3% and 4% of 
installations surrendered too many allowances in 2005 and 2006, respectively.  
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3) The EUTL has its own industry categorization. The European 
Commission regularly updates the list of industries subject to carbon 
leakage, but these industries rely on other industry categorizations: mainly 
the NACE Rev. 2 industry classifications, and the Prodcom-classification 
for a handful of specific products.86 EUTL data will be more in accordance 
with national and EU-wide statistics (e.g., Eurostat) if these industry 
classifications are adopted additionally or instead; 
4) A related aspect, as McGuinness and Trotignon (2007) and Verde et al. 
(2016) indicate, is that, while installations are categorized into EUTL 
industries (e.g., ‘Combustion of fuels’), its operator may actually be active 
in a different industry. The EUTL does not provide the operator’s industry; 
(i) However, identification of ownership is also effectively hindered, due to 
its time-inconsistent and/or incomplete ownership details and ambiguous 
accountholder names; 
(ii) Operator and accountholder names may change with EUTL updates. 
Such changes can also affect the names designated to be behind historical 
transactions. The EUTL should therefore record the previous names and 
the time periods these were active. With merged entities, for example, it 
will otherwise be impossible to trace which of the previously separate 
branch conducted transactions (e.g., GDF or SUEZ before their merger in 
2008); 
(iii) Moreover, the EUTL subsections on compliance and transactions 
should have more overlap in terms of variables and/or identifiers. One way 
in which linking will be improved is if AccountIdentifier, currently only 
provided in the transactions subsection, is also made available in the 
compliance-based subsections; 
(iv) And not all firms can be identified via CompanyRegistrationNo, 
primarily because most EU Member States supply a limited selection of 
company identifiers. The EUTL may hence provide an additional identifier 
to indicate which installations are company-affiliated across the EU; 
(v) Tracing ownership will be necessary in order to validate whether firms 
are actually subject to carbon leakage. The efficiency or distributional 
effects from the EU ETS can also be estimated, for example, if EU ETS 
markets can be manipulated (e.g. Hintermann, 2015); 
                                                        
86 The first four Prodcom-digits correspond with the NACE code, while the 
remaining four allow for the detailed product specification. 
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5) Currently, it cannot consistently be found out whether and how 
transactions with registries add up to the compliance-based allocations 
and surrenders. It cannot equivocally be pinpointed which allowances 
refer to which EU ETS Phase or to which calendar year within an EU ETS 
Phase. For example, for many transactions, transactionTypes are not 
specific enough (e.g., with the supplementary code: ‘no supp’) and details 
on the acquiring and transferring entities are not sufficient (e.g., lacking 
accountType codes). It is also uncertain whether deviations are on the part 
of the firm or of the registry. This can be mitigated if the EUTL provides 
details on the extent to which transactions with national registries had 
compliance-deviating or corrective impacts. With ComplianceCode (cf. 
Table 1), compliance statuses can be deduced but this is on an annual basis 
only – not per transaction. EUTL transactions do not have an analogous 
label yet; 
6) Besides these necessary details, this chapter has shown that the EUTL 
registry may not show transactions from accounts which have been closed 
by now. These transactions can be disclosed, for instance, via an extra 
identifier on the accounts closure dates.  
 
At the 2015 FSR Annual Climate Conference, we were told that the EUTL 
is limited in providing information and identifiers in the following two 
ways. First, EU Member States can decide how detailed and specific the 
information needs to be that they submit to the EUTL (e.g. whether 
AccountHolder names have to contain the official company names or not). 
The EUTL thus acts as an information intermediary. Second, the EU ETS 
registry regulation (Regulation 389/2013, Annex 13 and 14) outlines the 
identifiers (not) to be provided. For example, this explains why 
AccountIdentifier is mentioned in the transactions-based EUTL section 
but not the compliance-based one. 
The recommendations of this chapter are therefore primarily 
relevant for the European Commission and the EU Member States. They 
are in the position to change the regulations which determine what 
information the EUTL can provide. 
6. Conclusion 
Emissions trading registries are not problem-free. The registry of the 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the EU Transaction Log (EUTL), 
is a case in point.  
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We have demonstrated that the EUTL suffers from various data 
problems. One issue is that it cannot consistently be found out whether 
and how transactions with registries add up to the (annually provided) 
statistics on allowance allocations and surrenders. Another is that 
transactions downloads do not reveal historical transactions from 
accounts which have been closed by now. Moreover, this chapter focuses 
particularly on firm ownership. Firms are the actual owners and users of 
EUTL accounts and, therefore, influence how the EU ETS is run. But 
company information from the EUTL is both inconsistent and ambiguous. 
The issues have their roots in one main aspect: the EUTL lacks 
crucial variables or identifiers. For example, the previous names of the 
installation operators and of the accountholders, the (country-specific) 
identifier of the installations accounts, or the date when accounts have 
been closed. Moreover, for some identifiers, such transactionType and 
accountType, the value is either generic (“no supp”) or not available, 
making it equivocal by whom or for what purpose the transaction was 
conducted. 
Not only can extra information via such identifiers mitigate the 
above mentioned issues. It can also make the EUTL robust against its 
recurring updates, which have resulted in retroactive data changes. This 
chapter provides several suggestions for these identifiers. 
Although emission registries, such as the EUTL, suffer from design 
imperfections and data problems, their role remains undisputed in 
providing crucial information on the past performance of the 
corresponding emissions trading scheme. Experiences with registries, 
such as our study of the EUTL, as well as recommendations for 
improvements that follow from such experiences, may help to overcome 
similar problems in current and emerging emissions trading schemes 










Does EU emissions trading bite? An event 
study87 
1. Introduction 
To meet its greenhouse gas emission targets, the European Union 
(EU) has introduced in 2005 the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS).88 This scheme is based on ‘cap-and-trade’ regulation. The total 
amount of emissions is ‘capped’ and the EU emission allowances, which 
make up the subsets of that total amount, are tradable. In Phase I (2005-
2007) and Phase II (2008-2012) of the EU ETS, the total domestic supply 
of allowances was determined through National Allocation Plans (NAP). 
However, at the end of April, 2006, the first EU Member State annual 
reports were published. These reports showed that national demand for 
allowances in 2005 was much less than supply. The resulting carbon price 
drop was the main signal that market participants revised their 
expectations on the shortage of allowances.  
 But while supply was larger than demand, the carbon price did not 
immediately fall to zero. And while one can expect investors to put a lower 
valuation on cleaner rather than dirtier firms, the statistics (to be shown 
later) suggest that dirtier firms instead received a lower valuation. Yet, if 
the carbon price drop lowers firms’ valuations, it does not suggest that the 
EU ETS is costly. Since share prices reflect the firms' future profitability, 
the EU ETS ‘bite’ is in the market’s expectation of its future related costs. 
The aim of this chapter is to find out whether investors consider the EU 
                                                        
87 This is the author final version (i.e., the post-print) from the article which 
previously appeared in Jong et al. (2014). We are grateful for the useful comments 
we received from Denny Ellerman, Aleksandar Zaklan, Jurate Jaraitė, Zofia 
Lukszo, and from the participants at the IEA International Energy Workshop (19-
21 June, 2013), the EUI RSCAS Seminar Series (October 15th, 2012), the BAEE 
Research Workshop on Energy Economics (September 28th, 2012), and the 
University of Erfurt 25th Consecutive Workshop in Law and Economics (April 5th, 
2012). Any remaining errors are our own. 
88 We refer the reader to Böhringer (2014) for a recent, more general overview on 
EU ETS developments. 
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ETS as relevant for polluting firms, and how this is related to the firms’ 
allowance allocations and transactions.  
The central question of this chapter is therefore: Did EU ETS firms’ 
shareholders interpret the April 2006 carbon price drop as significant and, 
if so, how did the event’s impact differ among firms’ allocations and 
transactions? 
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, the literature will 
be reviewed on the EU ETS how the impact of the EU ETS differs through 
the related allocations and transactions. In Section 3, hypotheses are 
formulated on the share price responsiveness through which the carbon 
price drop impacted the EU ETS firms. The methodology will be discussed 
in Section 4. The empirical results and a discussion thereof will be 
presented in Sections 5. Section 6 concludes the chapter. 
2. Literature review 
With an abundant supply of allowances one may expect the 
regulation did not affect the firms’ management or share prices. For 
example, Anger and Oberndorfer (2008) showed for a sample of German 
firms that allocations did not impact revenues and employment. Kettner 
et al. (2008) concluded it was unlikely that abatement had taken place. 
However, ex-post research shows the EU ETS did have an impact on 
firms. Anderson and Di Maria (2011) showed there were both ‘under-
allocations’ as well as ‘over-allocations’ and that some firms did reduce 
emissions. Abrell et al. (2011) found that the profit margins of over-
allocated firms were positively affected, et vice versa. Furthermore, the 
market valuations of firms were responsive to the carbon price. For 
example, Oestreich and Tsiakas (2012) analyse the ‘carbon premium’, 
defined as the share price return difference of dirty versus clean firms. 
They find that this premium is higher for dirtier firms. However, when 
focusing on energy companies in the EU, Koch and Bassen (2013) find the 
opposite, namely that dirtier firms have higher costs of capital due to 
carbon related risks and thus a lower equity value. Moreover, through an 
event study on the April 2006 carbon price drop, Bushnell et al. (2013) 
shows that the market values of dirtier non-energy industries declined 
more, i.e., dirtier firms were more heavily penalized, as was found for the 
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energy industry in Koch and Bassen (2013).89 Among energy firms, 
however, the impact was the opposite, i.e., being cleaner will be penalized, 
as with Oestreich and Tsiakas (2012).  
This study contributes to the literature through the inclusion of the 
firms’ allowance purchases and sales from the EU ETS database: the 
European Union Transaction Log (EUTL). Only three studies have 
analysed these EU ETS transactions. Both Jaraitė and Kažukauskas (2012) 
and Zaklan (2013) examine determinants in purchasing and selling 
allowances. Yet, to our knowledge the impact of these transactions on 
share prices has not been analysed yet. 
Bushnell et al. (2013) also conduct an event study on the same 
allowance price fall in the EU ETS. However, this chapter is different from 
theirs. First, where Bushnell et al. (2013) make an industry comparison by 
focusing on power versus non-power industries, we use a more specific 
categorization of industries to test the effect of the allowance price fall on 
share prices. Second, contrary to Bushnell et al. (2013) we bring the buying 
and selling of allowances, which is the very essence of emissions trading, 
into the analysis, by incorporating such purchases and sales into a number 
of hypotheses. Third, as a result our conclusions partly reproduce but also 
partly differ from theirs, which enhances the validity of both studies and 
adds new insights to this carbon market event. 
The literature thus shows that the ex-post results are mixed on the 
impacts of over-allocation and of carbon-intensive production, and that 
there is a literature gap regarding the effects of allowance trade on share 
prices. This chapter fills these gaps by incorporating allowance trade with 
the allocation and the product market in determining the EU ETS impact 
on share prices. In the next section hypotheses are formulated on the 
interplay of these three factors. 
3. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
Several related effects on firms’ market values occur simultaneously 
with a change in the carbon price. The three main effects, discussed below, 
are: (1) carbon leakage and carbon-intensity effects, (2) exposure and 
borrowing effects, and (3) trade effects. 
                                                        




3.1 Carbon leakage and carbon-intensity effects 
Carbon-intensive production becomes less attractive in an emissions 
trading scheme. ‘Carbon leakage’ refers to the consequential relocation of 
companies, and thus emissions, to countries where restrictions on carbon 
emissions are weaker. Firms competing with firms from outside the system 
cannot or can partly pass on carbon-related costs in their product prices. 
This decreases their profit margins. Once the carbon price drops, the profit 
margins and thus share prices should increase of firms within the EU ETS. 
The first hypothesis H.1 is therefore: 
Market values of firms with carbon leakage increase.  
Increases are larger for dirtier firms, i.e., with a higher carbon-intensity 
of production, than for cleaner firms.    (H.1)  
 
Hence, if firms can pass-through less than 100% of their carbon-related 
costs, a drop in the carbon price increases the market value of such firms. 
However, if firms can pass on at least 100%, i.e., they do not suffer 
from carbon leakage, the carbon price drop decreases product revenues, 
profits and thus their market values.90 Indeed, Oberndorfer (2009) finds a 
positive share-price-to-carbon-price relationship for European power 
firms. The carbon cost margin, i.e., the carbon price times the emissions 
per unit of production, is higher for firms with a dirtier production. 
Product prices of dirtier firms will thus decrease more when the carbon 
price drops, lowering their profits and thus their share prices. Contrary to 
H.1, the impact for dirty versus clean firms is thus the opposite. As a result, 
the second hypothesis H.2 is that:  
Market values of firms without carbon leakage decrease.  
Decreases are larger for dirtier firms than for cleaner firms. (H.2) 
3.2 Exposure and borrowing effects 
Polluting firms in the EU ETS either receive their allowances for free 
or they have to buy them at auction. Auctioning or free allocation have 
similar economic costs (costs of buying allowances or the opportunity costs 
of using free allowances) but do effect accounting profits and the market 
values of firms differently. Firms receiving free allowances should thus 
have higher market values than comparable firms having to buy them at 
                                                        
90 This relationship holds with grandfathered allowances. With auctioning the 
effect on market values is neutral. Allowance costs are then not only an 
opportunity cost but an out-of-pocket expense as well. 
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auction. Typically, the former is long on allowances, while the latter is 
short. The carbon price drop should thus have lowered the cost burden for 
firms that were short on allowances on an annual basis. The hypothesis is 
that investors see the accumulation of these lowered cost burdens into 
increases in market values. The third hypothesis is thus as follows: 
Market values increase the more firms are short on allowances.   
Market values decrease the more firms are long on allowances. (H.3) 
 
However, in the short-term the price drop decreases the value of 
allowances held in stock. This negatively affects the market values of firms. 
One of the features of the EU ETS Directives (EC, 2003; EC, 2009a) 
allowing firms to manage short-term impacts is called ‘borrowing’. In the 
EU ETS, firms receive their next year’s allocation of allowances prior to the 
compliance date for their current year’s emissions. Firms can thus ‘borrow’ 
these allowances to cover for their current year’s emissions. But in case 
firms foresaw the carbon price drop they should also have sold any of their 
remaining allocation holdings. As such a strategy is a signal of market 
insight, firms with lower net stock positions should have higher market 
values. The fourth hypothesis is then as follows: 
Market values increase the more firms decreased their net stock holdings 
by borrowing and selling allowances.    (H.4) 
 
3.3 Trade effects 
If rational expectations are assumed, firms should trade for any 
discrepancies between allocations and emissions. However, firms do not 
only trade to eliminate these mismatches, they may also actively bet on 
carbon market developments. Active traders might know more about the 
workings of the market and thus have an information advantage. Investors 
might therefore positively value firms active at trading allowances, 
irrespective of whether they are buying or selling. The last hypothesis is 
thus as follows: 
Market values increase the larger the firms’ shares in the allowance 




4.1 Abnormal share returns 
In order to estimate the market valuation effects around the carbon 
price shock, we use an event study. This approach was introduced by Fama 
et al. (1969) initially for corporate finance purposes, but has also been 
applied within the field of regulatory economics. 
The event study methodology implicitly assumes the market is 
efficient: all available information impacting future profits of firms is 
discounted into the share prices. If an event is significant for a firm it 
should thus be possible to extract from its share price the firm-specific 
returns associated with the event.91 Subsequently, these ‘abnormal returns’ 
can be analysed by relating them to these firm’s characteristics. Here the 
firms’ industry categories, revenues, allocations, emissions, and allowance 
purchases and sales will be considered.  
For obtaining the market returns the Return Index (RI) was used 
from Datastream.92 With RI the (simple log) returns ri,t can be calculated 
by first-differencing its natural logarithm: 
ri,t = ln(RIi,t+1 / RIi,t) = ln(RIi,t+1) – ln(RIi,t)   (1) 
 
where i stands for the company i = 1,…, N and i = m denotes the market 
index. These market portfolio returns rm,t are proxied by the RI of the 
Morgan Stanley Capital International EU equity market index. The 
subscript t stands for the trading day. 
  
                                                        
91 Regulatory changes are often gradual and expected. Event study estimates will 
then become biased if key dates in the regulatory process are ambiguous. 
However, the information on the excess amount of allowances came as a shock to 
the market (see e.g., Figures 1 and 2). Moreover, in the April 21st 2006 edition of 
Carbon Market Europe of Point Carbon, it was argued that the CO2 price was too 
low (Ellerman and Buchner, 2008). The expectations before the event thus 
indicate a CO2 price movement in the opposite direction. 
92 In the calculation of the Return Index, dividends or share splits are corrected 
for. 
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As Figure 1 shows, the start of the event window is to be pinpointed 
at the 24th as it is the last day the price moved upwards. And since the price 
fall took off from the 25th we consider it the day of the event, i.e., for which 
t = 0.93 The inclusion of the 24th, i.e., for which t = -1, allows for the effects 
of prior information on the share prices. The event window should not 
encompass too many days as that may affect the degree of bias of the 
statistical analysis, but with too few days the impact of the event may not 
be captured (e.g., Campbell et al., 1997). We therefore devise three event 
windows: one with the 26th of April (t1 = {-1,1}), one with the 27th (t2 = {-
1,2}), and one with the 28th (t3 = {-1,3}).94  
                                                        
93 The disclosure of emissions by EU Member States did not take place on the same 
day. The shock can thus be more pronounced for firms from the countries that 
were first at disclosing their national demand for allowances.  
94 Bushnell et al. (2013) take the 26th until the 28th of April as the event window. 
They stated that little information had leaked into the market and that, otherwise, 
the carbon price would have responded to that. However, as Figure 1 shows, the 
carbon price fall had already started between the 24th and 25th. 
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In order to estimate the ‘abnormal’ returns caused by the event a 
business-as-usual estimate is needed. This estimate was determined by 
running, for each firm, an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression: 
ri,t = αi + βirm,t + ui,t       (2) 
 
These OLS regressions are run in a sufficiently large time period of 60 days 
before the event, the estimation window.95 The next step is to calculate the 
abnormal returns (ARi,t) through the estimation window intercepts () 
and beta’s (), and the event window’s realized firm (ri,t) and market 
returns (rm,t): 
ARi,t ≡  + 	
, − 	,      (3) 
 
It is standard to aggregate these abnormal returns over the event window. 
Since if these returns are significantly affected during the event window, 
they will not revolve around zero but maintain a new level. For t1, for 
example, these cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) can be calculated by 
summing ARi,t from t = -1 to t = 1. 
4.2 Carbon leakage and carbon-intensity effects 
For the carbon leakage estimate we draw on three Commission 
decisions (EC, 2010; EC, 2011b; EC, 2012a). These include lists of product 
categories deemed exposed to ‘carbon leakage’. As these product categories 
are provided in NACE codes, a dummy variable carbleaki is defined 
equaling 1 if a firm’s NACE code appears in the three Commission 
Decisions’ lists.  
The carbon-intensity of production (called: carbintensi) is estimated 
as follows96,97: 
carbintensi,2005 = emissionsi,2005 / revenuesi,2005 * 100% (4) 
 
                                                        
95 Five days in between the estimation and event window is allowed for to prevent 
events affecting the event window. 
96 The Orbis database does not provide the percentage of revenues attributable to 
a firm's installation(s). Firms having relatively more installations outside the EU 
ETS thus seem to have ‘clean’ output. Their lower exposure indeed enables them 
to switch production to the non-EU ETS installations. 
97 For several firms, we relied on revenue data from Datastream in case Orbis was 
not able to provide it. 
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The effect of carbon-intensity on share prices depends whether a firm 
suffers from carbon leakage. We take care of this interaction via a variable 
carbileaki, the product of carbintensi and carbleaki.  
Hypothesis H.1 suggests that with carbon leakage, share prices of 
dirtier firms increase more than those of cleaner firms. H.1 will then be 
accepted if carbleaki and carbileaki are positively related to CARi. To 
accept H.2, the opposite should hold. 
4.3 Exposure and borrowing effects 
Regarding the value effects associated with allocations and 
emissions two effects are important: 1) an exposure valuation: the 
allocations minus emissions amounts to come, and 2) a stock valuation: 
the value of allowances firms currently have in stock. As to the exposure 
valuation, it is expected that investors see annual shortfalls or surpluses in 
relative terms. One thus only needs to take the difference between 
allocations and verified emissions and divide it by either of the two. But for 
a part of the allowance transactions, it could not be discerned whether 
allocations belonged to the 2005 or 2006 tranches. The sum of the two 





∗ 100%    (5) 
 
where emissionsi,2005 are multiplied by two given the two allocation 
tranches.98 Hypothesis H.3 suggests market values increase (decrease) the 
more firms are short (long) on allowances. H.3 will then be accepted if expi 
is negatively related to CARi. 
For the stock valuation effect, we devised a net holding estimate 
which takes into account 1) the possibility for firms to borrow, and 2) the 
net allowances sales – since, at higher pre-event carbon prices, it would 
have been profitable if firms had also sold their 2006 allocations. The 
reference date for the net holdings is set at the 30th of April, 2006, when 








∗ 100    (6) 
 
                                                        
98 As the NAPs predetermined most of the allocations for Phase I it should pose 
less of a problem to assume that emissions for 2006 equal those of 2005. 
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Hypothesis H.4 suggests market values increase the more firms decreased 
their stock holdings. For H.4 to be accepted borrowi needs to be positively 
related to CARi. 
4.4 Trade effects 
Investors may value firms that are active at trading allowances, 
irrespective of whether they are buying or selling. The estimate we adopted 














∗ 100% (7) 
 
In addition, a dummy variable notradei is defined equaling 1 for firms 
which had nor purchases nor sales, and zero otherwise. 
Hypothesis H.5 suggests market values increase the larger the firms’ 
shares in the allowance trade. For H.5 to be accepted tradeintensi needs to 
be positively related to CARi.  
5. Results and discussion 
5.1 Firm and industry selection criteria 
By labeling with the Bureau van Dijk’s (BvD) Orbis database codes, 
we identified 10,419 of 10,650 installations operators from the National 
Allocation Plans (NAP), and 5,737 of the 5,957 European Transaction Log 
(EUTL) accountholders which appeared in the 2005-2006 transactions. 
The majority of the installations’ operator names were provided through 
overviews on the EU ETS website. The BvD-labelling of the remaining 
installations or EUTL transaction accounts was possible with other 
provided details, such as the names of the installations or accountholders 
themselves. Moreover, there are 25,020 transactions between the first 
transaction and the last one on the 30th of April, 2006. 898 of them are 
conducted among the same accountholders, e.g., for moving allowances 
from one national registry to another, 9,664 are allocations and 4,743 are 
surrendered allowances. The inter-account trade data is thus based on the 
remaining 9,715 transactions. 
                                                        
99 This trade data, i.e., from the EUTL registry transactions, is published five years 
after an EU ETS calendar year. Investors thus did not have it at their disposal 
during or before the event. In this analysis it thus functions as a trade proxy. 
Investors should have obtained their allowance trading estimates via other 
information sources. 
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The only common identifier in the NAPs and the EUTL transactions 
were the accountholder names. For most accountholder names in the 
NAPs, the received and surrendered allowances could be traced in the 
transactions. NAP accountholders that did not appear in the transactions 
before end December, 2006, were not included in the analysis (776 
accountholders controlling 1,073 installations). By not appearing in 
allowance transactions, we considered these accounts must have opted out 
from the EU ETS. The main allocations and emissions source we opted for 
were the NAPs; unlike the EUTL transactions it provides the verified 
emissions.100 We complemented it with accounts which did not appear in 
the NAPs but according to the transactions received or surrendered 
allowances up until the 30th of April, 2006. We further included EUTL 
transaction accounts that were used for trading purposes only (and not for 
allowance allocations or surrenders). 
The next step was to obtain the firms’ International Security 
Identification Numbers (ISINs) or exchange-listing codes from Orbis. On 
the basis of the accountholder names and these listing codes, we merged 
the 2005-2006 allocations, emissions, and the cumulative purchases and 
sales until the 30th of April, 2006. Furthermore, firms were only selected 
if they took part in the EU ETS by having allocations and/or emissions, by 
having traded allowances, or both. For several firms data was unavailable 
in Datastream or Orbis on the share prices, revenues or total assets, 
decreasing the number of firms from 506 to 393. Table 1 shows the 
numbers of accountholders (and installations) divided over the listed and 
non-listed firms. 
 
                                                        
100 As mentioned in Section 4.3, it could not be discerned whether the allowances 
received from or surrendered to the national registries were part of 2005 or 2006 
tranches. Some installations received allowances more than twice, suggesting 
these were corrections rather than allocations. We thus opted for the verified 
emissions to be included in the analysis. 
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Table 1: Sample of EU ETS accountholders  
Number of accountholders NAP-related 
Non-NAP with 
allocations and/or 
surrenders Only trade Total 
EU ETS total 6132 208 435 6775 
01-01-2005 to 31-12-2006 (10,650 installations)       
Identified, in transactions, 
and firm-specific data is 
available: 2,167 99 191 2,457 
01-01-2005 to 30-04-2006 (4,121 installations)      
- of which: listed firms 1,128 25 139 1,292 
  (2424 installations)     
- of which: non-listed firms 1,039 74 52 1,165 
 (1,697 installations)     
 
From the 2,167 identified accountholders, 1,128 (53%) and 1,039 
(48%) are assigned to the listed and non-listed firms, respectively. From 
Orbis we obtained the firms’ NACE Rev. 2 core codes. Based on the 
contents of the NACE code text descriptions, the NACE industries were 
checked whether they were among the European Commission’s lists of 
carbon leakage industries, and they were categorized into the following 
ETS sectors: 1) Power & Heat, 2) Iron, Steel & Coke, 3) Cement & Lime, 4) 
Refineries, 5) Pulp & Paper, 6) Glass, 7) Ceramics, Bricks & Tiles, 8) 
Unidentified / Others.101,102,103 
5.2 Cumulative abnormal returns 
The share prices, which determined the abnormal returns, are 
themselves established at the end of each trading day. These prices should 
thus reflect the carbon price changes on t = 0 for the initial decline and on 
t = 1 for the acceleration of the fall (cf. Figure 1).  
  
                                                        
101 An overview of the NACE industries, its EU ETS sectors and carbon leakage 
categorization is available on request. 
102 For cases where the NACE industry text descriptions closely resembled those 
of the carbon leakage descriptions, we allocated them to the carbon leakage list. 
103 This ETS sector categorization is used in more studies, among others in 
Ellerman and Joskow (2008). 
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Figure 2: Full sample average abnormal returns within event window t = 
{-2,3} 
Figure 2 shows the path of the full sample average abnormal returns 
(ARs, not CARs) over an event window of t = {-2,3}. This event window 
illustrates that before and until t = 0, the abnormal returns gravitated to 
the negative. The initial and positive response to the news came at t = 1, 
suggesting investors belatedly realized the information had an impact on 
the firms’ valuations. The market re-evaluated this shock (downwards) at 
t = 2. And it took another day for the ARs to tend back to zero, indicating 
the impact was not substantial overall. We thus expect event window t1 = 
{-1,1} to be informative as it includes the initial response to the news. Other 
event windows we consider are t2 = {-1,2} and t3 = {-1,3} which provide 
insights into the share price corrections the days after.  
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the CARs for the three 
event windows t1, t2, and t3.104 From t1 to t2 the average firm saw a decline 
in the mean of its CAR, but there was no average change from t2 to t3. 
  
                                                        
104 More than half of firms are in sector 8, the residual category. Relatively few 
firms within sectors 1 to 7 were publicly listed. And if we relied on primary or 
























CAR(-1,1) N = 393 N = 25 N = 34 N = 13 N = 67 N = 34 N = 5 N = 4 N = 211 
Mean -0,25% -0,90% -0,31% 1,09% -0,47% -0,62% -0,28% 1,88% -0,16% 
Std. dev. 2,91% 2,58% 3,99% 3,07% 2,98% 2,58% 2,03% 2,45% 2,78% 
Median -0,25% -0,58% -0,05% 0,62% -0,45% -0,30% -0,72% 1,94% -0,17% 
Minimum -13,07% -6,99% -13,07% -2,14% -8,42% -6,98% -2,31% -1,14% -11,55% 
Maximum 11,91% 4,84% 8,20% 8,99% 9,92% 6,35% 2,96% 4,78% 11,91% 
T-test -1,71* -1,74* -0,45 1,28 -1,3 -1,41 -0,31 1,54 -0,82 
SCAR test -1,68* -2,61*** -0,61 2,58*** -2,61*** -2,34** 0,43 2,88*** 0,16 
CAR(-1,2)          
Mean -0,75% -1,96% -2,34% 0,39% -1,16% -1,22% 0,49% 1,60% -0,29% 
Std. dev. 4,11% 2,77% 4,30% 3,03% 3,72% 2,92% 3,28% 3,58% 4,48% 
Median -0,69% -1,27% -1,89% -0,05% -0,72% -1,40% -0,97% 2,00% -0,34% 
Minimum -21,02% -8,62% -10,96% -2,96% -11,13% -7,21% -2,84% -3,14% -21,02% 
Maximum 36,40% 2,36% 10,23% 8,71% 9,55% 7,04% 5,51% 5,54% 36,40% 
T-test -3,63*** -3,54*** -3,17*** 0,46 -2,55** -2,44** 0,33 0,9 -0,95 
SCAR test -6,97*** -6,07*** -6,04*** 0,88 -5,2*** -4,37*** 1,01 2,56** -1,04 
CAR(-1,3)          
Mean -0,83% -1,73% -1,74% 0,32% -1,51% -1,10% -0,29% 1,64% -0,44% 
Std. dev. 4,97% 3,37% 5,69% 3,53% 4,30% 4,43% 4,86% 2,76% 5,36% 
Median -0,86% -1,18% -2,03% 0,51% -1,23% -1,34% -2,73% 1,62% -0,47% 
Minimum -25,15% -10,20% -11,31% -3,42% -12,40% -8,98% -5,13% -1,72% -25,15% 
Maximum 43,86% 3,04% 13,11% 8,84% 9,87% 12,31% 5,18% 5,05% 43,86% 
T-test -3,3*** -2,56** -1,78* 0,32 -2,87*** -1,44 -0,13 1,19 -1,2 
SCAR test -7,85*** -5,21*** -5,07*** 0,55 -7,05*** -3,89*** 0,96 2,58*** -2** 
 
For the significance of the CARs two types of test statistics are 
provided: the t-test and the standardized CAR (or: SCAR) test (cf. 
Campbell et al., 1997: section 4.4). The SCAR test weighs the CARs with 
the standard error of the estimation regression (cf. Section 4.1, equation 
2). The corresponding p-values in Table 2 show that the (S)CARs are 
significantly different from zero.  
If we consider t1, the SCAR test statistics point to significance of 
returns for five sectors. However, the mean CAR from the full sample is 
only significant at the 90% confidence level. As they are more significant 
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for t2 and t3, this lends support to include these days in the analysis. In t2 
and t3, four sectors had significant negative returns (sectors 1, 2, 4, and 5), 
and one had small negative returns (sector 8).105 Hence, also from a sector 
perspective it is clear that the returns were negative in general. 
Although the CARs seem small, the total value effect is substantial. 
Multiplying all firms’ CARs with their average equity market values in 
April, 2006, yields a net value effect of € -54 billion for t2.106 To put this 
figure into perspective, we can estimate the change in the opportunity 
costs of holding allowances by taking the carbon price drop over t2 (€ 
13,14) and multiplying it by the sum of the firms’ two remaining allocations 
for Phase I.107 We find that these opportunity costs account for 1,22% of 
the firms’ total April 2006 average equity market values, and 55,5% of the 
change in the April 2006 average equity market value as caused by the 
carbon price drop. 
5.3 Carbon leakage and carbon-intensity effects 
The first section of Table 3 shows the full sample statistics on carbon 
leakage and the carbon-intensity of production.108 The variable carbintens, 
or the amount of emissions per unit of revenues, has an average of 0,04%. 
This implies that, on average, there is one tonne of CO2 emissions for every 
25 Euro in revenues. The associated positive skewness of 6,55 indicates 
that there are few firms emitting many emissions per unit of revenues and 
that there are many firms with few emissions per unit of revenues. The 
mean of carbleak (55%) shows that the majority of firms is prone to carbon 
leakage. 
 
                                                        
105 We leave sectors 6 and 7 out of the discussion due to the small number of 
observations. 
106 The net effect consists of firms with a positive and a negative event effect. The 
negative effect amounts to € -109,5 billion and the positive effect to € 55.6 billion. 
107 We assume firms used (most) of their 2005 allocations to cover their 2005 
emissions. The opportunity costs of holding allowances will then relate to the 
2006 allocation but also the 2007 one, from which firms can borrow for their 2006 
emissions. 
108 Table 3 and Table 4 below provide these statistics on different numbers of 
firms. Of the total amount of 393 firms, 16 firms had zero allocations so that exp 
and borrow could not be determined; 27 firms had zero emissions so that 
carbintens and carbileak could not be determined. 
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Table 3: Full sample descriptive statistics on the product market, exposure, 
borrowing, and allowance trading 
Full sample Mean Std. dev. Median Min. Max. Skew. N 
carbintens 0,04% 0, 12% 0,003% 0% 1,23% 6,55 366 
carbleak 55,22% 49,79% 100% 0% 100% -0,21 393 
carbileak  0,02% 0,06% 0% 0% 0,68% 6,65 366 
exp 10,9% 54,86% 12,52% -928% 100% -13,44 377 
borrow -78,11% 2.285% 47,48% -44.237% 232% -19,3 377 
tradeintens 0,25% 1,03% 0% 0% 9,53% 5,58 393 
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Table 4: Sector level descriptive statistics on the product market, exposure, 
borrowing, and allowance trading 
Listed firms   
Full 
sample sector 1 sector 2 sector 3 sector 4 sector 5 sector 6 sector 7 sector 8 
   N = 393 N = 25 N = 34 N = 13 N = 67 N = 34 N = 5 N = 4 N = 211 
N   157 22 1 3 11 3 0 0 117 
carbintens, 
where            
carbleak=0 A 0,05% 0,28% 0,13% 0,03% 0,01% 0,003% n.a. n.a. 0,01% 
N  217 1 33 10 56 31 5 4 77 
carbintens, 
where          
carbleak=1 A 0,03% 1E-04% 0,04% 0,19% 0,02% 0,04% 0,05% 0,05% 0,01% 
N  366 23 33 12 67 32 5 4 190 
carbintens A 0,04% 0,26% 0,05% 0,15% 0,02% 0,04% 0,05% 0,05% 0,01% 
 B 0,02% 0,16% 0,03% 0,09% 0,004% 0,01% 0,02% 0,004% 0,003% 
carbileak A 0,02% 5E-06 0,04% 0,14% 0,02% 0,04% 0,05% 0,05% 0,002% 
N  377 23 33 13 67 33 5 4 199 
exp A 10,90% -1% 10,08% 15,22% 14,51% 24% 11,71% 13,70% 8,68% 
  B -0,99% -13,92% 22% 9,16% 13,31% 24% 10,53% 21,61% 9,53% 
borrow A -78,11% 65,40% 48,74% 45,54% 49,18% 51,24% 29,65% 50,05% -193,40% 
  B 48,37% 48,74% 54,91% 46,13% 49,68% 50,35% -2,53% 49,59% 45,04% 
N  393 25 34 13 67 34 5 4 211 
tradeintens A 0,25% 1,64% 0,19% 0,26% 0,07% 0,02% 0,58% 0,00% 0,19% 
  B 100% 41,08% 6,59% 3,34% 4,36% 0,80% 2,89% 0,01% 40,93% 
notrade A 54,71% 20% 55,88% 38,46% 53,73% 47,06% 20% 50% 62,09% 
 
Table 4 provides for the variables a full sample average, sector 
averages (A) and a ‘sector ratio’ (B). The latter is calculated by considering 
each sector as being one ’firm’. The allocations, surrenders, allowance 
purchases and sales are summed up per sector.  
Both the sector average (A) and sector ratio (B) indicate that 
especially sector 1 (Power & Heat) but also sector 3 (Cement & Lime) emit 
most CO2 per unit of revenue. Compared to the other sectors, their 
production is three to twenty-six times more carbon-intensive. However, 
sector 1 and sector 3 differ with respect to carbon leakage. In accordance 
with Hypothesis H.1, sector 3 with its high carbon leakage has positive 
CARs due to the carbon price drop. And sector 1 with no carbon leakage 
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has negative CARs, which is in accordance with H.2. The outcomes of 
sectors 4, 5, and 8 are not in line with H.1 or H.2 since positive CARs were 
to be expected, given their carbon leakage. 
 Furthermore, Table 4 shows that the average carbon-intensity is 
larger for firms without carbon leakage (0,05%) than for those with carbon 
leakage (0,03%). This is mainly due to the relatively high carbon-intensity 
of Sector 1 (0,28%). Without sector 1 the statistics point out that, when 
subject to carbon leakage, firms produce with a relatively higher carbon-
intensity. 
5.4 Exposure and borrowing effects 
Table 3 further reports the descriptive statistics for the variables exp 
and borrow. It shows most firms were long on allowances; see the positive 
average and median values of exp.  
The variable borrow is the ratio of the stock of allowances on the 30th 
of April, 2006, divided by the allocations of 2005 and 2006. The mean of 
-78% shows that the average firm expended and sold less allowances than 
it purchased. However, with 47,5% the median firm expended 95% of its 
2005 allocation and banked the remainder plus the 2006 allocation. This 
implies a few firms skew the borrow variable towards a large negative 
mean, i.e., most firms were long in allowances. 
That these surpluses were not subsequently sold off is an indication 
that many did not foresee the carbon price drop. On the other hand, the 
picture from borrow may be distorted. Our data only contains transactions 
from the spot market but not the derivatives market. Firms which 
purchased allowances on the spot market and sold them (at higher prices) 
through forwards and futures thus appear as not having foreseen the 
carbon price drop, while they actually may have profited from it via the 
derivatives market. This may be the case for three firms (Barclays PLC, AB 
Electrolux, and Severn Trent PLC) which had highly negative borrow 
values.109 
The sector perspective on exp and borrow is provided in the second 
section of Table 4. For most sectors the averages differ from their sector 
ratios, but the signs do not. The result remains that all except sector 1 
(Power & Heat) are long on allowances. Interestingly, the full sample 
                                                        
109 Relative to their purchases and sales, their allocations and emissions were very 
small. The outlier statistics did not detect these three firms as outliers, so they 
were included in the analysis. 
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average of 11% differs from the full sample sector ratio for the EU ETS of -
1%. It implies that, on average, firms are long but on the whole the EU ETS 
is short. This number is close to the range of the EU ETS allocation 
estimations from Ellerman and Buchner (2008) and Anderson and Di 
Maria (2011). These were in the order of +0,6% and -0,5%, respectively. 
Hence, although the number is small, in aggregate the listed firms faced 
pressure to reduce their pollution.  
The sector values for borrow are in accordance with those of Table 3 
as values were in the 45-50% range. Only sectors 1, 5, and 7 borrowed from 
their 2006 allocations as their borrow rates were in the 50-100% range. 
For sector 1 it is to be expected to borrow given its shortfall in allowances. 
Sector 5 (Pulp & Paper), however, is long in allowances but the data show 
that pulp and paper firms used 51% of their two allocation tranches, either 
via covering their emissions or via net sales. 
5.5 Trade effects 
The last statistics in Table 3 are on the allowance trade. As the zero 
median of tradeintens indicates, most firms did not trade in allowances. 
The mean of notrade indicates this was the case for 55% of firms. 
Furthermore, the average firm’s share of total EU ETS purchases and sales 
was 0,25%. The skewness of 5,58 indicates that a few firms conducted most 
of the trade in allowances.  
The trade differences among industry sectors are provided in the last 
section of Table 4. The sector ratios of tradeintens show that most trade 
originates from sector 1 (Power & Heat) and 8 (Unidentified / Others) 
with, respectively, 41,1% and 40,9% of total allowance trade. The sector 
averages, though, indicate that the average firm in sectors 2, 3, and 6 
traded about as much or even more than the average firm within sector 8. 
Sectors 4, 5, and 7 were the least active. 
5.6 Cross-sectional regression 
In the OLS regressions the statistics point to a non-normal 
distribution of the residuals.110 Normality of residuals, though, is not a 
sufficient condition for obtaining consistent estimates. In order to test 
whether the assumptions of the regression models are correct, Long and 
                                                        
110 To detect outliers, the deviation of the residual, the leverage and influence of 
the observation were considered (Baum, 2006: section 5.2.10). Nature Group PLC 
and Providence Resources PLC were consistently detected and therefore left out 
of the analysis. 
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Trivedi (1992) suggests applying two types of specification tests: the robust 
LM Ramsey’s RESET test and the Information Matrix (IM) test. If these 
tests are passed, the “interpretation of OLS estimates and application of 
standard statistical tests are justified” (Long and Trivedi, 1992).  
There are five hypotheses to test over three event windows.111 We 
group the variables in four blocks related to these hypotheses. Then we 
take up all significant variables in a subsequent regression. In Table 5 the 
OLS results with robust clustered standard errors are provided for the 
three windows.112 The two specification tests do not point towards a 
misspecification of the estimated model. 
                                                        
111 We performed several robustness checks. More information is available on 
request. Concerning endogeneity, we expect it to be minor. The abnormal returns 
(i.e., changes in the firms’ expected profitability) as well as the independent 
variables are in relative rather than absolute terms. During the small event 
window, unobserved heterogeneous factors from the error term (e.g., productivity 
levels) are therefore unlikely to have changed and thereby impacted the abnormal 
returns via the covariates. Furthermore, the event was not anticipated (cf. footnote 
91) and it was not induced by firms themselves, but by the EU Member States 
release of emissions information. 

























 Table 5: OLS regressions on the CARs from event windows t1, t2, and t3 
 Event window t1 Event window t2 Event window t3 
  H.1-H.2 H.3 H.4 H.5 H.1-H.5 H.1-H.2 H.3 H.4 H.5 H.1-H.5 H.1-H.2 H.3 H.4 H.5 H.1-H.5 
carbintens -1,649**       -1,531** -3,782***       -4,086** -1,339*       -3,107 
 (0,043)    (0,022) (0,0004)    (0,017) (0,067)    (0,251) 
carbleak -0,0003     -0,003     0,001     
 (0,916)     (0,187)     (0,711)     
carbileak 0,005     -1,831     -7,767     
 (0,997)     (0,626)     (0,161)     
tradeintens  -0,002*   -0,0005   -0,003**   -0,0003   -0,003*   -0,0005 
  (0,08)   (0,52)   (0,042)   (0,682)   (0,082)   (0,761) 
notrade  -0,006      -0,005      -0,008    
  (0,144)      (0,377)      (0,328)    
exp   1,64E-05*  1,29E-05**    1,56E-05      1,27E-05   
   (0,099)  (0,036)    (0,128)      (0,348)   
borrow    5,56E-08* -2,6E-08     -1,3E-07      -4,5E-07*** -5,2E-07 
    (0,066) (0,832)     (0,211)      (0,001) (0,123) 
constant -0,002 0,001 -0,002** -0,002* -0,002** -0,004 -0,004 -0,007* -0,007* -0,006* -0,007** -0,003 -0,008** -0,008** -0,007** 
  (0,421) (0,72) (0,044) (0,051) (0,049) (0,164) (0,601) (0,072) (0,073) (0,072) (0,022) (0,637) (0,032) (0,029) (0,014) 
R2 0,005 0,011 0,001 0,000 0,006 0,019 0,008 0,0005 0,0001 0,016 0,014 0,007 0,0002 0,0005 0,007 
Adj. R2 -0,003 0,006 -0,002 -0,003 -0,005 0,011 0,003 -0,002 -0,003 0,011 0,006 0,002 -0,002 -0,002 -0,001 
N 366 393 377 377 366 366 393 377 377 366 366 393 377 377 366 
F-test 0,110 0,192 0,099 0,066 0,044 0,001 0,008 0,128 0,211 0,005 0,010 0,188 0,348 0,001 0,002 
RESET 0,292 0,151 0,157 0,355 0,297 0,496 0,163 0,668 0,426 0,501 0,136 0,197 0,607 0,497 0,233 
IM_total 0,071 0,144 0,109 0,102 0,781 0,806 0,430 0,714 0,720 0,955 0,803 0,610 0,693 0,717 0,998 
* / ** / ***: 90% / 95% / 99% confidence level. P-values are within brackets, R2 is the (adjusted) coefficient of determination, N the number of 
observations. Null of RESET p-value: correct and robust specified conditional mean of the dependent variable. Null of IM-test p-value: joint 
homoscedasticity and normality of the errors (Long and Trivedi, 1992). Variables are estimated with robust clustered standard errors, but not the IM-
test statistics as STATA 12 does not provide these with clustered errors. 
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A first inference one can make is that the fit of the model is weak, 
given the low (adjusted) R-squared. Yet, this is to be expected since the 
carbon price effect only indirectly relates to share prices. There can always 
be non-EU ETS related factors playing a role in determining the share 
price movements, e.g., changes in the macro-economic environment. And 
unlike the selected EU ETS variables, it may well be that the EU ETS 
impact on share prices manifests itself through other channels. For 
example, a firm’s state of abatement technology and business strategy 
regarding climate change regulation, i.e., factors which are hardly 
measurable. Related to that, the carbon price shock may have changed 
investors’ expectations on the EU ETS future stringency, and that the 
carbon price drop induced unanimity among policymakers for decreasing 
the EU ETS cap. Indeed, in October, 2006, the European Commission 
announced stricter NAPs for Phase II. This might explain why the 
abnormal returns were negative, even though lower carbon prices should 
be conceived as good news for cost-effectively achieving emission targets. 
Over the event windows, carbintens, tradeintens, exp, and borrow 
had a significant impact on the CARs. The variable of carbintens shows up 
in two full model regressions, exp in one, and borrow and tradeintens in 
none of them.  
The coefficient on carbintens is negative, indicating that the carbon 
price drop has a more negative impact on share prices of dirtier firms. For 
example, for event window t2, if a firm’s carbintens increased by one 
standard deviation, this would lead to an average CAR-decrease of -0,41%. 
Relative to the CAR-average of -0,8% for this window, this is quite 
substantial. That investors value carbon-intensity negatively is a sign that 
the EU ETS is valued as restricting pollution. Firms are considered more 
profitable with lower carbon-intensity rates as these signal towards better 
abatement capacities. This finding is in line with Koch and Bassen (2013) 
and runs counter to Oestreich and Tsiakas (2012) who concluded that 
investors demand a higher carbon risk premium for the (expected higher) 
cost of capital of dirtier firms. 
The insignificance of carbleak leads to a rejection of Hypotheses H.1 
and H.2. The descriptive statistics (cf. Section 5.3) showed that only sector 
1 (Power & Heat) and sector 3 (Cement & Lime) provide support for H.1 
and H.2, while the support of the six other sectors was the opposite. There 
can be several reasons for these incompatible findings. For one thing, the 
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variable carbleak may not have sufficient detail. Unknown is the actual 
carbon pass-through rate by firms. It is further probable that this cost 
pass-through threshold, for which market value impacts turn positive, 
does not lie at/above 100% but at lower rates. Further research is 
necessary to find this out. 
The second variable, exp, is only significant in t1. The positive 
estimate of exp indicates that the carbon price drop led to larger share 
price increases for firms which were more ‘long’ or less ‘short’ on 
allowances. Increasing exp by 10% translates into an average CAR impact 
of 0,013%. Since the full sample average of event window t1 equals -0,3% 
its impact is small. That exp is positively related with the CARs is in 
contrast with Hypothesis H.3. This positive exp-to-CARs relationship is in 
line with Abrell et al. (2011) that over-allocated firms were more profitable, 
the latter of which should correspond to higher share prices.  
 The impact on CARs from trade, or tradeintens and notrade, is 
absent in the full model regressions. It is likely that carbintens and/or exp 
captured the variance from the CARs instead. This can also explain why 
borrow is insignificant, since the only difference in the definitions of exp 
and borrow is the net sales in allowances. There is thus no evidence that 
investors valued the firms’ net sales of allowances, or that value is derived 
from the being a large trader, irrespective of them being buyers or sellers. 
Hence, both Hypothesis H.4 and H.5 need to be rejected. 
In one respect it is surprising that the trade variables do not come up 
in the regressions. As listed firms normally manage their currency 
exposure, it is probable they do that for their carbon exposure as well. And 
as the carbon market was relatively new and carbon prices were high, 
market traders could have engaged in profitable trading strategies. 
Although they may have done so, it had no discernible effect on share 
prices. Nevertheless, it is also not surprising this carbon trade effect is 
missing. Few measures are available for investors to gauge a firm’s trade 
activity. Data on forwards and futures positions taken is not publicly 
available. Besides, the EUTL data is published 5 years after an EU ETS 
calendar year. In some U.S. emissions trading schemes data on emissions 
is published daily and annually on the allowances transferred. While 
continuous monitoring of greenhouse gases may be expensive (at least for 
now), there should be no technical limits on more frequent publications of 
the transfer of allowances. Without a view on the trade in allowances, one 
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cannot discern whether firms e.g., borrowed or stockpiled unused 
allowances. This information shortage constrains markets in realizing 
their valuable allocation properties. 
Another information constraint results from the compliance timing 
as laid out in the EU ETS Directives (EC, 2003; EC, 2009a). While 
(currently) allowance auctions are spread over the calendar year and thus 
ensure a gradual feed-in of information, there is just one moment in the 
year that all firms surrender their allowances. It will be conducive to 
market certainty if there are more of such moments during the year (e.g., 
Holland and Moore, 2012) and that the European Commission 
subsequently reports on these compliance moments.113 This would have 
prevented or at least reduced the April 2006 shock. The more that signals 
on scarcity are held up, the more difficult it becomes for firms to forecast 
whether they have planned enough emission-reduction projects. If the 
release of information on the scarcity in the EU ETS is stepped up, 
situations of over-allocation such as the EU ETS faces currently are more 
likely to be averted. 
6. Conclusion 
Did EU ETS firms’ shareholders interpret the April 2006 carbon 
price drop as significant and, if so, how did the event’s impact differ among 
firms’ allocations and transactions? Through an event study the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), i.e., the event-induced share price 
returns, were derived from a sample of exchange-listed firms participating 
in the EU ETS. The CARs statistics indicate that shareholders interpreted 
the April 2006 carbon price drop as having a negative effect on the future 
profitability of the sample of firms. In that sense, and as we conclude from 
our methodological framework, the EU ETS did ‘bite’.  
For the share price responsiveness to the EU ETS three groups of 
variables were checked: 1) the product’s carbon-intensity and carbon 
leakage, 2) the short and medium-term allowance holdings, and 3) the 
trade in allowances. The results indicate that the product’s carbon-
intensity and medium-term allowance holdings were, respectively, 
negatively and positively related to the firms’ share prices. As to the 
medium-term allowance holdings, we expected that the carbon price drop 
                                                        
113 While Holland and Moore (2012) is on the Los Angeles NOX market, it may be 
applicable to (non-point) CO2 emissions as well. 
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would increase the profits for firms having allowances shortages, et vice 
versa. Since we found opposite results, the market possibly incorporates a 
longer time horizon than expected. With future expected stringency of the 
EU ETS, firms are considered more competitive with lower carbon-
intensity rates and larger allowance holdings as both are signals of better 
abatement capacities. The EU ETS is thus valued as a restriction on 
pollution. 
Finally, the firms’ trade activity in allowances was not value-
relevant. This result may well be the consequence of investors lacking 
sufficient data on the firms’ allowance trade. A valuation will then be 
difficult to make when it is not known whether firms e.g., borrowed or 
stockpiled unused allowances. The market will therefore benefit if the 
European Commission increases the frequency of publications of the 









EU Emissions Trading by Energy Firms114 
1. Introduction 
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) was 
launched in 2005 to cost-effectively reduce greenhouse gases in several 
industry sectors. The mechanism behind the EU ETS is a cap-and-trade 
system where the ‘cap’ is the aggregate sum of the EU Member States’ 
emissions reduction targets and the subsequent ‘trade’ in allowances 
underlying the cap is left to the market. Allowance trades are thus an 
essential policy component, especially for the energy sector115, which takes 
up the largest share of EU ETS emissions (approximately 70%). Energy 
firms are therefore more likely to leave their mark on the carbon market. 
Incentives to trade are themselves a function of whether firms need 
to tap the carbon market. Firms can behave self-sufficiently by allocating 
production, emissions and, hence, allowances within firm boundaries. The 
more cost-effective this will be, the fewer incentives firms have to trade on 
the carbon market.  
The aim of this chapter is to empirically analyze the actual allowance 
trading of energy firms and to determine the importance of allowance 
trade drivers when firms are either self-sufficient or not in terms of carbon 
allowances. The central question of this chapter is therefore as follows: do 
European energy firms depend less on the EU carbon market (EU ETS) 
when they are better able to pool their in-house pollution abatement 
potential? 
This chapter applies an integrated analysis of market and firm-
specific characteristics on EU ETS allowance trades by energy firms. It 
contributes to the understanding of what drives energy firms to consume, 
                                                        
114 This article version is available as Jong and Zeitlberger (2017). We are grateful 
for the useful comments we received from Oscar Couwenberg, Edwin O. Fischer, 
Henryk Gurgul, Michael Murg, Matthias Pachler, Herwig Pilaj, Stefan P. 
Schleicher, Edwin Woerdman, and from participants at the Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency KLE-DO lecture (2 April, 2015), the World 
Congress of Environmental and Resource Economists (June, 28 - July, 2, 2014), 
the Energy Systems Conference (24–25 June, 2014) and the 6th EDGaR Research 
Day (24 April, 2014). Any remaining errors are our own. 
115 In Section 4.2.2 we define which industry categories make up the energy sector. 
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hold, and exchange their allowances. For policymakers and businesses, 
these insights will be crucial for a better understanding of the functioning 
of the EU ETS. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
on allowance trading incentives for energy firms. Section 3 formulates 
hypotheses, upon which Section 4 discusses the methodology. The 
descriptive statistics are presented in Section 5. Section 6 provides the 
results and discussion. Section 7 concludes the chapter and discusses 
policy implications. 
2. Energy firms and allowance trade 
Theory suggests that demand for and supply of carbon allowances 
can realize an efficient allocation of pollution abatement (e.g., Baumol and 
Oates, 1988). If governments determine the allowance supply and if they 
have perfect information on the allowance demand of firms, for example, 
how demand changes as a function of the carbon contents of production, 
governments can allocate the first-best amounts of allowances to the 
carbon-regulated firms. Firms will adjust their emissions and, hence, 
production processes to these allowance allocations. And given this perfect 
allowance allocation, firms do not have allowance deficits or surpluses. 
Consequently, they do not need to source the carbon market. 
Given imperfect information and the resultant imperfect allowance 
allocations, firms may need to source the carbon market. As of the start of 
the EU ETS, this is especially the case for energy firms. EU Member States 
‘under-allocated’ electricity firms (i.e., they needed more allowances to 
cover their emissions than they received in allowance allocations), while 
other industrial sectors and the EU ETS as a whole were over-allocated. 
EU Member States considered that electricity firms were best able to cost-
effectively abate pollution through fuel switching, and that their 
production is not susceptible to international competition (e.g., Ellerman 
et al., 2007, Part I). 
Moreover, from an institutional point of view, energy firms source 
markets in matching their customers’ demand with the volatile nature of 
production. For example, spot or derivative markets allow dispatching a 
firm’s own plants (if available) but also tap into other firms' production 
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capacity (if needed).116,117 Carbon markets also provide such sourcing 
flexibility. For example, carbon markets enable firms with allowance 
deficits to ‘outsource’ the abatement of their pollution emissions to firms 
with allowance surpluses.118 
Such firm-market interactions are not only driven by production and 
pollution abatement costs. If the transaction costs for contracting property 
within firm boundaries are lower than the transaction costs for contracting 
market players’ property (e.g., on the carbon market), firms will consider 
more in- than outsourcing of their transactions. In the law and economics 
literature this is called the ‘make-or-buy’ decision.119 
Typical emissions trading schemes, including the EU ETS, share 
two characteristics which reduce the need for firms to source the carbon 
market, in other words, to behave ‘self-sufficiently’ (Hanemann, 2010; 
Kreutzer, 2006). The first characteristic is that firms can abate pollution 
emissions, and exchange allowances between subsidiaries before they opt 
for the carbon market (i.e., when within-firm options have run out). 
Despite the over-allocation of the EU ETS in aggregate, Jaraitė and Di 
Maria (2012) show that the energy sector did abate emissions (i.e., within 
firm boundaries).120 Moreover, especially larger firms in the combustion 
(i.e., energy) sector were likely to trade between their subsidiaries (e.g., 
Zaklan, 2013).121 
                                                        
116 The latter can be optimal, for example, if prevailing market prices are low 
and/or capacity and operational costs are high. 
117 The empirical literature on how energy firms actually optimize their capacity is 
scarce, primarily because these firm-level data are rarely (made) available. Typical 
analyses examine how bidding behavior is a function of market power (e.g., Hu et 
al., 2005; Perekhodtsev and Baselice, 2011). 
118 Another institutional argument is that in some countries where electricity 
prices are regulated (e.g. Spain), electricity firms have to prove the carbon costs in 
order to be allowed to pass-through the carbon price on the electricity price. This 
may be a reason they prefer to trade via the market, as to ensure that a market 
price is given. Our analysis accounts for country-effects due to a panel-data 
framework. 
119 The make-or-buy’ decision is inspired by Ronald Coase’s “Theory of the Firm” 
(Coase, 1937). 
120 Bel and Joseph (2015) show that the EU ETS cut emissions, but more pollution 
was abated because of the 2008/09 economic crisis. 
121 Moreover, the current (EC, 2009a) and previous (EC, 2003) EU ETS Directives 
allow (de facto) borrowing of allowances, as the next calendar year’s allocation will 
be received (in February) before the current year’s allowances need to be 
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The second characteristic facilitating self-sufficient behavior is that 
carbon allowances can be banked within and/or between compliance 
periods.122 This enables firms to optimize allowance holdings over time, for 
example, by hedging against future carbon price increases. Already at the 
beginning of the EU ETS, carbon forward and futures markets were 
considered to be liquid, and more so than spot markets (Zeitlberger and 
Brauneis, 2016). 
This chapter fills a gap in the firm-level empirical literature on 
allowance banking and trading. This literature is limited because, in 
addition to allocations and emissions, allowance transactions data are 
needed for estimates on the allowance banks. 123,124 Such transaction data 
are difficult to obtain from the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL), 
are only available after a time delay, and are not at the firm level.125 Most 
carbon market analyses therefore focus only on the (empirically available) 
allocations and emissions but lack allowance trade-behavioral analyses. 
This shortcoming is significant because the energy sector had the largest 
share of inter-firm trade in the EU ETS (Jong et al., 2014).  
This study analyzes factors that affect the extent to which firms trade 
allowances. By focusing on EUTL transactions, our analysis is comparable 
to Zaklan (2013) and Jaraitė and Kažukauskas (2014) in terms of 
                                                        
surrendered (in April). In Phase I (2005-2007), the energy sector borrowed most 
from its subsequent allocations (Jong et al., 2014). 
122 Only EU ETS Phase I (2005-2007) allowances could not be banked toward later 
phases. 
123 The theoretical literature is more developed. Most empirical literature 
analyzing changes in the allowance holdings of firms focuses on US emissions 
trading schemes. Examples of the findings are that SO2 allowance holdings are 
responsive to future changes in the cap (Ellerman and Montero, 2007); firms with 
higher SO2 pollution rates maintain relatively more allowances for precautionary 
purposes (Rousse and Sevi, 2007); and allowance holdings respond as expected 
to the convenience yield and to price differences between low- and high-sulphur 
coal (Considine and Larson, 2006). However, plant owners did not appear to take 
full advantage of the available cost savings the SO2 allowance market offered 
(Swinton, 2004).  
124 The only carbon allowance holdings estimates that we found were in Martino 
and Trotignon (2013) on EU ETS totals and in Hintermann (2015) at the electricity 
firm level. Both analyses concern Phase I but are limited to the annual level. 
125 This delay used to be five years, but a recent Commission Regulation (no. 
389/2013) decreased it to three years. Although Phase I allowances become void 
in Phase II, an analysis of Phase I is still useful when firms were incentivized to 
wind up their allowance holdings. 
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underlying data.126 Instead of including other EU ETS industrial sectors, 
this chapter concentrates on the energy sector (e.g., fossil fuels usage, fuel 
prices).127 It further tests for self-sufficiency vis-à-vis the carbon market, 
and takes into account allowance banking, and finance-related factors 
affecting trades (e.g., on arbitrage opportunities). As a result, this chapter 
contributes to an energy market-specific understanding for EU ETS 
policymakers, for example, whether and how firms actually utilize the 
carbon market in meeting their emission constraints. 
3. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
To capture the ‘make’ part in the abovementioned ‘make-or-buy’ 
concept, we assume that firms can behave self-sufficiently or spread their 
carbon costs within firm boundaries if they can flexibly adjust their carbon 
intensity of production. Energy firms can manage this carbon intensity 
through more and diverse production sources: by spreading the same 
production over a different number of installations and/or over different 
fuel-sourced installations (i.e., fuel switching). This also implies that 
allowance holdings will follow such within-firm optimization of 
production.128 The incentives to trade for self-sufficient firms are therefore 
reduced (but do not necessarily disappear) because they are better able 
than less self-sufficient firms to absorb market shocks. The first and 
second hypotheses are therefore as follows: 
(H.1) Self-sufficient firms trade less responsively than less self-
sufficient firms to changes in allowance demand. 
(H.2) Self-sufficient firms conduct more within- than between-firm 
trades than less self-sufficient firms.  
 
Key among these allowance demand factors is the firms’ EU ETS 
compliance. Firms are expected to surrender allowances corresponding to 
                                                        
126 Contrary to Jaraitė and Kažukauskas (2014), Betz and Schmidt (2015), and Fan 
et al. (2016) we do not distinguish between different EUTL account types but 
consider all transactions to be trades which occur to and from the accounts owned 
by the same firms, as in Balietti (2016) and Liu et al. (2016). Transactions are 
distinguished whether they occur within firm boundaries (i.e., INTRAGUO) or 
outside of firm boundaries (i.e., INTERGUO) (see Section 4.2.1).  
127 Only in cases where such firms take the opposite position in allowance 
transactions with an energy firm.  
128 Such within-firm holdings will be further optimized via the pooling, borrowing, 
and/or banking of allowances. 
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their emissions to avoid being penalized. Moreover, our sample runs 
towards the end of EU ETS Phase I, when Phase I allowances became void 
for Phase II. Firms are therefore expected to redeem their (Phase I) 
allowance surpluses. Given the incentives to both redeem allowance 
surpluses and surrender for allowance deficits, we hypothesize that the 
allowance holdings trajectory of firms is to minimize any differences 
between their allocations and emissions.129 The third hypothesis is 
therefore as follows: 
(H.3) Firms minimize their allocations and emissions differences 
through allowances purchases and sales, and these differences 
converge to zero towards the end of EU ETS Phase I.  
 
Furthermore, in managing their emissions, energy firms control two main 
channels. The first, production, generally needs to follow energy 
demand.130 Firms will need more (fewer) allowances when demand is 
higher (lower) than expected. The fourth hypothesis is thus as follows: 
(H.4) Allowance purchases are positively related to higher energy 
demand levels, and allowance sales are positively related to lower 
energy demand levels. 
 
The second channel affecting emissions, the emissions per unit of 
production, is typically controlled through fuel switching between gas and 
coal. Switching may not only be triggered by coal-gas price differences, but 
also if firms have limited alternative (non-fossil) fuels to produce energy. 
Given that more emissions are involved with coal than with gas, thus 
requiring more allowances, we hypothesize as follows: 
(H.5.1) Firms purchase allowances if coal prices decrease and/or 
gas prices increase.  
(H.5.2) The effect of H.5.1 is amplified if fossil-based fuels (i.e., coal 
and gas) make up a larger part of the inputs. 
 
Moreover, meeting allowance demand from production and emissions can 
be costly if carbon price and volume risks are not accounted for. As energy 
                                                        
129 Yet, firms may want to make sure to have sufficient reserves of allowances to 
cover emissions at or close to the end of Phase I, when it might be costly to cover 
for (unforeseen) allowance shortfalls. 
130 ‘Smart’ energy (e.g., through interruptible contracts) was not important as a 
source of supply in our sample period.  
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production, and thus emissions, is volatile and typically planned months 
or even years in advance, derivative markets can prevent these risks from 
adversely affecting production decisions.131,132 Based on the reasoning of 
Smith Jr. (2008), firms are likely to hedge on the carbon market when they 
have few within-firm possibilities to optimize their costs – in other words, 
when they cannot behave self-sufficiently. Hence, less self-sufficient firms 
will not only trade more frequently, they will also up- and downscale their 
carbon allowance holdings according to the volatility of energy production. 
We expect here that systematic purchasing and selling, or ‘bi-directional’ 
trading, is indicative of hedging. Conversely, the transactions of self-
sufficient firms are expected to be ‘uni-directional’, implying that they 
predominantly purchase (sell) when allocations-to-emissions gaps are 
negative (positive). The sixth hypothesis is therefore as follows: 
(H.6.1) Self-sufficient firms have a propensity to trade uni-
directionally,  
(H.6.2) Less self-sufficient firms have a propensity to trade bi-
directionally. 
 
Finally, this analysis will take into account that firms purchase from or sell 
to the carbon market to trade given arbitrage opportunities and price 
expectations. In EU ETS Phase I (2005-2007) carbon forward and futures 
markets were considered to be liquid, which was less the case for spot 
markets (Zeitlberger and Brauneis, 2016). With (spot) market illiquidity 
the carbon price may not reflect all publicly available information, which 
could be due to missing market participants in this phase. Better informed, 
active participants therefore might have been able to use mispricing. For 
firms trading allowances, differences between spot and forward or futures 
markets can give arbitrage opportunities. For example, given negligible 
storage costs of allowances and differences between spot and futures 
prices, firms can profit by purchasing allowances via the spot market in the 
                                                        
131 The possibility of banking allowances is one of the main conditions for carbon 
derivatives (e.g., Maeda, 2004). In addition, allowance banking has been an 
efficient strategy to reduce compliance costs (e.g., Ellerman and Montero, 2007). 
132 Carbon hedging structures depend on the selected timeframes and market 
prices in the portfolio. However, because the carbon price behaves in a volatile 
and discontinuous manner, hedging structures can unexpectedly lose their 
optimality (Daskalakis et al., 2009).  
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present and by selling them later via futures markets, and vice versa. For 
these two elements, we hypothesize the following: 
(H.7) Firms trade allowances given carbon price expectations and 
arbitrage opportunities between carbon spot and futures prices. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 The model setup 
For the response variable, the daily net allowance amounts traded, 
we take the within-day allowance transactions from the European 
Transaction Log (EUTL). We aggregate and, hence, net these transactions 
towards the daily level.133,134,135 To tackle the small to extremely large 
                                                        
133 Most corporate owners of the EUTL accounts were identified by the ‘Ownership 
Links and Enhanced EUTL Dataset’ through their Bureau van Dijk’s (BvD) 
company codes. The dataset (Jaraitė et al., 2013b) as well as the technical report 
(Jaraitė et al., 2013a) are joint efforts by researchers from different EU-based 
universities. 
134 This aggregation only affects cases where similar parties conducted multiple 
daily transactions. In addition, because firms are aggregated at the national and 
‘Global Ultimate Owner’ (GUO) levels (cf. Section 4.2.1), allowance trades between 
national GUO-subsidiaries are netted out. Furthermore, for all of the regressions 
in Section 6, aggregating daily data to the monthly level does not improve the 
model fit (results are available upon request).  
135 The transactions from the EUTL are the settlements as recorded in the EU ETS 
allowance registries. A limitation is that the EUTL only provides the names of the 
purchasing and selling parties, the amounts settled, and the time-stamp of the 
settlement, but not the underlying price and the nature of the contract. This 
framework makes it difficult to distinguish spot transactions from over-the-
counter (OTC) or exchange-based derivatives that may have initiated, 
intermediated, or finalized the EUTL settlements. An indication regarding the 
delivery of futures can be obtained by identifying the trade activity in EUTL 
exchange clearing accounts (Martino and Trotignon, 2013), but because most of 
the Phase I trades took place OTC, this identification would capture only a small 
share of the futures trades. Forwards and futures allow firms to flexibly upgrade 
or downgrade the exposure that they consider to be optimal. For example, 
exposure can be lowered by adjusting the corresponding derivative positions (e.g., 
going long while maintaining an overall short position), whereby exchanges of 
allowance ownership can be cancelled. EUTL transactions are allowance 
ownership exchanges that must have been beneficial to both transacting parties. 
We therefore assume that these EUTL transactions are spot trades. However, 
without the initiated and intermediated transactions, the net benefits of the 
‘unobserved’ observations (i.e., the latent demand) cannot be estimated. As 
inferences on the firms’ decisions to trade are difficult to make, we are limited to 
estimating the volume and sign of the observed transactions only.  
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transaction amounts and thereby stabilize the variance, we transformed 
these transaction amounts by taking the natural logarithm. We next 
considered a ‘double-hurdle’ model, as applied in Jaraitė and Kažukauskas 
(2014). However, this model does not allow the values to be either 
negative, zero, or positive (i.e., for allowance purchases and sales). Jaraitė 
and Kažukauskas (2014) therefore separated the data into two dependent 
variables: one where firms conducted zero or net purchases, and one where 
firms conducted zero or net sales.136 The data shows that many firms both 
purchased and sold allowances, not only during the day but also across 
days. An example of their behavior is to be net purchasers at day t but net 
sellers at day t+1.  
To accommodate that logarithm-transformed and, hence, 
continuous values can be negative, zero, and positive, we therefore set up 
the dependent variable through the ‘neglog’ transformation (see e.g., 
Whittaker et al., 2005) in the following way: 
TRADEi,t = sign(Wi,t) ln(|Wi,t | + 1)    (1) 
 
where net trade Wi,t = PURCHi,t – SELLi,t, PURCHi,t and SELLi,t are the 
allowance purchases and sales of firm i at time t, respectively, and 
sign(Wi,t) equals 1 if Wi,t > 0, 0 if Wi,t = 0 and –1 if Wi,t < 0.137  
                                                        
136 Moreover, given the many zeroes in the response variable, if the decision to 
trade is separate from the decision what amounts to exchange, the estimates 
would be inconsistent if the decision to trade was not random. The panel data 
approach of Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) allowed us to test for both this 
selection bias as well as the presence of endogenous regressors. In all regression 
setups the absence of selection bias and endogeneity cannot be rejected. For the 
endogenous regressor, we selected the country and daily average of the 
temperatures from European weather stations as recorded in the European 
Climate Assessment & Dataset (Klein Tank et al., 2002). The reason we selected 
temperature is that it should only indirectly affect the emissions per unit of 
production and thus the demand for carbon allowances. For example, 
temperatures affect the ability of water to cool down power plants and, thereby, 
affect the fuel source of choice (e.g., Fthenakis and Kim, 2010). Temperature 
changes also influence electricity demand (e.g., Pardo et al., 2002). 
137 According to Castellaneta and Zollo (2014), a standard log transformation and 
a shift parameter making all values positive may not yield asymptotical maximum 
likelihood results. The ‘neglog’ transformation “has the same advantages of the log 
function and also appropriately extends monotonicity to negative values. […] This 
property is particularly important for financial variables where the sign of the 
variable corresponds to profit and loss” (Castellaneta and Zollo, 2014). 
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We apply a panel model framework to accommodate individual 
firms i and time t in our firm-level sample as follows: 
TRADEi,t = βCONSTANT + δ0NSSUFi +  
+ (β1+δ1NSSUFi)INTRAGUOi,t  
+ (β2+δ2NSSUFi)INTERGUOi,t  
+ (β3+δ3NSSUFi)LCTi,t  
+ (β4+δ4NSSUFi)(LCT)2i,t  
+ (β5+δ5NSSUFi) ∆LEDEMi,t  
+ (β6+δ6NSSUFi)EDEMi,t  
+ (β7+δ7NSSUFi) ∆FEDEMi,t  
+ (β8+δ8NSSUFi)BSPREADi,t  
+ (β9+δ9NSSUFi)SPREADi,t  
+ (β10+δ10NSSUFi)BDIRECTi,t  
+ (β11+δ11NSSUFi)UDIRECTi,t  
+ (β12+δ12NSSUFi)BSSi,t  
+ (β13+δ13NSSUFi)CCAi,t 
+ (β14+δ14NSSUFi)QUARTER1i,t  
+ (β15+δ15NSSUFi)QUARTER2i,t  
+ (β16+δ16NSSUFi)QUARTER4i,t + µi + εi, t  (2)  
 
where subscript i stands for the firm (1, …, 1549) and t for the trading day 
over EU ETS Phase I (February 7, 2005 to April 30, 2008).138 TRADEi,t is 
the response variable capturing the daily net allowance amounts traded, 
and βCONSTANT is the intercept coefficient. The dummy variable NSSUFi is a 
                                                        
138 The econometric tests performed on the data point towards the use of panel 
data models, which account for auto-correlated, heteroskedastic, and panel-
correlated structures of the error term. The Breusch-Pagan LM test rejected the 
pooled model, and the panel data Wooldridge test for autocorrelation rejected the 
null of no first-order autocorrelation, while the modified Wald statistic rejected 
the null of group-wise homoscedasticity. We considered it feasible to use 
generalized least squares models with correlated disturbances, but, unfortunately, 
we abandoned this effort after Stata 12 was unable to provide results. We therefore 
selected a fixed effects model with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors and a random 
effects model with panel-corrected Prais-Winsten standard errors. If the 
Hausman test rejected the random effects model, we selected the Driscoll-Kraay 
fixed effects model, and we selected the Prais-Winsten random effects model if 
otherwise. As the Prais-Winsten model allows for different autocorrelation 
structures, those with the best R2 fits were selected. These autocorrelations are 
common or panel-specific and via time-series or Durbin-Watson setups. For the 
Driscoll-Kraay models, the default lag order of autocorrelation was selected. 
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self-sufficiency indicator and is applied as an interaction term (see Section 
4.3.1 below). The coefficients β1 to β16 capture the base effects, namely from 
the more self-sufficient firms (i.e., when NSSUFi=0). If significant, the 
coefficients δ1 to δ16 shift the intercept βCONSTANT and the slopes on the 
regressors (i.e., from INTRAGUOi,t to QUARTER4i,t). Hence, these 
coefficients capture the differential impacts for less self-sufficient firms 
(i.e., when NSSUFi=1). Both Yi,t, NSSUFi, and the regressors are discussed 
in the remainder of Section 4. Finally, this panel model framework allows 
for unobserved fixed effects µi (see footnote 138). The idiosyncratic shocks 
are captured by εi,t. 
4.2 Defining firm and energy sector boundaries 
4.2.1 Defining firm boundaries 
Our data sources have not recorded the level at which allowance 
trades are managed within firms (e.g., centralized or decentralized). Any 
assumed allowance management structure is therefore correct for some 
firms but inadequate for others.139 We aggregated firm-specific data over 
the following two ‘levels’: 1) per country and 2) per Global Ultimate Owner 
(GUO).140,141,142 The reason for using the country level is that EU ETS 
compliance is a national matter, and most EU electricity markets are 
national. As for the GUO level, we consider it likely that subsidiaries within 
                                                        
139 Future research may be needed to show the impacts of these industry-structure 
trade-offs. 
140 GUOs are the ‘ultimate’ shareholders by controlling at least 50.01% of the 
shares. An example resulting from this country-GUO merger is that the UK 
subsidiary (i.e., the country) of GDF SUEZ (i.e., the GUO) contains all of the 
domestic energy production and UK-registered allowance trades of International 
Power Ltd. (and others, such as Cofely District Energy Ltd.). In the sample, GDF 
SUEZ operates in 13 EU member states. It therefore controls 13 of such ‘separate’ 
country-GUO entities in the sample. 
141 In calculating SIZE, per GUO we sum all of the energy-related operators’ assets. 
GUO-wide assets could be requested, but this approach would incorporate asset 
values from outside the EU. These assets are then averaged over the 2004-2009 
period due to year gaps for several companies (e.g., only 2005 and 2007 but not 
2006) and instances where the data started later (e.g., in 2006 instead of 2005). 
142 There are two main types of EU ETS accounts held by firms: Operator Holding 
Accounts (OHA) and Person Holding Accounts (PHA). Firms have an OHA for 
each of their installations. PHAs are not installation-specific, and can function as 
‘central’ accounts from which firms conduct trade. We agree that this distinction 
between account types can provide a degree of (de)centralization. Yet, Bureau van 
Dijk’s company database does not have firm details available at the installation 
level. We were therefore necessitated to select the national level. 
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the same country had a (nationally) coordinated allowance management 
system rather than a decentralized system.143 
To indicate whether trades took place within a specific GUO such 
that a firm pools resources and thus behaves self-sufficiently, we create the 
following dummy variable:  
INTRAGUOi,t  
= ΣINTRAGUO(PURCHi,t + SALESi,t)/ ΣINTRAGUO+INTERGUO(PURCHi,t + SALESi,t)  
if ΣINTRAGUO+INTERGUO(PURCHi,t + SALESi,t) ≠ 0 
= 0    
if ΣINTRAGUO+INTERGUO(PURCHi,t + SALESi,t) = 0  (3) 
 
so that INTRAGUOi,t equals the proportion of a firm´s daily trade among 
subsidiaries, and equals zero if the firm does not trade.144 Analogous to 
INTRAGUOi,t we create the dummy variable to indicate whether trades 
took place between GUOs to capture whether firms do not behave self-
sufficiently:  
INTERGUOi,t  
= ΣINTERGUO(PURCHi,t + SALESi,t)/ ΣINTRAGUO+INTERGUO(PURCHi,t + SALESi,t)  
if ΣINTRAGUO+INTERGUO(PURCHi,t + SALESi,t) ≠ 0 
= 0    
if ΣINTRAGUO+INTERGUO(PURCHi,t + SALESi,t) = 0  (4) 
 
so that INTERGUOi,t equals the proportion of a firm´s daily trade between 
other firms’ subsidiaries, and equals zero if the firm does not trade. For 
Hypothesis H.1 to be accepted, namely that self-sufficient firms have more 
within- than between-firm trades, the regression coefficients will need to 
be such that |βINTRAGUO|>|βINTERGUO|. 
 
                                                        
143 Furthermore, of the total number of identified firms (1549), 227 firms did not 
trade and were left out of the sample.  
144 The model setup captures allowance holding behavior where (self-sufficient) 
firms first shift their allowances to one or multiple central EU ETS accounts and, 
right before the allowance surrender date (the 1st of May), move the required 
allowances back to their installation accounts. Such trades are between 
subsidiaries (i.e., INTRAGUOi,t > 0), the allowance holdings are to minimize 
allocation-emissions differences (see Section 4.4 below), and trade is uni-
directional (see Section 4.6 below). Furthermore, such firms are labelled as 
infrequent allowance trading firms (i.e., FRQi = 1) (see Section 4.3.2 below). 
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4.2.2 Defining energy sector boundaries 
At the operator (not the conglomerate) level, we obtained the 
industry classification NACE Rev. 2 primary and secondary codes. NACE 
codes and, hence, firms were selected if they were active in the electricity 
value chain. Our selection of NACE codes includes the following:  
- ‘coal’: ‘mining of hard coal’, ‘mining of lignite’, and ‘extraction of peat’; 
- ‘electricity’: ‘electric power generation, transmission and distribution’, 
‘production of electricity’, ‘transmission of electricity’, ‘distribution of 
electricity’, ‘trade of electricity’, and ‘electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply’; 
- ‘gas’: ‘electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply’, ‘extraction of 
natural gas’, ‘manufacture of gas; distribution of gaseous fuels through 
mains’, ‘manufacture of gas’, ‘distribution of gaseous fuels through mains’, 
‘trade of gas through mains’, and ‘extraction of crude petroleum and 
natural gas’; 
- ‘petroleum’: ‘extraction of crude petroleum’, and ‘extraction of crude 
petroleum and natural gas’; 
- ‘uranium’: ‘mining of uranium and thorium ores’, and ‘processing of 
nuclear fuel’; and  
- ‘other’: ‘steam and air conditioning supply’, ‘wholesale of solid, liquid and 
gaseous fuels and related products’, and ‘transport via pipeline’. 
Hence, the energy sector as defined here encompasses both 
electricity firms but also ‘non-electricity’ firms. For example, these firms 
extract fuels, trade, and transport energy. In the remainder of the text, 
references to ‘firms’ encompass both electricity and non-electricity firms. 
4.3 Interaction terms and sample subsets 
4.3.1 Interaction terms 
As shown above in Section 4.1 and equation (2), the dummy variable 
NSSUFi (i.e., ‘not self-sufficient’) is applied as an interaction term to test 
for the differential impacts of self-sufficiency. Since ‘self-sufficiency’ 
cannot equivocally be measured, we looked for two different indicators for 
NSSUFi.  
The first indicator we constructed is a composite indicator (EQPi) 
(i.e., ‘equipped’) from a set of constant and/or annual variables affecting 
the firms’ carbon intensity. For the second indicator we use the firms’ 
(natural logarithm) asset size (SIZEi). We expect that higher valuations of 
assets allow firms to behave self-sufficiently. Since EQPi yielded a lower 
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regression fit than SIZEi, we continue using only SIZEi (i.e., NSSUFi = 
{SIZEi}).145 We turned these into dummy variables, by designating values 
below the SIZE or EQP-median to equal 1, and 0 otherwise. 
To test whether self-sufficient firms trade less responsively to 
changes in allowance demand (i.e., Hypothesis H.2), the interaction terms 
δ1 to δ16 in equation (2), which correspond to the effects for less self-
sufficient firms, need to have an additional impact on the magnitude of the 
base terms of β1 to β16. Therefore, to accept H.2, all interaction terms δ 
need to be such that: |β+δ| > |β|.146 
 
4.3.2 Sample subsets 
Furthermore, we apply the regression from equation (2) (including 
the interaction terms) on subsets of the total sample. To expose differences 
in allowance trade incentives, these subsets are demarcated based on the 
firms’ frequency of allowance trade. We took two approaches to define this 
trade frequency. 
The first trade frequency subset, FRQi, is determined through the 
firm’s average Phase I allowance trade divided by its Phase I total amount 
exchanged. This variable converges to zero the more a firm trades.147 FRQi 
approaches one for infrequent traders. FRQi is also turned into a dummy 
variable – as we did above for SIZEi and EQPi. The second trade frequency 
subset is a dummy variable (ELECi) which equals 1 if a firm owns or 
controls at least one electricity installation and 0 otherwise. The reasoning 
is that electricity firms are among the most active traders in the carbon 
market. 
4.4 Allowance demand: compliance 
Hypothesis H.3 posits that firms minimize their allocations and 
emissions differences, and these differences converge to zero towards the 
                                                        
145 All of the setups using SIZEi result in better regression fit (R2) values than with 
EQPi. For the discussion below, we therefore selected the SIZEi interaction term. 
Indirectly, this analysis will also contribute to the transaction costs literature, 
which posits that both EU ETS implementation and trading costs are declining by 
firm size (e.g., Jaraitė et al., 2010). The discussion of the composite indicator EQPi 
is available upon request. 
146 Moreover, in Section 4.2.1 we mention that, to accept Hypothesis H.1, the 
regression coefficients need to be such that |βINTRAGUO|<|βINTERGUO|. Given the 
absence of the interaction term δ, this inequality does not rule out that 
INTERGUOi,t or INTRAGUOi,t meet the conditions for Hypothesis H.2. 
147 We calculated (1/T ∑Tt=1 PURCHi,t + SELLi,t) / ( ∑Tt=1 PURCHi,t + SELLi,t). 
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end of EU ETS Phase I. We therefore constructed a compliance trajectory 
indicator (LCTi,t) to capture whether allowance holdings follow a trajectory 
that minimizes the difference between allocations (ALLOCi) and emissions 
(EMISSi) taking into account purchases (PURCHi,t) and sales (SELLi,t). 
LCTi,t is defined as follows: 
LCTi,t = sign(Zj,t-1) ln(|Zj,t-1| + 1)       (5) 
Zj,t-1 = ∑Ji ⊂ j [ALLOCi – EMISSi + ∑tt=1 PURCHi,t-1 – ∑tt=1 SELLi,t-1]    (6) 
 
where ∑Tt=1 PURCHi,t-1 and ∑Tt=1 SELLi,t-1 are the cumulative allowance 
purchases and sales from t = 1, the first day as of when trades commenced 
in EU ETS Phase I (Monday, February 7th, 2005), to T = 843 days 
(Wednesday, April 30th, 2008), and where sign(Zj,t-1) equals 1 if Zj,t-1 > 0, 0 
if Zj,t-1 = 0 and –1 if Zj,t-1 < 0, and where subscript j stands for the 
conglomerate to which firm i belongs.148,149 
Zj,t-1 is calculated for every trading day t. It is the difference between 
what a firm expects to be allocated and will have emitted over the whole 
Phase I, taking into account its cumulative trading until day t.150 Firms are 
expected to trade allowances to decrease their allowance positions: if Zj,t-
1>0, they are allocated or have purchased more allowances than they sold 
                                                        
148 A ratio would be less useful for LCTi,t because these four parameters can take 
up zero or positive values in all combinations. For example, also firms with zero 
allocations and zero emissions are expected to have sold their allowances at the 
end of Phase I. 
149 Through the four variables which cumulatively make up the allowance holdings 
within Zj,t, LCTi,t implicitly takes allowance banking and borrowing into account 
within Phase I (2005-2007). Firms can bank allowances if they can carry forward 
allowances for later compliance or trading purposes (i.e., when the allowances are 
not rendered invalid over time). Moreover, firms can borrow allowances by 
meeting their current year’s obligations with the allowance allocations they 
received for the upcoming year. In addition, defining LCTi,t at the conglomerate 
level (j) prevents diverging values when allowances are pooled within firm 
boundaries. 
150 For emissions (EMISSi), we take the (ex-post) verified sum of emissions over 
Phase I. Firms will be (formally) certain of their emissions upon receiving their 
monitoring reports (i.e., after each calendar year). As energy production is 
typically booked ahead of time, we assume that firms are able to predict their 
cumulative emissions within a certain bandwidth. Based on these estimates, 
future allocations of allowances should be predictable as well given the terms laid 
out in the Phase I National Allocation Plans. We therefore take the sum of the 
three allocations (to be) received over Phase I (ALLOCi). It is then up to firms to 
minimize any differences between their allocations and emissions through 
purchases and sales. 
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or needed to cover for their emissions, et vice versa. LCTi,t subsequently 
transforms Zj,t-1 (as is done with TRADEi,t) since values of Zj,t-1 are (also) 1) 
continuous, 2) negative, zero, or positive, and 3) small to extremely large. 
Besides, while LCTi,t is considered at t, it is a function of Zj,t-1 which is at t-
1 (i.e., 1-day lagged). This is done so that yesterday’s deviations from Zj,t-1 
≠ 0 incentivize firms to trade today. LCTi,t is therefore constructed so that 
positive (negative) values should initiate firms to sell (purchase) 
allowances.151,152 
Since TRADEi,t is larger (smaller) than zero with allowance 
purchases (sales), LCTi,t should be negatively related to TRADEi,t for 
Hypothesis H.3 to be accepted.  
4.5 Allowance demand: energy demand and fuel-switching 
Hypothesis H.4 posits that allowance purchases are positively 
related to higher energy demand levels, and allowance sales are positively 
related to lower energy demand levels. To test H.4, we relate the (country-
level) current monthly MWh electricity demand (EDEMi,t), its change with 
respect to the previous month (∆LEDEMi,t), and its change with respect to 
the next month (∆FEDEMi,t) to allowance trade.153,154 Firms that are self-
sufficient are expected to be less responsive with respect to their allowance 
purchases to electricity demand changes. 
Moreover, to test whether firms purchase allowances if coal prices 
decrease and/or gas prices increase (i.e., Hypothesis H.5.2). we approach 
                                                        
151 This approach can be considered analogous to Kerr and Maré (1999), where the 
trade decision depends on the trade value to be gained minus the transaction 
costs. 
152 Yet, despite the natural logarithm transformation on Zj,t-1, values closer to zero 
may lower the need for firms to trade allowances (e.g., footnote 129).  
153 National electricity demand is obtained via the ENTSO-E country packages. It 
is only available from 2006 and onward. It is not available for Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Sweden. The dataset comprises of monthly data. The monthly data smooth 
the volatile and non-linear nature of daily electricity production.  
154 This is an ex-post constructed variable, hence, it is not based on ex-ante 
expectations on energy demand. By selecting an ex-post variable our approach 
does not account for the bias that energy firms may be behaving precautionary by 
ensuring more than sufficient supplies relative to demand (e.g, Tanrisever et al., 
2015). Yet, the setup of these energy demand variables, namely through a moving 
time window, should account for both the forward-looking demand and 
backward-looking demand (i.e., ex-post corrections on previous expectations on 
demand). At the same time, this prevents the model from becoming overly 
complicated, for example, through the use of ex-ante stochastic approaches.  
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the propensity for switching via the coal–gas price difference: SPREADt = 
ln(COALt – GASt).155 Firms have an incentive to switch to gas with a larger 
spread. Since gas is less carbon-intensive than coal, fewer allowances are 
needed to cover for the emissions. Hence, SPREAD should be negatively 
related to TRADEi,t in order to accept Hypothesis H.5.1.  
In order to approach the effect if, additional to this negative 
relationship, coal and gas fuels make up a larger part of the inputs (i.e., 
Hypothesis H.5.2) we look at the interaction of this fuel price differential 
with the share of fossil fuels in electricity production 
(SPREADt*BROWNi,t) resulting in BSPREADi,t (i.e. the “brown spread”).156 
In order to accept Hypothesis H.5.2, BSPREADi,t should be more 
negatively related to TRADEi,t, than SPREADt . )This is because firms with 
higher shares of fossil fuels (i.e., higher BROWNi,t levels) will need to be 
more responsive to coal and gas price changes than firms which can make 
more use of non-fossil fuel inputs..157 
4.6 Allowance demand: trade direction, arbitrage, price 
expectations 
Hypothesis H.6.1 states that self-sufficient firms have a propensity 
to trade ‘uni-directionally’ and Hypothesis H.6.2 states that less self-
sufficient firms have a propensity to trade ‘bi-directionally’.158 The ‘uni-
directionality’ index, UDIRECTi,t, denotes what proportion of daily trade 
came about through either purchases or sales, and is defined as follows: 
 
 
                                                        
155 The (EU-wide) data are obtained from Datastream: GAS is the London Natural 
Gas Index, and COAL is the Global Coal New Castle Index. Because we lack the 
exact composition of fossil fuels at the installation and (therefore) the firm level, 
switching prices could not be estimated, as in Bertrand (2012), for example. 
156 Data on electricity production (in MWh) were obtained from Carma.org at the 
installation level; the fuel input percentages were only available at the firm level. 
We linked up these companies with the BvD codes, as with the EUTL accounts. In 
addition, because Carma.org provides the 2004, 2009, and ‘future’ electricity 
production, the installations’ MWh values for 2005 to 2007 were linearly 
extrapolated. 
157 The fuel shares are such that BROWNi,t + HYDROi,t + NUCLEARi,t + 
RENEWABLEi,t add up to 1, and refer to the shares of fossil (incl. gas and coal), 
hydro-electric, renewable, and nuclear fuels, respectively.  
158 For the uni-directionality and bi-directionality indices we drew inspiration 




= abs(PURCHi,t – SELLi,t) / (PURCHi,t + SELLi,t)   
if PURCHi,t , SELLi,t ≠ 0 
= 0 
if PURCHi,t , SELLi,t = 0     (7) 
 
The ‘bi-directionality’ index, BDIRECTi,t, denotes what proportion of daily 
trade came about through a combination of both purchases and sales. 
BDIRECTi,t is defined as follows: 
BDIRECTi,t  
= 1 – abs(PURCHi,t – SELLi,t) / (PURCHi,t + SELLi,t)  
if PURCHi,t , SELLi,t ≠ 0 
= 0 
if PURCHi,t , SELLi,t = 0     (8) 
 
As provided in equations (7) and (8), the indices are equal to zero if no 
trade occurred at day t (i.e. both PURCHi,t and SELLi,t are equal to zero). 
For Hypothesis H.6.1 to be accepted, namely that self-sufficient 
firms have a propensity for uni-directional trade, it should hold that 
|βUDIRECT| > |βBDIRECT|. For H.6.2, namely that less self-sufficient firms have 
a propensity to trade bi-directionally, it should hold that 
|βBDIRECT+δBDIRECT| > |βUDIRECT+δUDIRECT|. The two conditions for H.6.1 and 
H.6.2 can hold both, for example, if δBDIRECT and δUDIRECT are sufficiently 
large and small, respectively. 
For the seizing of price expectations, we assume firms are price 
takers. By not knowing to where the carbon price will go, these firms will 
trade according to their anchor price. For this anchor price we selected the 
‘buy-sell signal’ (BSSt). BSSt contains the difference between the current 
carbon spot price and its 30-day moving average. If today’s price is higher 
(lower) than the 30-day moving average, it indicates it is profitable to sell 
(buy) allowances, because they are more (less) expensive than average. As 
firms would sell (purchase) with positive (negative) ‘buy-sell signal’ 
spreads, the first part of Hypothesis H.7 is accepted if TRADEi,t is 
negatively related to BSSt.  
For the seizing of arbitrage opportunities, we selected the ‘cash-and-
carry arbitrage’ (CCAt), which is a proxy for (risk-free) arbitrage 
opportunities. CCAt is the difference between the time-discounted carbon 
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futures price minus the spot price and reflects the opportunity costs of 
keeping allowances.159 Firms purchase (sell) allowances when the time-
discounted carbon futures price is higher (lower) than the spot price. The 
second part of Hypothesis H.7 is therefore accepted if TRADEi,t is 
positively related to CCAi,t. 
5. Descriptive statistics  
This section provides the descriptive statistics based on the self-
sufficiency and trade frequency indicators, as discussed in Section 4.3.  
 
  
                                                        
159 Specifically, CO2FUTt-CO2SPOTt*erT, where r is the one-month EURIBOR 
rate, CO2FUT is the ICE Phase I average continuous futures CO2 price, and 
CO2SPOT is the EEX-EU CO2 settlement (spot) price. The (EU-wide) data are 




 Table 2: TRADEi,t, LCTi,t, energy demand (∆LEDEMi,t, EDEMi,t, 
∆FEDEMi,t), and fuel switching statistics (BSPREADi,t, SPREADt) with 
respect to the interaction terms on SIZEi and the subsamples on ELECi, 
and FRQi. 
  
















TRADE small mean -0.021 -0.021 -0.022  -0.042 -0.012 *** 
 
small sd 0.639 0.673 0.632  0.917 0.460  
TRADE large mean 0.024 0.038*** 0.012*** *** 0.037*** -0.005*** *** 
 
large sd 1.733 2.063 1.354  2.054 0.476  
LCT small mean 2.769 1.685 2.989 *** 1.190 3.482 *** 
 
small sd 9.439 10.011 9.303  10.638 8.751  
LCT large mean 2.987 2.770*** 3.189*** *** 2.290*** 4.579*** *** 
 
large sd 12.148 13.009 11.283  13.006 9.727  
SPREAD small/large mean 3.776 3.776 3.776  3.776 3.776  
 small/large sd 0.266 0.266 0.266  0.266 0.266  
BSPREAD small mean 0.441 2.614 0 *** 0.413 0.454 *** 
 
small sd 1.139 1.417 0  1.115 1.149  
BSPREAD large mean 1.235 2.562*** 0 *** 1.424*** 0.806*** *** 
 
large sd 1.591 1.360 0  1.623 1.425  
EDEM small mean 9.417 9.657 9.368 *** 9.500 9.379 *** 
 
small sd 1.197 1.334 1.161  1.368 1.109  
EDEM large mean 9.727 9.887*** 9.578*** *** 9.796*** 9.568*** *** 
 
large sd 1.226 1.230 1.203  1.222 1.220  
∆LEDEM small mean -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 *** -0.008 -0.004 *** 
 small sd 0.104 0.115 0.101  0.127 0.092  
∆LEDEM large mean -0.005 -0.006 -0.004** *** -0.006*** -0.004 *** 
 large sd 0.105 0.110 0.099  0.108 0.095  
∆FEDEM small mean 0.007 0.008 0.007 *** 0.011 0.005 *** 
 
small sd 0.089 0.097 0.088  0.102 0.083  
∆FEDEM large mean 0.006 0.007*** 0.005*** *** 0.007*** 0.004*** *** 
 large sd 0.090 0.093 0.088  0.092 0.087  
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The upper (lower) means and standard deviations refer to the firms with high 
(low) SIZEi values. The asterisks indicate the significance of the difference in 
means (*** / ** / * are significant at 99% / 95% / 90% confidence). To check the 
significance of the SIZE-differences, we follow the two-group mean-comparison 
approach in Cameron and Trivedi (2009, p. 78) through a regression of the 
respective variable on SIZE while applying heteroskedastic-consistent standard 
errors. 
The significance asterisks in the “Diff” column correspond to the mean difference 
between the subsets (e.g. ELEC and FRQ) but where SIZE of firms is fixed, for 
example, small electricity versus small non-electricity firms. The other asterisks 
(i.e. those not in the “Diff” column) correspond to the mean differences within 
subsets but between small and large firms, for example, between small and large 
electricity firms (i.e. where ELEC=0).  
The variable definitions and measurement units are as follows: 
- SIZEi: = 1 if ln(total assets 2004-2009 average) > sample median, 0 otherwise 
(firm, constant level). Hence, a firm is large (small) if SIZE equals one (zero).  
- FRQi: = 1 if > sample median, 0 otherwise, where FRQi = (1/T ΣTt=1 (PURCHi,t + 
SELLi,t)) / ΣTt=1 (PURCHi,t + SELLi,t) (firm, constant level). Hence, a firm is a 
(non-)frequent trader if FRQ equals one (zero).  
- ELECi: =1 if firm controls at least one electricity installation, 0 otherwise (firm, 
constant level) 
- TRADEi,t: Daily net allowance trade in (cf. equation (1)) (in: ln(tonnes CO2)) 
(firm, daily level) 
- LCTi,t: Lagged compliance trajectory (cf. equation (5) and (6)) (in: ln(tonnes 
CO2)) (firm, daily level) 
- SPREADt: Price returns coal minus gas (in: ln(€)) (EU-wide, daily level) 
- BSPREADi,t: Weighted coal-gas price returns: BROWNi,t * SPREADt, where 
- BROWNi: Firm's (national) MWh production by fossil fuels (in: %) (firm, daily 
level) 
- EDEMi,t: Monthly demand for national electricity (in: ln(MWh)) (country, 
monthly level) 
- ∆FEDEMi,t: Difference next minus current electricity demand (in: ln(MWh)) 
(country, monthly level) 
- ∆LEDEMi,t: Difference current minus previous month’s electricity demand (in: 
ln(MWh)) (country, monthly level) 
 
Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations for the daily net 
allowance trade (TRADEi,t), the lagged compliance trajectory (LCTi,t), fuel 
switching (SPREADi,t and BSPREADt), and energy demand (∆LEDEMi,t to 
∆FEDEMi,t). The asterisks in the “Diff” column correspond to the mean 
difference between subsets (e.g. ELEC and FRQ) among while holding the 
size of firms fixed, for example, small frequent traders versus small 
infrequent traders firms (i.e. FRQ=0 versus FRQ=1). The asterisks which 
are not in the “Diff” column indicate the significance of the differences in 
means between small and large firms, for example, within the subset of 
electricity firms (i.e. where ELEC=0). 
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The TRADEi,t averages are close to zero mainly because of the many 
non-trades, but also because the average purchases almost equal the 
average sales (not shown here). In general, large firms are on average 
purchasers (i.e., TRADEi,t > 0) and small firms are sellers. Only between 
small electricity and small non-electricity firms is the mean difference not 
significant.  
As mentioned in Section 4.4, the lagged compliance trajectory 
(LCTi,t) should converge to zero 1) to prevent penalties when having too 
few allowances in stock and 2) to redeem superfluous allowances. Table 2 
shows the LCTi,t values are positive in all cases, which is likely a result of 
the Phase I allowance oversupply (or demand shortage). On average, all 
firms were running allowance surpluses (i.e. given LCT > 0). Large firms 
were running larger surpluses than small firms.  
As for the fuel inputs used, we assumed that all firms follow the same 
EU-wide gas and coal price indices. This approach results in an equal 
average coal-gas price differential (SPREADt) for all of the firms (mean: 
3.78, sd: 0.27). In addition, because BSPREADi,t is a multiple of SPREADt 
and BROWNi,t (i.e., the fossil share in electricity production), differences 
in BSPREADi,t emanate from BROWNi,t. By definition, BROWNi,t is zero 
for non-electricity producers. Table 2 shows that large electricity 
producers have lower average fossil shares (i.e. smaller BROWNi,t and thus 
lower BSPREADi,t values) than small electricity producers. 
Regarding energy demand, Table 2 shows higher electricity demand 
(EDEMi,t) is associated with larger firms. This may be due to the country-
specific nature of EDEM, and the fact that these firms operate in national 
markets with higher MWh demands (i.e., larger EU member states). Table 
2 further suggests an upward trend of electricity demand since, on average, 
the next minus current month’s electricity demand (∆FEDEM) is positive, 
whereas the current minus the previous month’s electricity demand 
(∆LEDEM) is negative. Both type of differences are generally smaller for 
large firms than for small firms, although the ∆LEDEM-differences are not 
significant among electricity firms and frequent traders. 
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Figure 3: Regressor over time: compliance trajectory (LCTi,t) based on 
SIZE, ELEC, and FRQ 
The firm-averaged Lagged Compliance Trajectory (LCTi,t) for firms which are: 
small vs. large (SIZE: Panel A), produce electricity or not (ELEC: Panel B), and 
are frequent vs. non-frequent traders (FRQ: Panel C) 
 
Figure 3 plots the firm-averaged Lagged Compliance Trajectory 
(LCTi,t) based on the interaction term on self-sufficiency (i.e., SIZE) and 
the trade frequency subsets (i.e., ELEC and FRQ).160 Despite some 
stagnations it shows that LCTi,t gradually converges to zero. What is visible 
from the panels is that the small (panel A), the non-electricity (panel B), 
and the non-frequent trader firms (panel C) adhere better to a path of 
gradual convergence to zero for their LCTi,t values than the large (panel A), 
the electricity (panel B) and the frequent trader firms (panel C). It is also 
this first group that sees a drop in LCT in the last weeks of Phase I, and 
more so than the second group.  
Figure 3 further shows that, towards the end of Phase I, firms kept 
sizeable amounts of allowances in stock.161 When the small firms’ final 
                                                        
160 The scatter plot of LCTi,t with the response variable, TRADEi,t, results in a 
quadratic relationship (not shown here). We therefore include a squared term of 
LCTi,t in the regression analysis below.  
161 Hintermann (2015) conjectures this stocking of allowances could be a strategy 
1) for precautionary purposes (i.e. to have enough in stock before the end of Phase 
I), and 2) to profit from a higher carbon price (i.e. if, due to conducive product 
demand elasticities, the product price increases more than the carbon price). 
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Phase I demand became certain, these firms were triggered to redeem their 
superfluous allowances. 
 
Table 4: Trade direction (UDIRECTi,t and BDIRECTi,t), arbitrage (CCAt), 
price expectations (BSSt), and intra- and inter-GUO trade (resp. 
INTRAGUO and INTERGUO) statistics with respect to the interaction 
terms on SIZEi and the subsets on ELECi, and FRQi. 


















UDIRECT SIZE=0 mean 0.005 0.005 0.005  0.009 0.003 *** 
  SIZE=0 sd 0.067 0.068 0.067  0.094 0.050  
UDIRECT SIZE=1 mean 0.073 0.100*** 0.047*** *** 0.093*** 0.027*** *** 
  SIZE=1 sd 0.249 0.286 0.205  0.277 0.157  
BDIRECT SIZE=0 mean 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001  0.0003 0.00003 *** 
  SIZE=0 sd 0.009 0.010 0.008  0.014 0.004  
BDIRECT SIZE=1 mean 0.018 0.027*** 0.010*** *** 0.024*** 0.004*** *** 
  SIZE=1 sd 0.109 0.133 0.081  0.126 0.053  
CCA small/large mean 0.401 0.401 0.401  0.401 0.401  
  small/large sd 0.530 0.530 0.530  0.530 0.530  
BSS  small/large mean -0.159 -0.159 -0.159  -0.159 -0.159  
  small/large sd 0.336 0.336 0.336  0.336 0.336  
INTRAGUO SIZE=0 mean 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001  0.0003 0.00004 *** 
  SIZE=0 sd 0.010 0.011 0.010  0.016 0.006  
INTRAGUO SIZE=1 mean 0.002 0.003*** 0.001*** *** 0.003*** 0.0001 *** 
 SIZE=1 Sd 0.038 0.048 0.025  0.045 0.007  
INTERGUO SIZE=0 mean 0.005 0.005 0.005  0.009 0.002 *** 
  SIZE=0 Sd 0.067 0.069 0.067  0.096 0.049  
INTERGUO SIZE=1 Mean 0.027 0.037*** 0.018*** *** 0.038*** 0.002 *** 
 SIZE=1 Sd 0.160 0.185 0.132  0.188 0.050  
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The upper (lower) means and standard deviations refer to the firms with high 
(low) SIZEi values. The asterisks indicate the significance of the difference in 
means (*** / ** / * are significant at 99% / 95% / 90% confidence). To check the 
significance of the SIZE-differences, we follow the two-group mean-comparison 
approach in Cameron and Trivedi (2009, p. 78) through a regression of the 
respective variable on SIZE while applying heteroskedastic-consistent standard 
errors. The asterisks in the “Diff” column correspond to the mean difference 
between subsets but where SIZE of firms is fixed, for example, electricity versus 
non-electricity firms. The other asterisks (i.e. those not in the “Diff” column) 
correspond to the mean differences within subsets but between small and large 
firms, for example, between small and large electricity firms (i.e. where 
ELEC=0).  
The variable definitions and measurement units are as follows: 
- SIZEi: = 1 if ln(total assets 2004-2009 average) > sample median, 0 otherwise 
(firm, constant level). Hence, a firm is large (small) if SIZE equals one (zero).  
- FRQi: = 1 if > sample median, 0 otherwise, where FRQi = (1/T ΣTt=1 (PURCHi,t + 
SELLi,t)) / ΣTt=1 (PURCHi,t + SELLi,t) (firm, constant level). Hence, a firm is a 
(non-)frequent trader if FRQ equals one (zero). 
- ELECi: =1 if firm controls at least one electricity installation, 0 otherwise (firm, 
constant level) 
- BSSt: Buy-and-Sell Signal: CO2SPOTt - 30 day CO2SPOTt moving avg. (EU-
wide, daily level) 
- CCAt: Cost of Carry Arbitrage: CO2FUTt - CO2SPOTt * erT (EU-wide, daily level) 
- UDIRECTi,t: 0 if both purchases (PURCHi,t) and sales (SELLi,t) are zero, and 
equals abs(PURCHi,t – SELLi,t) / (PURCHi,t + SELLi,t) if otherwise (firm, daily 
level) 
- BDIRECTi,t: 0 if both purchases (PURCHi,t) and sales (SELLi,t) are zero, and 
equals 1–abs(PURCHi,t – SELLi,t) / (PURCHi,t + SELLi,t) if otherwise (firm, daily 
level) 
- INTRAGUOi,t: Daily average of dummy: = 0 if PURCHi,t + SALESi,t = 0, and = 
ΣINTRAGUO(PURCHi,t + SALESi,t)/ ΣINTRAGUO+INTERGUO(PURCHi,t + SALESi,t) if 
otherwise.  
- INTERGUOi,t: Daily average of dummy: = 0 if PURCHi,t + SALESi,t = 0, and = 
ΣINTERGUO(PURCHi,t + SALESi,t)/ ΣINTRAGUO+INTERGUO(PURCHi,t + SALESi,t) if 
otherwise. 
 
Table 4 shows the means and standard deviations of the variables on 
trade direction, arbitrage, price expectations, and intra- and inter-GUO 
trade.  
In all tabulated cases, the means of uni-directionality trade 
(UDIRECTi,t) are larger than of bi-directionality trade (BDIRECTi,t). Both 
self-sufficient and less self-sufficient firms have a higher propensity to 
trade uni-directionally rather than bi-directionally during the day. For 
self-sufficient firms this result is in line with Hypothesis H.6.1, but for less 
self-sufficient firms this result is not in line with Hypothesis H.6.2. 
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The cash-and-carry arbitrage (CCAt) and buy-sell signal (BSSt) do 
not differ over SIZE, which is why the duplicate rows are left out of Table 
4. These are EU-wide. For BSSt, we hypothesized that firms sell (purchase) 
allowances when BSSt is positive (negative). With BSSt having a negative 
average value, the hypothesized effect is that firms should on average be 
buying allowances. For firms with carbon allowances shortages a 
continuous buy-signal can be expected given the carbon price decline 
towards the end of Phase 1 (2005-April, 2008). The CCAt averages are 
positive, implying an incentive to buy allowances (the hypothesized effect 
is that firms buy allowances when discounted carbon prices are higher 
than spot prices). However, the large standard deviation implies a large 
variation centering on zero. Such a variation might make it more difficult 
for firms to arbitrage profitably.  
Finally, the inter-GUO means are larger than those of intra-GUO. 
Both self-sufficient and less self-sufficient firms therefore have more a 
propensity to trade outside their firm boundaries (i.e. INTERGUOi,t) 
rather than within firm boundaries (i.e. INTRAGUOi,t). For less self-
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Figure 5: Response variable over time: the daily net allowance amounts 
traded 
Figure 5 shows the daily net amounts traded summed over the firms in the 
sample (i.e. ΣiTRADEi,t) and electricity demand (EDEM). 
 
Figure 6: Regressors over time: on energy demand and fuel switching 
 
Figure 6 shows the daily net amounts traded summed over the firms in the 
sample (i.e. ΣiTRADEi,t) and the fossil-fuel-weighted coal-gas price spread 
(BSPREAD). 
 
Figure 5 shows the daily total allowance trade and monthly 
electricity demand. The figure shows that trades follow three recurring 
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patterns. First, allowance trade volumes increase gradually from January 
towards April, when the (previous calendar year’s) allowance demand is 
verified, and allowances are exchanged before the annual end-of-April 
allowance surrender deadline. Second, volumes spike at year-end. This is 
probably due to the exercise of carbon derivatives and the closing of the 
bookkeeping year for firms. Third, the plotted allowance volumes 
(TRADEi,t) generally move in tandem with the national electricity demand 
(EDEMi,t). For example, allowance volumes are low during the third 
quartiles, when less electricity was required for the summer months.162 
Figure 6 also shows the daily total allowance trade but with 
BSPREADi,t, the interaction of the coal-gas price differential with the share 
of fossil fuels in electricity production. The figure does not highlight a clear 
discernable pattern between the two variables.  
 
Figure 7: Regressors over time: on trade direction 
Figure 7 panel A shows the uni-directionality (UDIRECT) and bi-directionality 
index (BDIRECT). Panel B shows the within-conglomerate and between-
conglomerate transactions (resp. INTRAGUO and INTERGUO). 
 
Figure 7 panels A and B show that the trade direction variables tend 
to remain in the same ranges: BDIRECTi,t (panel A) and INTRAGUOi,t 
                                                        
162 During these months, trade activity is lower in general. In addition to the April 
and December EU ETS volume spikes, this pattern may also be driven by other 
factors (e.g., institutional, such as summer holidays).  
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(panel B) are in the lower ranges between 0 and 0.3, while UDINDEXi,t and 
INTERGUOi,t are in the upper ranges between 0.7 and 1. There are few 
moments when the lower-ranged BDIRECTi,t or INTRAGUOi,t increase at 
the cost of the upper-ranged UDINDEXi,t and INTERGUOi,t. This figure 
therefore confirms the statistics in Table 4, namely that firms generally 
trade uni-directionally (through the upper-ranged UDINDEXi,t in panel A) 
and that firms do not trade within but between firm boundaries (through 
the upper-ranged INTERGUOi,t in panel B).  
 
Figure 8: Regressors over time: on arbitrage and price expectations 
Figure 8 shows the Cash-and-Carry Arbitrage (CCAt) for values above 0.05 and 
the Buy-Sell Signal (BSS). 
 
Figure 8 shows the development of the Cash-and-Carry Arbitrage 
(CCAt) and the Buy-Sell Signal (BSSt) over time. For CCAt we assume the 
transaction costs equal 0.05, which we take as the minimum required 
difference between the spot and futures prices. The figure shows CCAt was 
above 0.05 only until mid-2006. After April 2006, it became publicly 
known that aggregate allowance demand was much lower than expected. 
This led to the downfall and subsequent decline of the carbon price 
towards the end of Phase I (e.g., Jong et al., 2014; Zeitlberger and 
Brauneis, 2016). After mid-2006, CCAt was below 0.05, which may imply 
that transaction costs prevented firms from exploiting arbitrage 
opportunities. Furthermore, BSSt in Figure 8 confirms the statistics in 
Table 4, namely that BSSt is negative on average. Given the development 
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of BSSt, the market signal is for firms to buy allowances because the carbon 
price is less expensive than its 30-day moving average.  
6. Empirical results 
This section applies the methodology from Section 4 through 
regressions on the response variable TRADEi,t, and subsequently 
interprets and discusses the regression results in light of the hypotheses 








Table 9: Panel data regressions on TRADEi,t 
Variable ELEC non-ELEC FRQ non-FRQ 
SIZE -0.239* -0.368* -0.217* -0.007 
CONSTANT 0 0.334* 0.118 0 
βINTRAGUO -0.700 0.240 0.031 2.406 
δINTRAGUO -1.091 -2.376* -1.989* -1.830 
βINTERGUO 0.114 1.090* 0.999* -2.555* 
δINTERGUO -3.516* -1.121* -1.510* -2.427* 
βLCT -0.005* -0.003* -0.004* -0.001* 
δLCT 0.004* 0.002* 0.003* -0.0002 
βLCT2 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* -0.0001 
δLCT2 -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* 0.0002 
β∆LEDEM 0.007 -0.164* -0.160* 0.049* 
δ∆LEDEM -0.052 0.216* 0.136* -0.074* 
βEDEM 0.082* 0.016* 0.017* 0.010 
δEDEM -0.067 -0.011* -0.011* -0.015 
β∆FEDEM 0.030 -0.256* -0.154* 0.019 
δ∆FEDEM -0.065 0.263* 0.128 -0.028 
βBSPREAD 0 -0.026* -0.016* 0.007 
δBSPREAD 0 0.022* 0.013* -0.005 
βSPREAD -0.050* 0.051* 0.004 0.008 
δSPREAD 0.052* -0.050 0.014 -0.009 
βBDIRECT -0.183 -0.215* -0.208* 0.120 
δBDIRECT 3.678* -3.874* -0.727 10.900* 
βUDIRECT -0.165* -0.008 -0.042 -0.030 
δUDIRECT -1.263* -4.372* -4.054* -0.001 
βBSS -0.005 0.017 0.012 -0.008 
δBSS 0.005 -0.016 -0.010 0.005 
βCCA 0.028* 0.013 0.023* 0.005 
δCCA -0.028* -0.021 -0.031* -0.004 
βQUARTER1 -0.010 -0.008 -0.017 0.003 
δQUARTER1 0.003 0.011 0.012 -0.004 
βQUARTER2 -0.007 0.030 0.012 -0.003 
δQUARTER2 0.009 -0.017 0.003 0.005 
βQUARTER4 -0.026* 0.049* 0.014 0.004 
δQUARTER4 0.027* -0.059* -0.019 -0.001 
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R2 (within) 0.064 0.018 0.026 0.215 
No. obs 456816 229636 353050 333402 
No. firms 744 374 575 543 
The methodologies used are fixed effects (within) regressions with Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors (for non-FRQi and ELECi) and panel-corrected Prais-
Winsten standard errors (for FRQi and non-ELECi). The values are coefficients 
and are marked with * if significant at 95%. The δ-coefficients are the SIZEi 
interaction terms. If significant, the sums of the δ- and β-coefficients provide the 
effects for small firms, while the β-coefficients provide the effects for large firms. 
If the δ-coefficients are not significant, the coefficient effects are the same among 
both small and large firms. 
 
Table 10: The p-values from the joint significance (Wald) tests on the Table 
9 variables 
Variable ELEC non-ELEC FRQ non-FRQ 
Full model (i.e., F-test) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
INTRAGUO, INTERGUO 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LCT, LCT2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
EDEM, ∆LEDEM, ∆FEDEM 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.204 
BSPREAD, SPREAD 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.756 
BDIRECT, UDIRECT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.081 
QUARTER1, QUARTER2, QUARTER4 0.100 0.000 0.015 0.510 
 
The coefficients are Wald tests including the base and interaction terms of SIZEi. 
 
Table 9 shows the regression results within the subsets of 
(non-)electricity producers and (in)frequent traders (i.e. ELECi, non-
ELECi, FRQi, and non-FRQi). The δ-coefficients are the interaction terms. 
If significant, the sums of the δ- and β-coefficients provide the effects for 
small firms, while the β-coefficients provide the effects for large firms. If 
the δ-coefficients are not significant, the coefficient effects are the same 
among both small and large firms. This also holds for the intercept shift, 
SIZEi. If SIZEi is significant, small firms have a different intercept (i.e. 
CONSTANTi +SIZEi) than large firms (i.e. CONSTANTi). Otherwise, both 
types of firms follow CONSTANTi as the intercept. Table 10 provides the 
joint significance Wald test p-values for both pairs of variables (e.g. 
INTRAGUOi,t and INTERGUOi,t) and of interaction terms (i.e., both the δ- 
and β-terms).  
To test whether self-sufficient (i.e. large) firms trade less 
responsively to changes in allowance demand (i.e., Hypothesis H.1), all 
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coefficients need to be such that: |β| < |β+δ|. Applying these inequalities 
to the pairs of β- and δ-coefficients leads us to reject Hypothesis H.1. For 
example, while the inequality holds for BSSt (i.e., since | βBSS = -0.005| < | 
βBSS + δBSS = -0.005 + 0.005|, it does not hold for UDIRECTi,t (i.e., since | 
βUDIRECT = -0.165|≮| βUDIRECT + δUDIRECT = -0.165–1.263|). Moreover, while the 
inequality holds for INTRAGUOi,t within the subset ELEC, it does not hold 
for LCTi,t within this subset.  
We hypothesized via H.2 that self-sufficient firms conduct more 
within- than between-firm trades. This implies |βINTRAGUO|>|βINTERGUO| will 
need to hold. Table 9 shows this is only the case for electricity firms (i.e. 
ELEC, given |βINTRAGUO| = 0.700 and |βINTERGUO| = 0.114). The other large 
firms (i.e. the β-values in non-ELEC, FRQ, and non-FRQ) behaved 
opposite than hypothesized.163 
H.3 hypothesizes that firms purchase and sell allowances so as to 
minimize differences between allocations and emissions. By construction, 
the LCTi,t coefficient would then need to be negative (see Section 4.4). 
Table 9 shows this is the case for all four columns, which therefore 
confirms Hypothesis H.3.164,165  
Yet, since LCTi,t followed a quadratic relationship with the response 
variable (TRADEi,t) (cf. footnote 160), we also included the squared term 
of LCTi,t in the regression. Since changes are expected to be larger when 
firms are further away from the expected value of LCTi,t=0, this squared 
term allows for impacts to change depending on the LCTi,t-level. The 
significant squared term captures the parabolic impact LCTi,t has on 
TRADEi,t. One implication of this term is that the marginal impact will 
have a sign change (i.e. at LCTi,t = -βLCT/(2*βLCT^2). Less intuitive will then 
be the domain where LCTi,t impacts are or turn positive, since a positive 
relationship implies that firms increase rather than diminish their 
                                                        
163 As discussed in Section 4.2, among the impacts of aggregating firms at the 
country level is that both within-firm and within-country trades were netted out. 
INTERGUOi,t and INTRAGUOi,t may thus change if a different allowance 
management structure is assumed for the sample. 
164 Although LCTi,t and TRADEi,t include purchases and sales, we expect 
endogeneity to be negligible. First, LCTi,t has (t-1) lagged purchases and sales, and 
the selected Prais-Winsten and Driscoll-Kraay econometric models accommodate 
autocorrelation (i.e., a typical endogeneity source). Second, the time-invariant 
nature of endogeneity is tackled via the panel methodology.  
165 As TRADEi,t and LCTi,t are in logarithmic terms, the coefficients are to be 
interpreted as elasticities. 
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allowance surpluses or deficits. Related to this sign change is that the 
marginal impacts are either diminishing or increasing (i.e. given the 
squared term’s additional marginal effect of 2*LCTi,t* βLCT2). For the 
columns ELEC, non-ELEC and FRQ of Table 9 it holds that βLCT2 > 0, so 
that the negative LCTi,t impacts are diminishing, whereas for the non-FRQ 
column the LCTi,t impacts are increasing given that βLCT2 < 0. The intuitive 
case is when LCTi,t impacts are increasingly negative (i.e. where βLCT2 > 0), 
since larger deviations from LCTi,t = 0 provide extra incentives for firms to 
return their allowance holdings to LCTi,t = 0.  
Table 10 shows the three energy demand variables (i.e. ∆LEDEM to 
∆FEDEM) are only jointly significant for frequent traders and non-
electricity firms (i.e. FRQ and non-ELEC, respectively).166 Adding up the 
three effects demand coefficients, namely the current electricity demand 
(EDEMi,t), the difference of EDEMi,t with the previous month (∆LEDEMi,t) 
and the next month (∆FEDEMi,t), results in -0.044 (i.e. FRQ) and +0.064 
(non-ELEC) for the small firms of these subsets. The sums are -0.297 and 
-0.404 for the large firms. Since Hypothesis H.4 states that firms are 
expected to purchase (sell) allowances when electricity demand increases 
(decreases), H.4 is accepted when values are positive. This is only the case 
for the small non-electricity firms (i.e. non-ELEC). Hypothesis H.4 needs 
to be rejected for the other subsets. 
According to Hypothesis H.5, firms have an incentive to switch to gas 
with a larger spread, and more so for firms with higher shares of fossil 
fuels. This is, respectively, captured by a negative SPREADt and a more 
negative BSPREADt-coefficient. Table 10 shows the two variables are 
jointly significant for all except the infrequent traders (i.e. non-FRQ). By 
adding the two coefficients, namely through (1+BROWNi,t)SPREADt, the 
overall impact of the two coefficients is negative only for the large 
electricity firms (i.e. 0 – 0.050 < 0) and large frequent traders (i.e. -0.016 
+ 0.004 < 0). Among these two cases, only the large frequent traders have 
a more negative BSPREADt-coefficient (i.e. -0.016 < 0.004). Hence, only 
this subset is in line with Hypothesis H.5. Hypothesis H.5 needs to be 
rejected for the other subsets. 
For the first part of Hypothesis H.6 to be accepted, namely that self-
sufficient firms have a propensity for uni-directional trade, it should hold 
                                                        
166 We will not discuss the coefficients of the electricity firms subset (i.e. ELEC) 
since they are close to joint insignificance (0.047) 
CHAPTER 5 
EU Emissions Trading by Energy Firms 
111 
 
that |βUDIRECT| > |βBDIRECT|. None of the coefficients show this result, 
whereby the results for infrequent traders are insignificant (see Table 10). 
For the second part of H.6, namely that less self-sufficient firms have a 
propensity to trade bi-directionally, it should hold that 
|βBDIRECT+δBDIRECT| > |βUDIRECT+δUDIRECT|. This relationship holds for the 
electricity firms.  
The first part of Hypothesis H.7 states that BSSt (Buy-Sell Signal) 
should be negative when firms sell (purchase) allowances with positive 
(negative) BSSt spreads. For neither of the subsets is BSSt significant, 
thereby rejecting this part of Hypothesis H.7. The second part of 
Hypothesis H.7 suggests that CCAt is positively related to TRADEi,t, as 
higher CCAt levels incentivize firms to trade – rather than keeping 
allowances in stock. CCAt is significant for electricity firms and frequent 
traders. The coefficients for the large firms (β = 0.028 and 0.023) are 
positive and, hence, follow Hypothesis H.7. The coefficients for the small 
firms (β + δ = -0.0001 and -0.008) are negative and, hence, do not follow 
Hypothesis H.7. 
Finally, in order to test for the time effects we introduced quarterly 
dummies (i.e. QUARTER). The QUARTER-dummies show the difference 
vis-à-vis the intercept term or base dummy, which captures the third 
quarter.167 Table 10 shows the results are significant for frequent traders 
and non-electricity firms. Relative to the third quarter or Q3 (i.e., the base 
dummy) large firms and frequent trading small firms sell more in Q1, 
whereas small non-electricity firms purchase more in Q1. Large (small) 
firms purchase (sell) relatively more in Q2 and Q4. 
  
                                                        
167 One dummy is left out to avoid the “dummy variable trap”.  
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Table 11: Summary of the coefficients accepting or rejecting the Section 4 
hypotheses for large and small firms with respect to the interaction terms 
on SIZEi and the subsets on ELECi, and FRQi. 
Coefficient ELEC non-ELEC FRQ non-FRQ 
|βFULL+δFUL
L|>|βFULL| H.1 Rejected H.1 Rejected H.1 Rejected H.1 Rejected 
βINTRAGUO H.2 Accepted  H.2 Rejected  H.2 Rejected H.2 Rejected 
δINTRAGUO     
βINTERGUO     
δINTERGUO     
βLCT H.3 Accepted H.3 Accepted H.3 Accepted H.3 Accepted 
δLCT     
βLCT2     
δLCT2     
β∆LEDEM 
H.4 Not 
significant H.4 Rejected H.4 Rejected 
H.4 Not 
significant 
δ∆LEDEM  (large) (large)  
βEDEM     
δEDEM     
β∆FEDEM  H4. Accepted  H4. Rejected   
δ∆FEDEM  (small) (small)  
βBSPREAD 
H.5.1 




(only large not 
small) 
(both small and 
large) 




Rejected H.5.2 Rejected H.5.2 Accepted  
δSPREAD 
(both small and 
large) 
(both small and 
large) 






Rejected H.6.1 Rejected H.6.1 Rejected 
H.6.1 Not 
significant 
δBDIRECT     
βUDIRECT 
H.6.2 
Accepted  H.6.2 Rejected H.6.2 Rejected 
H.6.2 Not 
significant 

































significant Large: Q1< Q3  Large: Q1<Q3  Not significant 
δQUARTER1 
 Small: Q1>Q3 Small: Q1<Q3  
βQUARTER2 
 Large: Q1>Q3  Large: Q1>Q3   
δQUARTER2 
 Small: Q1<Q3 Small: Q1<Q3  
βQUARTER4 
 Large: Q1>Q3  Large: Q1>Q3   
δQUARTER4  Small: Q1<Q3 Small: Q1<Q3  
 
Table 11 summarizes the above findings, by indicating whether the 
results were significant or not, and whether the results led us to accept or 
reject the Hypotheses from Section 4. There are three unequivocal 
outcomes. First, large firms do not trade less responsively to changes in 
allowance demand (Hypothesis H.1: all rejected). In fact, the reverse holds 
(i.e., |βFULL+δFULL|<|βFULL|), implying that large firms trade more 
responsively. Second, firms participate in the carbon market to minimize 
their allocations and emissions differences (Hypothesis H.3: all accepted). 
This result confirms for all firms that the EU ETS, after having initially 
allocated allowances, decentralizes the reallocation of allowances among 
firms. Third, on average, firms do not follow the ‘buy-sell signal’ (BSSt) as 
the anchor for their carbon price expectations (Hypothesis H.7.1: all 
rejected). This anchor may have been too basic for this purpose. We leave 
a more specific analysis on firms’ behavior to carbon prices to future 
research.  
The other coefficients in Table 11 provide equivocal outcomes across 
the firm types. The prevailing result between each of the two sets of 
columns (i.e. ELEC vs. non-ELEC and FRQ vs. non-FRQ) is that large firms 
do not conduct more within- than between-firm trades (Hypothesis H.2: 
most are rejected) but that the reverse holds (i.e., |βINTRAGUO|<|βINTERGUO|.). 
Theory suggests that allowance trades will be triggered when firms have 
different pollution abatement capacities (e.g., Baumol and Oates, 1988). 
The fact that large firms trade less within firm boundaries than on the 
market may imply that their within-firm abatement potential is more 
costly than expected. It may also imply that carbon-related transaction 
costs (e.g., information costs) are higher within firm boundaries and that 
these costs prevent them from using their within-firm abatement capacity 
(e.g., Stavins, 1995). 
With H.4, H.5.1, and H.5.2 we hypothesized that firms sell carbon 
allowances when the coal-gas price spread increases, and vice versa. If the 
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coal price increases, demand for carbon allowances is expected to fall due 
to the switching from coal to gas, which is less polluting. Yet, the regression 
results point towards an opposite and less intuitive relationship, namely 
that firms purchase carbon allowances when coal-gas spreads are wider, 
and vice versa.  
This finding can be the result from hedging by the firms in our 
sample. Firms apply hedges to neutralize the financial impacts from one 
product with the counteracting financial impacts from another product. 
For example, when coal prices increase and firms switch to gas, 
neutralizing the financial impacts on the price of electricity requires a 
higher carbon price, given that gas is relatively less polluting than coal. 
Firms can put upward pressure on the carbon price by purchasing carbon 
allowances. At the same time, this enables them to have allowances to sell 
off when electricity production from coal becomes cheaper.  
 The trade-related Hypotheses H.6.1 and H.6.2 are predominantly 
rejected. This implies that (not large but) small firms have a propensity to 
trade uni-directionally, and that (not small but) large firms have a 
propensity to trade bi-directionally. As mentioned in Section 3, expected 
is that the large firms’ systematic purchasing and selling, or ‘bi-directional’ 
trading, is indicative of hedging. For future research, a more detailed 
business economics view within energy firms (e.g., footnote 139) can take 
up the extent of hedging. For example, Graham and Rogers (2002) derive 
the extent of hedging from financial statements. Orbis, the company 
database we utilized, did not provide this specific information. 
Finally, the trade-related Hypothesis H.7.2 is either not significant, 
or accepted for large firms, or rejected for small firms. For large firms, this 
finding provides a weak indication that they seize (risk-free) arbitrage 
opportunities.  
 
In sum, that the allowance trade of large firms is more responsive to the 
selected parameters (than small firms), more between than within firm 
boundaries, and indicative of carbon hedging and seizing of arbitrage 
opportunities, leads us to infer that large firms utilize the EU ETS for more 
than the purpose of compliance. While both large and small firms need to 
cope with volatile demand for their production, large firms can better 
spread the costs of risk management (e.g., hedging) over their larger 
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production volumes. They can thereby lower their effective carbon costs by 
accounting for their carbon price risks. 
7. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This chapter examines the ‘make-or-buy decision’ in explaining EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) transactions by EU energy firms. 
Applied to the EU ETS, the ‘make-or-buy decision’ posits that carbon 
transactions take place within firm boundaries when transaction costs are 
lower vis-à-vis the carbon market. The central question is as follows: do 
European energy firms depend less on the EU carbon market when they 
are better able to pool their in-house pollution abatement potential? We 
expected that cost-minimizing firms behave ‘self-sufficiently’ by first 
allocating production, emissions, and, hence, allowances within firm 
boundaries before opting for the carbon market. Self-sufficient firms’ 
external or carbon market trades are therefore expected to be less 
responsive to allowance demand factors because they are better able to 
absorb shocks within the firm. 
Since ‘self-sufficiency’ cannot equivocally be measured, we 
constructed a composite indicator based on multiple variables affecting 
the firms’ carbon intensity. Given the regression analyses we instead 
selected the firms’ asset size since it performed better than this indicator.  
The results show that large firms actually depend more on the EU 
ETS carbon market than small firms do. Contrary to our theoretical 
expectations, we find that large firms conduct more allowance trade on the 
carbon market than within firm boundaries. This may imply that, 1) their 
pollution abatement capacity is more expensive and/or 2) the carbon-
related transaction costs within firm boundaries (e.g., information costs) 
prevent them from using their pollution abatement capacity (e.g., Stavins, 
1995). Coordination of abatement through the carbon market will then be 
more cost-effective. This finding therefore affirms that, similar to the US 
Acid Rain Program (e.g., Ellerman et al., 2000), for large firms, the EU 
ETS leads to relative cost savings. 
We further find that large firms purchase during electricity demand 
declines and with higher coal and/or lower gas prices and vice versa. This 
counterintuitive finding points to allowance hedging. The indications 
which generally affirm this conjecture are that trades were systematic 
repurchases and resales (instead of uni-directional trades) and that the 
trades were responsive to market arbitrage opportunities. 
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If smaller firms face higher transaction costs on the carbon market 
than within firm boundaries, policymakers should look into ways to 
improve the carbon market, for example, on the aspects of transparency 
and allowance property rights. Regarding allowance property rights, 
allowance trades were initially only lightly regulated. Although they have 
increasingly been treated as financial instruments, there are currently 
several exceptions (e.g., the Transparency Directive (EC, 2013) and the 
Financial Collateral Directive (EC, 2002) are not applicable to allowance 
spot trades. Nevertheless, some stakeholders indicate that market liquidity 
will deteriorate as of January, 2017, when the second Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (EC, 2014) will be applicable to energy products and 
emissions allowances (e.g., CEER, 2015). Future research is needed to test 
the willingness of small firms to participate on the carbon market after 
such more stringent regulations have been implemented. Furthermore, 
regulators can improve transparency by smoothing out the EU ETS 
timeline on allowance allocations and surrenders (e.g., Lucia et al., 2015) 
and by reporting on these events. Such smoothing can materialize, for 
example, if firms or sectors can decide on their own annual compliance 
cycles rather than following the EU-wide cycle.  
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CHAPTER 6  
European Energy Regulators: An Empirical 
Analysis of Legal Competences168 
1. Introduction 
This chapter provides an empirical and comparative analysis of the 
legal competences of National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) across the 
European Union (EU), including the extent to which those regulators have 
the power to intervene in contractual freedoms such as price setting, sales 
and investment decisions. By limiting the contractual freedom of firms, 
energy regulation restricts the property rights of gas and electricity 
companies. If contract restrictions are optimal, socially inefficient 
behavior by those energy firms is prevented so that competition and 
innovation are sustained. The aim is to test whether the differences in legal 
competences of NRAs are significant, and whether they are aligned to the 
public interest of a (1) secure, (2) competitive, and (3) carbon-neutral 
energy supply. By taking a descriptive and exploratory approach, this 
empirical analysis assesses energy governance arrangements across the 
EU. These insights may contribute to the European Commission’s review 
of the regulatory framework, in particular the functioning of the energy 
regulators, as stipulated among the action points of the Energy Union 
package (EC, 2015). 
The central research question is therefore as follows: what are the 
main differences in the legal competences of National Regulatory 
Authorities (NRAs) in the European gas and electricity markets, and are 
those differences aligned to the countries’ divergent levels of secure, 
competitive, and carbon-neutral energy supply? 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of 
the literature on the role of NRAs in energy regulation, and explains how 
the legal competences of NRAs are expected to respond to the security, 
                                                        
168 This is the author pre-print version (i.e., the post-print) from the article which 
previously appeared in Jong and Woerdman (2016). We wish to thank Oscar 
Couwenberg, Francesca Pia Vantaggiato, Heinrich Winter, and the participants of 
the November 2014 GCEL research seminar as well as the 2014 BAEE research 
workshop for their comments and assistance. Any remaining errors are our own. 
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competitiveness, and carbon-neutrality of energy supply. Section 3 
discusses the research methodology, whereas section 4 presents the results 
and a discussion thereof. Finally, section 5 concludes the chapter. 
2. Literature review 
A two-part definition of regulation is provided in Den Hertog (2012). 
The first part of the definition mentions “the employment of legal 
instruments for the implementation of social-economic policy objectives”. 
From a law and economics point of view, gas and electricity market 
regulation restricts the contractual freedom that those energy firms have 
on their property rights. These restrictions should mainly be applied for 
those policy objectives related to improving the functioning of markets.169 
With regard to the energy market, the typical policy objectives or public 
interests at stake, according to the European Commission, are a (1) secure, 
(2) competitive, and (3) carbon-neutral energy supply.170 
The second part of the regulation definition in Den Hertog (2012) 
considers the enforcement aspect of such legal instruments as follows: 
“individuals or organizations can be compelled by government to comply 
with prescribed behavior under penalty of sanctions.” The enforcement of 
energy regulation has increasingly been allocated to National Regulatory 
Authorities (NRAs), for example, to establish “fines and penalties for non-
compliance, [in acting] as arbiters in disputes between industry players, 
[or in protecting] end-users and [regulating] entry and exit through 
licences” (Battle and Ocaña, 2013).  
Given this delegation of legal competences from Ministries, much of 
the literature on NRAs focuses on the reasoning for and the extent to which 
NRAs are independent from the regulated industries and from political 
stakeholders (e.g., Gilardi, 2008). Other NRA-related literature typically 
analyses either their internal organizational structure (e.g., decision-
                                                        
169 Besides the typical market failures as natural monopolies and the continuity 
and availability of service, regulation should also further “distributional justice, 
rights protection, and citizenship – as, for example, […] regulated utilities are 
obliged […] to meet universal service obligations” (Baldwin et al., 2012). 
170 The European Commission has increasingly adopted these as the main energy 
supply criteria. For example, in the Energy Roadmap 2050, “the Commission 
explores the challenges posed by delivering the EU's decarbonisation objective 
while at the same time ensuring security of energy supply and competitiveness” 
(EC, 2011a). 
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making and external funding (Hanretty and Koop, 2012) or the energy 
sectors’ market structure (e.g., Cambini and Franzi, 2013; Ugur, 2009). 
Less discussed and hardly analyzed are the legal competences or 
‘powers’ of NRAs, and the extent to which these contribute to the energy 
supply objectives, which are essentially the two elements which make up 
the definition of regulation by Den Hertog (2012). For instance, NRAs 
should “take all reasonable measures […] within the framework of their 
duties and powers to […] promote […] a competitive, secure, and 
environmentally sustainable internal market in electricity/natural gas 
within the [EU]” (Johnston and Block, 2012).171 Moreover, “in performing 
[the] tariff/methodology-setting function, [NRAs are to] ensure that 
transmission or distribution system operators are granted appropriate 
incentive, over both the long and short term, to increase efficiencies, foster 
market integration, and security of supply […] ” (ibid). 
This chapter fills a gap in the literature on the relationship between 
NRA competences and the realization of the three abovementioned 
objectives of a secure, competitive, and carbon-neutral energy supply.172 
Hypothesized is that NRAs have fewer competences when those policy 
objectives are sufficiently met, because the realization of the objectives 
reduces the need for regulatory intervention.173 
The data on legal competences are deduced from questionnaires on 
gas and electricity market regulation gathered in 2011 and 2012 by the 
                                                        
171 However, it may not be excluded that their objectives are shared with other 
authorities. 
172 In translating EU-wide goals into policies, the European Commission relied 
predominantly on Directives rather than Regulations. Partly, this is because 
energy has been among the main domains where EU Member States are reluctant 
to transferring their national sovereignty to the EU level. In the Energy Package 
Directives, the minimum list of NRA duties and competences are stipulated. In 
addition, if compatible with EU law, Member States can go further than this 
minimum set of legal duties and competences, making inter-NRA differences 
likely. 
173 We thank a reviewer from the journal “Competition and Regulation in Network 
Industries” for pointing out that higher energy scores could well result from more 
regulatory intervention. As indicated in footnote 190 below, the data sample 
limited such test. We selected the energy scores among the covariates since it 
lacked the competence-nesting (level c). Since the sample only covers one time 
period we could, hence, not test for (Granger) causality. The approach we 
therefore took is to hypothesize that the opposite sequence holds. Indeed, given 
the results below we cannot unequivocally reject that higher energy scores reduce 
the need for regulatory intervention. 
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International Confederation of Energy Regulators (ICER).174,175 The 2011 
electricity ICER survey has been analyzed before by Gianfreda and 
Vantaggiato (2013). From most EU Member States plus several 
neighboring countries, they investigate the enforcement powers of NRAs 
on electricity regulation and tariffs. Their main findings are that NRAs had 
diverse competences for transmission grids, and that the generation part 
of the value chain was lighter regulated than the retail part (i.e., it involved 
fewer competences). Moreover, Cambini and Franzi (2013) conducted 
surveys on competences of NRAs, but focused on Northern African and 
Middle Eastern countries. However, Gianfreda and Vantaggiato (2013) 
and Cambini and Franzi (2013) do not check whether the competences of 
NRAs are aligned with the countries’ realization of energy supply 
objectives. Moreover, other researchers analyze NRA competences either 
concerning other impacts (e.g., the centrality of NRAs in policy-making 
(Maggetti, 2009) or they analyze closely related policy objectives but apply 
different NRA aspects (e.g., NRA regulatory independence on connection 
charges (Edwards and Waverman, 2006).176 
This chapter further adds to the literature by empirically analyzing 
the distribution of NRA competence-types. To keep costs of both 
regulatory authorities and regulated firms contained (e.g., by ex-ante 
prescribing acceptable behavior instead of ex-post legal action) NRAs 
should follow the concept of ‘responsive regulation’ (e.g., Ayres and 
Braithwaite, 1992). Interventions are then differentiated according to the 
willingness of the regulated to comply, where the harshness of 
interventions is attuned with the severity of the violations at hand. In 
effect, and from softer to tougher interventions, regulators dispose of the 
following three regulatory ‘tools’: 1) to communicate and gather 
information, 2) to form subsequent judgments, and 3) possible 
                                                        
174 This data are available from: http://www.icer-regulators.net. 
175 Another EU-wide source on legal competences is a 2005 report compiled by the 
European Council of Energy Regulators (CEER, 2005), but CEER has not 
reiterated this study. More recent data on legal competences are scattered, not 
available in English, or not as detailed as CEER (2005) or the ICER-
questionnaires as analyzed here. 
176 We could not check the source of regulator competence data from Ugur (2009), 
the Market Opening Milestones database, as it is not publicly available. 
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interventions.177 We arrange the legal competences according to this 
‘responsive regulation’ benchmark and, via this differentiation, we test the 
alignment of these competences to the various energy supply objectives. 
3. Methodology  
As mentioned above, the data on legal competences are deduced 
from 2011 and 2012 International Confederation of Energy Regulators 
(ICER) questionnaires on gas and electricity market regulation.178 In these 
questionnaires, (non-)EU Member States are asked whether they had legal 
competences over several categories, among others, whether they have the 
power to intervene in contractual freedoms such as price setting, sales and 
investment decisions. Rather than a cluster analysis in Gianfreda and 
Vantaggiato (2013), the approach here is to label the questions according 
to their ‘responsive regulation’ competence-type (as identified from the 
ICER surveys on legal competences, and indexed with c): 1) inform, 2) 
assess, 3) approve, and 4) penalize.179 Questionnaire replies with a ‘no’ or 
‘yes’ were scored zero or one, respectively, upon which they were summed 
                                                        
177 Indeed, these three tools can be further subdivided. For example, both financial 
penalties and licence withdrawals are NRA-interventions, where the former is 
typically less intrusive than the latter. 
178 Because the 2011 questionnaire encompasses more EU Member States 
(including non-EU Member States: Iceland and Norway), the two are merged 
where, if overlapping, the 2012 results are selected. Both the gas and electricity 
surveys are included, although fewer replies were provided for the gas surveys (22) 
than for the electricity surveys (28). The EU Member States which replied to both 
gas and electricity surveys are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Hungary, 
Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, 
and the Slovak Republic. The countries which only replied to the electricity 
surveys are: Greece, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal. 
179 Appendix 1 lists the survey questions underlying these competences-types, as 
well as the remaining and excluded categories of overturn and n.a.. The n.a.-




over the four competence-types.180,181 Larger values thus point towards 
more legal competences in these categories. 
 Figure 1 illustrates our expectation on the four competence-types. 
Analogous to Ayres and Braithwaite (1992), ‘softer’ competences are 
expected to be less costly to apply than ‘tougher’ competences, and 
therefore to receive lower shares in the overall NRA competence ‘toolkit’. 
‘Tougher’ competences are more costly to apply, because they entail more 
extensive legal procedures than ‘softer’ competences do (e.g., because 
pleas need to be prepared). Thus, regarding the first research question 
(i.e., on the main differences in legal competences), the first hypothesis is 
as follows: 
(H1). Most legal competences are allocated to the inform-category, 
and are subsequently allocated to the categories of assess, approve, and 
penalize, respectively. 
 
                                                        
180 For future research, weights could be applied to the scores instead of a 
summation. 
181 NRAs also provided some context for a few powers. We did not include this 
information as we could not score these varying and textual comments. Implicit 
in our approach is therefore that the respondents weighed up these nuances 
through their binary answers. In principle, a no-answer or yes-answer may in fact 
lie between 0 and 49% or 50 and 100%, respectively. 
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Figure 1: Expected distribution of legal competences 
 
- inform: to monitor and audit compliance, rules, activities, tariffs, 
planning, and standards; to request and publish information 
- assess: to propose rules, methodologies, tariffs, standards, and to issue 
opinions 
- approve: to set, approve, and issue rules, tariffs, standards, and 
methodologies 
- penalize: fines and penalties 
 
The ICER-questionnaires have been conducted over two main 
sections. The first section includes subcategories analogous to the three 
policy objectives. The competence estimates herein will be used as 
response variables: 
1) ‘security-of-supply’ (soscsi) for the security-of-supply competences. 
2) ‘renewables and environment’ and ‘environmental regulation’ relate to 
the electricity and gas sectors, respectively, where these sector-specific 
subcategories are merged for the carbon-neutrality competences (carbcsi). 
3) The remaining competence-subcategories on ‘consumer protection’ 
(mkstcsi) and ‘energy efficiency’ (enefcsi) are applied for ‘competitiveness’. 
Consumer protection is conducive to competition, for example, through 
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the improved bargaining position of consumers.182 And competitiveness, 
in its turn, is conducive to efficiency.183 These aspects thus capture the 
competitive forces confined to these competence categories. 
Note that the subscript csi refers to the nesting of observations. The 
first level c = 1, …, 4 stands for the competence-types inform, assess, 
approve, and penalize, respectively; the second level s = 0, 1 refers for the 
electricity and gas sector, respectively; and the third level i = 1,…, 28 
denotes the European country.184 Expected is that priority is given to 
security-of-supply, not only because (industrialized) economies depend on 
continuous energy consumption, but also because legal exceptions are 
mainly granted for security of supply purposes (e.g., Johnston and Block, 
2012). It is not clear-cut which of the remaining two policies are second in 
line, or whether electricity or gas sectors differ regarding these priorities. 
Hence, the second hypothesis is as follows: 
(H2). Most legal competences are allocated to security-of-supply 
purposes. 
 
The second ICER-questionnaire section includes NRA competences 
over the four elements of the energy value chain, namely: 1) generation 
(genercsi), 2) transmission (transmcsi), 3) distribution (distrcsi), and 4) 
retail (retailcsi). They are brought together as follows: 
gridcsi = ( transmcsi + distrcsi ) – ( genercsi + retailcsi )  (1) 
 
As part of the covariates, it captures the difference in the number of 
competences within grids (transmcsi and distrcsi) compared with non-grids 
                                                        
182 On the other hand, 'consumer protection' can prohibit cooperative contract or 
ownership structures among firms, asset-specific investments can be thwarted 
(e.g., hold-up issues). Investments are essential to sustain medium to long-term 
competition. 
183There may be ‘energy efficient’ systems with only one or few firms serving the 
market. However, ‘competitiveness’ does not only rely on the number of firms. In 
addition, if efficiency competences only target the transport of energy, cost-
effectiveness may still be limited. For example, also energy resource costs are a 
significant factor. We would like to thank attendants of our 2014 BAEE research 
workshop presentation for raising this last point. 
184 With four competences per sector, two sectors, and 28 countries, there are four 
times two times 28 competences, encompassing 200 observations (as replies on 
six countries’ gas sectors are missing in the ICER surveys). 
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(genercsi and retailcsi).185 In liberalized energy markets, relatively more 
competences are allocated towards regulating transmission and 
distribution (i.e., gridcsi is higher). This effect is expected to be less 
pronounced for the gas sector, however. Influential players outside 
national legal boundaries may benefit from markets which are liberalized. 
This especially holds for non-grid activity, as grid activity is locally bound. 
More non-grid competences are therefore necessary to prevent that the 
outcomes deviate from national public interests (i.e., gridcsi is lower). 
It is not clear-cut, however, whether market liberalization increases 
the total number of competences. On the one hand, market liberalization 
leads governments to decrease their intervention in markets, which results 
in fewer legal competences. On the other hand, market liberalization leads 
to more rules to ensure efficient and fair competition, as argued in Vogel 
(1996), so that more legal competences may be needed (i.e., higher values 
for soscsi to carbcsi).186 Based on the latter argument, the third hypothesis is 
therefore as follows: 
(H3). The number of policy area competences increases with more 
grid-related competences. This relationship is weaker for the gas sector. 
 
The remaining independent variables include the scores on the three 
energy supply objectives. For the security-of-supply score (indexsossi), we 
applied the countries’ energy security rankings as available on the World 
Energy Council (WEC) website. The rankings were first min-max 
normalized.187 The index is then the average of these normalized 
                                                        
185 Furthermore, if taken separately, these variables correlate highly with the 
response variables. 
186 By including gridcsi, a causal effect may therefore be captured between the 
covariates and the response variables. 
187 Min-max normalization implies that: zi = [xi – min(x)] / [max(x) – min(x)]) 




rankings.188 The scores thus range between 0 and 1, where higher scores 
point towards a better performance.189 For consistency purposes, the same 
steps are also taken for the other energy scores.190 
Because there are two ‘competitiveness’ competences (i.e., mkstcsi 
and enefcsi), we also constructed two analogous energy scores. For the 
energy efficiency index (indexenefsi) a ratio is set up from Eurostat’s 
Energy Balances items by subtracting ‘consumption in energy sector’ and 
‘distribution losses’ from total energy output, and subsequently dividing it 
again by total energy output. Hence, the higher this ratio, the less energy 
                                                        
188 This approach follows that of Sovacool (2013), upon which one of our security-
of-supply indices is based (see the next footnote). We admit that, by virtue of this 
methodology choice, other techniques are skipped through which countries’ policy 
performance can be tested. One main branch concerns benchmarking, such as 
Data Envelopment Analysis (see e.g., Pompei (2013) specifically, or Zhou et al. 
(2008) generally). Nevertheless, given its own flaws, benchmarking may not lead 
to an improved view on a country’s relative performance (see e.g., Hirschauer and 
Musshof (2014) and Grifell-Tatjé and Kerstens (2008)) which is needed in this 
analysis. 
189 For robustness purposes, we applied three security-of-supply indices. The 
(country-specific) index as mentioned in the text had the best model fit (AIC, BIC, 
log-likelihood, and the raw R2). Information on the other two is available on 
request. 
190 While the security-of-supply score is country-specific, the other scores only 
have the subscripts s and i, as data are only available at the sector and country 
level, respectively. In addition, unlike the response variables soscsi to carbcsi, the 
policy scores lack the competence nesting (c), so it is more natural to take the 
scores as covariates. 
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is lost at generation and/or distribution, and the more efficient the energy 
system is.191,192 
For the consumer protection competences (i.e., mkstcsi) we created a 
market structure index (indexmkstsi) through the European Commission’s 
internal energy market indicators on electricity and gas market structures 
(EC, 2012b).193 While consumer protection mainly concerns retail markets, 
we also included the EC (2012b) wholesale market indicators. Market 
power in wholesale markets can still be maintained with competitive retail 
markets (e.g., Goulding et al., 1999). For the carbon-neutrality score 
(indexcarbsi), the energy-related carbon emissions per capita is selected 
for the electricity sector.194 For the gas sector, the carbon emissions from 
the natural gas consumption and flaring are taken as a proportion of the 
total carbon emissions from the consumption of energy.195 
Having defined the competences and the realization of energy policy 
objectives, the next hypothesis relates to the research question on their 
                                                        
191 In the Eurostat Energy Balances, the key energy input-output equation which 
needs to hold is:  
'Gross inland consumption' + 'transformation output' + 'exchanges and transfers, 
returns' = 'final energy consumption' + 'final non-energy consumption' + 
'transformation input' + 'consumption in energy sector' + 'distribution losses' + 
'statistical differences'. For the electricity and gas balances, separately, indexenef 
is set up through a ratio from the equation’s right-hand side: (final energy 
consumption + final non-energy consumption + transformation input + statistical 
differences) / (final energy consumption + final non-energy consumption + 
transformation input + consumption in energy sector + distribution losses + 
statistical differences). 
192 The European Commission "EU Energy in Figures" statistical pocketbooks 
provide two useful metrics on energy efficiency: "Energy intensity" and "Primary 
energy efficiency". The former is a widely used indicator while, unfortunately, 
details on the latter are not provided. An example of energy intensity is the amount 
of energy consumed relative to GDP. However, we could not create electricity and 
gas sector counterparts because we lack data for the denominator (e.g., profits at 
both country and sector level). 
193 These include the national electricity and gas market values, Herfindahl-
Hirschmann Indices, switching rates, numbers of generators and retailers, market 
shares of the largest entities, and whether prices are regulated. 
194 This is the climate change-related metric in Sovacool (2013). As it concerns 
only one metric, no averaging was necessary. 
195 Both statistics are available at the U.S. Energy Information Administration 
website. The total carbon emissions are in fact a summation of the carbon 
emissions from the consumption of coal, petroleum, and the consumption and 
flaring of natural gas. 
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alignment. Because NRAs should have fewer competences when policy 
objectives are sufficiently met, the hypothesis is therefore as follows: 
(H4). The number of NRA competences decreases (i.e., soscsi to 
carbcsi) with higher energy scores (i.e., indexsossi to indexcarbsi) 
 
We selected a multilevel econometric approach which, analogous to 
panel data techniques, accounts for repeated measurements and thereby 
reduces the impacts from causal effects.196 Specifically, it mitigates the 
omitted-variable bias, where effects from the covariates on the response 
variables depend on the (ceteris paribus) levels of one or more excluded 
variables. An excluded variable example can be legal origin (e.g., civil or 
common law). Even if two NRAs have an equal number of grid-
competences (i.e., one of the covariates) the legal origin may cause one of 
the NRAs to have more authority over the policy in question. Standard 
econometric setups do not account for such fixed effects, which renders 
inconsistent the parameter estimation. Multilevel effects can control for 
multiple within-cluster effects and, thereby, account for such spurious 
effects as each cluster serves as its own control. Appendix 2 further 
discusses the econometric setup and the regression results. 
4. Results and discussion 











                                                        
196 Beneficial compared with panel data techniques is that the multilevel approach 
enables analyzing the “cluster-level random processes that affect the response 
variable" (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012). It treats cluster effects as non-
random, which is reasonable “if the clusters are, for instance, countries” (ibid). In 
addition, multiple levels of clustering can be analyzed, as with this three-level 
hierarchy (i.e., country, sector, and competence). 
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Competence-country score correlations: sos (0.17), mkst (0.31), enef (-0.27),  
and carb (0.33) 
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Figure 3: Per sector: sum of legal competences and average energy score 
The upper bar graph shows the electricity and gas sector sum of 
competences on security-of-supply (sos), consumer protection (mkst), 
energy efficiency (enef), and carbon-neutrality (carb), while the lower 
bar graph shows the sector averages of the corresponding energy scores. 




Figure 4: Per competence: sum of legal competences 
 The bar graph shows the sum of competences on security-of-supply (sos), 
consumer protection (mkst), energy efficiency (enef), and carbon-
neutrality (carb) over the four competence-types of inform, assess, 
approve, and penalize. 
 
Figures 2, 3, and 4 show the total number of legal competences and 
the averaged energy scores at the country, sector, and competence level, 
respectively. Figure 2 shows that the differences in competences across 
NRAs are large. There are strongly intrusive NRAs such as Great Britain, 
Italy, and Romania, and there are weakly intrusive NRAs such as Greece, 
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Portugal, and the Netherlands.197 Figure 2 further indicates, for instance, 
that countries have fewer competences related to energy efficiency in 
comparison with their other competences.  
Overall, instead of security-of-supply, most competences are 
allocated for carbon-neutrality purposes. This therefore rejects the second 
hypothesis (H2). Nevertheless, Figure 2 shows that the majority of 
countries have a total number of security-of-supply (average: 5.11), 
consumer protection (average: 6.21), and carbon-neutrality (6.32) 
competences around and higher than the average, respectively. Only for 
energy efficiency do the majority of countries have less than the average 
number of competences (3.29). 
Figure 3 shows that overall more competences are allocated to the 
electricity sector, and that within the electricity sector most competences 
are allocated for security-of-supply and within the gas sector for carbon-
neutrality purposes. Given the fewer gas competences generally and to 
security-of-supply specifically, Ministries may have decided not to confer 
these gas-sector competences to their NRAs so as to better cope with 
influential gas suppliers outside their national legal boundaries.  
Moreover, Figure 3 shows that the inter-sector differences in scores 
mainly arise with regard to energy efficiency (i.e., enefindexsi).198 The 
higher score for the gas sector implies that this sector is on average more 
efficient in the transformation of energy than the electricity sector. 
Figure 4 further shows that most competences appear in the 
competence-category of inform, fewer for either assess or approve, and 
least for penalize. Overall, the ordering is hierarchic from inform to 
penalize, as expected from Hypothesis H1. Strictly speaking, though, only 
for consumer protection (mkst) this ordering is fully hierarchic. For energy 
efficiency, security-of-supply, and carbon-neutrality, NRAs need to be 
allocated more assess and/or fewer approve competences, according to 
                                                        
197 For some countries, the (country level) competence sums are low. Partly, this 
is because they have not answered the gas surveys (these were: Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal). Even so, the graphs show they 
have few electricity-competences as well (except Norway). Rather than the no = 
0-49% and yes = 50-100% range as in footnote 181, these low numbers may be 
caused by countries which only answered with “yes” for unequivocal cases.  
198 The scores do not vary between the competence-types, but only across sectors 
and countries. The covariate secindex is not dependent on the sectors, but it differs 
slightly because the electricity sector subsample comprises more countries. 
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our theoretical benchmark. Additional research is necessary to draw more 
robust conclusions on whether these cases could serve as indications 
regarding either under- or overregulation by NRAs. 
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The upper bar graph shows the electricity and gas sector average of 
competences on generation (gener), transmission (transm), distribution 
(distr), and retail (retail), while the lower bar graph shows the 
transformation into grid = gener + retail – transm - distr.  
 
The upper part of Figure 5 shows the competences over the four 
elements of the energy value chain, namely: 1) generation (genercsi), 2) 
transmission (transmcsi), 3) distribution (distrcsi), and 4) retail (retailcsi). 
The lower part of Figure 5 shows the transformation into gridcsi. The fact 
that the gridcsi-bars are generally positive implies that most NRAs are 
allocated more competences for the grids. This result is in line with EU 
developments of grid unbundling whereby NRAs need to monitor and 
enforce the structural and behavioral rules for transmission (TSOs) and 
distribution system operators (DSOs). For example, operators which 
control (transmission) grids in the gas and electricity value chains are 
prohibited from controlling generation and retail facilities, and vice 
versa.199 
4.2 Multilevel results 
Figures 2, 3, and 4 indicate that the sample follows a Poisson 
distribution, mainly because the number of competences is non-negative, 
they comprise multiple-valued integers (i.e., whole numbers) and, without 
a natural upper bound, they comprise multiple zeroes – in the policy areas 
for which NRAs were not conferred legal competences.200 
  
                                                        
199 More on the unbundling regulations can be found in chapter 3 of Johnston and 
Block (2012). 
200 Moreover, the overall mean and variance of the observations are almost equal 
(i.e., the ‘equidispersion’ property). Detailed descriptive statistics are available on 
request. 
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Figure 6: Effects on the predicted mean number of legal competences 
(including multilevel fixed and random effects of sos to carb) from 
changing the grid-related competences (grid) with energy score (i.e., 
indexsos to indexcarb) held fixed 
The variables are: 1) the number of competences in security-of-supply 
(sos), consumer protection (mkst), energy efficiency (enef), carbon-
neutrality (carb), and grid-related competences (grid), and 2) the energy 
scores on security-of-supply (indexsos), market structure (indexmkst), 
energy efficiency (indexenef), and carbon-neutrality (indexcarb), and 
where: 
indexsos(min) = 0 indexmkst(min) = 0 
indexsos(avg) = 0.61 indexmkst(avg)= 0.30 
indexsos(max) = 1 indexmkst(max) = 1 
indexenef(min) = 0 indexcarb(min) = 0 
indexenef(avg) = 0.73 indexcarb(avg) = 0.47 























Figure 7: Effects on the predicted mean number of legal competences 
(including multilevel fixed and random effects of sos to carb) from 
changing the corresponding energy score (indexsos to indexcarb) with 
grid-related competences (grid) held fixed. 
The variables are: 1) the number of competences in security-of-supply 
(sos), consumer protection (mkst), energy efficiency (enef), carbon-
neutrality (carb), and grid-related competences (grid), and 2) the energy 
scores on security-of-supply (indexsos), market structure (indexmkst), 
energy efficiency (indexenef), and carbon-neutrality (indexcarb), and 
where: grid(min) = -13 ; grid(avg) = 10.01 ; grid(max) = 33 
 
Figures 6 and 7 show, based on the Appendix 2 multilevel regression 
outcomes, how the average numbers of competences (i.e., the y-axis) are 
aligned with the energy scores and the grid-related competences. Figure 6 
shows these averages as a function of the energy scores (index) while the 
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number of grid-related competences (grid) is held fixed at the minimum, 
average, and maximum levels. Figure 7 does the opposite for the energy 
scores and grid. Important to note is that the results on carbon-neutrality 
(carbcsi), as shown in this section (i.e. Figures 6 and 7), are not significant 
(see Appendix 2). We nevertheless provide and consider the results in 
order to discuss all three policy areas, including the important pillar of 
carbon-neutrality.  
Figure 6 indicates that Hypothesis H3 holds, which conjectures a 
positive relationship between the number of NRA competences (i.e., soscsi 
to carbcsi) and grid-related competences (i.e., gridcsi). This finding thus 
endorses the ‘freer markets, more rules’ conjecture of Vogel (1996), if the 
‘freer market’ aspect can be captured by the number of grid-related 
competences (i.e., market liberalization), and the ‘more rules’ can be 
captured by the number of policy area competences (i.e., soscsi to carbcsi). 
This effect especially holds for security-of-supply (sos) and consumer 
protection (mkst), because these lines become increasingly positive from 
index(min) to index(max) – while the energy efficiency (enef) and carbon-
neutrality (carb) lines level off. 
Furthermore, Figure 7 indicates that Hypothesis H4 does not always 
hold; not for all policy areas are fewer competences conferred to NRAs 
(i.e., soscsi to carbcsi) when energy scores are higher (i.e., index). Because 
the impacts from carbon-neutrality change sign (i.e., from grid(min) to 
grid(max)), as with Figure 6, we infer that carbon-neutrality (carbcsi) is a 
mixed bag. Its mixed (and insignificant) results may relate to the overall 
separation of EU climate and energy policy. Although generally the largest, 
the energy sector is not the only contributor to carbon emissions. This may 
have led governments to delegate some competences to other climate 
policy-specific NRAs or Ministries. However, such shared responsibilities 
need to be accurately delineated so that, for example, NRAs can still 
sufficiently monitor “corporations that operate or have interests in 
different sectors and industries” (Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2010). 
Effectiveness may therefore improve if the sampled countries reconsider 
the regulatory scope of their NRAs.201 
                                                        
201 It may also originate from the ICER survey categorization of “renewables and 
environment” and “environmental regulation” for the electricity and gas sectors, 
respectively. There is a possibility that these competences relate to more than the 
carbon-attributes of electricity and gas.  
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Next of interest is why impacts on energy efficiency (enef) 
competences are opposite to those of security-of-supply (sos) and 
consumer protection (mkst). One distinguishing factor is that energy 
efficiency, despite its large potential in the management of energy systems, 
has received relatively less attention in national and EU policies.202 
Indeed, as shown in Section 4.1 above, fewest competences are allocated 
for energy efficiency purposes. A comparison with security-of-supply and 
consumer protection would therefore be on unequal terms. It is therefore 
the question whether the same outcomes would hold if NRAs were to be 
equipped with more energy efficiency competences (enefcsi). 
 In the development of EU energy law, especially security-of-supply 
(soscsi) and consumer protection (mkstcsi) (i.e., competition policy) have 
interchangeably occupied center stage on the policy agenda (Johnston and 
Block, 2012). It is reasonable to assume that firms will not voluntarily 
incur expenses to improve these two energy aspects. Energy efficiency 
improvements, conversely, reduce costs and may even result in energy 
demand increases (the so-called ‘rebound effect’). The positive 
relationships between legal competences and scores of security-of-supply 
(soscsi) and consumer protection (mkstcsi) may therefore be driven by a 
regulatory ‘lock-in’ effect. Higher scores are then matched with stricter 
rules and enforcement.203  
4.3 Recommendations for future research 
Rather than following the path of ever stricter regulations, policymakers 
should rearrange energy property rights such that it is in the firms’ own 
interest to arrive at the (socially) optimal levels of security-of-supply and 
consumer protection.  
 With demand for energy set to rise, the incentives increase to 
optimize the contractual freedom of energy stakeholders and therefore the 
boundaries of energy property rights (see also Section 2). At the wholesale 
                                                        
202 For example, among the European Commission’s 20-20-20 targets (i.e., 20% 
reductions on carbon emissions, renewables, and energy efficiency), the targets 
on energy efficiency are not binding at Member State level. 
203 Finally, the second part of Hypothesis H3 has not yet been discussed, namely 
whether impacts on the number of competences are weaker for the gas sector. 
While Figure 3 shows that gas versus electricity sector differences are substantial, 
effects at the sector level were either not significant or had a poorer model fit. 
Competences at the sector level are therefore not sufficiently pronounced for the 
hypothesis to be accepted or rejected regarding the gas sector. 
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level, for example, derivative markets have taken up an important role in 
this contractual optimization by allocating risks. However, risk allocation 
at the retail (e.g. consumer protection) and system level (e.g. security-of-
supply) is primarily provided through regulation. One possible research 
venue, hence, is the extent to which market parties can assist in allocating 
risks (e.g., via insurance) and can be a complement to or substitute for 
regulation. 
Another research venue is in the measurement of the influence of 
NRAs. For example, having legal competences does not necessarily imply 
that NRAs have exercised them (e.g., Voigt, 2012). Moreover, an extension 
of this analysis may include the legal competences of Ministries and the 
judiciary (i.e., in case of legal action).  
5. Conclusion 
This chapter presented an EU-wide empirical study of energy market 
regulators and their legal powers. The following questions were posed: 
what are the main differences in the legal competences of National 
Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) in European gas and electricity markets, 
and are those differences aligned to the countries’ divergent levels of (1) 
secure, (2) competitive, and (3) carbon-neutral energy supply? 
From a variety of sources, we derived energy scores on the extent to 
which European countries have realized a (1) secure, (2) energy efficient, 
competitive and consumer-protective, as well as (3) carbon-neutral energy 
supply for their electricity and gas sectors. Based on surveys by the 
International Confederation of Energy Regulators (ICER), we developed 
estimates on NRA competences analogous to these energy supply 
properties, which range from less intrusive (‘soft’) to more intrusive 
(‘tough’) competences. 
 Across NRAs, it appears that the differences in the number of legal 
competences are large. Ministries have mainly conferred competences to 
NRAs for the electricity sector, primarily for carbon-neutrality purposes, 
but also for security-of-supply, consumer protection, and energy 
efficiency. NRAs are allocated more grid-related (i.e., transmission and 
distribution) than non-grid-related competences (i.e., generation and 
retail), which is in line with EU grid ‘unbundling’ developments. Moreover, 
the legal competences of NRAs do not follow the ‘optimal’ competence 
arrangement of regulatory authorities: compared with a theoretical 
benchmark there are relatively more ‘tough’ than ‘soft’ competences, while 
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the latter are less costly to exercise. These potential regulatory 
‘mismatches’ could be corrected by adjusting the number and 
intrusiveness of the NRAs’ legal powers. 
 Through a multilevel analysis we find that NRA competences are 
not fully aligned with their corresponding energy scores.  First of all, 
although higher energy scores should reduce the need for regulatory 
intervention and thus legal competences, this inverse relationship does not 
hold for most of the policy objectives. For energy efficiency, energy scores 
and competences move oppositely as hypothesized, but definitive 
conclusions cannot be drawn because only few NRAs have competences in 
this policy area. For carbon-neutrality, energy scores and competences 
move both in similar and opposite directions. These mixed findings likely 
result from governments which have delegated these competences to other 
policy-specific NRAs or Ministries. Effectiveness of regulations may 
therefore improve if the sampled countries reconsider the scope of their 
NRAs. The research recommendations we provide, for instance in 
improving the measurement of the influence of NRAs, may further 
sharpen the competence-policy perspective on energy efficiency and 
carbon-neutrality. 
Finally, for security-of-supply and consumer protection, energy 
policy scores and competences move in similar directions. These 
interactions may be driven by a regulatory ‘lock-in’ effect. Higher scores 
are then matched with stricter rules and enforcement. 
In addition, we find evidence that NRAs with more grid-related 
competences, which operate in more ‘unbundled’ and liberalized sectors, 
also have more of the above policy area competences. This finding 
supports the ‘freer markets, more rules’ proposition by Vogel (1996). 
However, instead of creating more rules, future research is needed to find 
out to what extent delegating the insurance of energy and climate 
objectives to private parties is recommendable in assisting the regulation 
of energy markets.  
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Appendix 1 – Competence categories 
 
Competence: (1) inform 
Complaint management 
Do you monitor and/or audit access rules to the distribution networks? 
Do you monitor and/or audit compliance with access rules for 
distribution networks?  
Do you monitor and/or audit compliance with access rules for 
transmission networks?  
Do you monitor and/or audit compliance with consumer protection 
measures? 
Do you monitor and/or audit compliance with consumer protection 
measures?  
Do you monitor and/or audit compliance with energy efficiency 
obligations?  
Do you monitor and/or audit compliance with rules concerning 
environmental obligations? 
Do you monitor and/or audit compliance with rules concerning 
renewables and environmental obligations? 
Do you monitor and/or audit congestion and balancing rules? 
Do you monitor and/or audit congestion and balancing rules?  
Do you monitor and/or audit cross-border activities?  
Do you monitor and/or audit distribution activities? 
Do you monitor and/or audit distribution tariffs? 
Do you monitor and/or audit distribution tariffs?  
Do you monitor and/or audit generation activities?  
Do you monitor and/or audit generation and/or wholesale tariffs/prices? 
Do you monitor and/or audit investment planning in distribution? 
Do you monitor and/or audit investment planning in distribution?  
Do you monitor and/or audit investment planning in transmission? 
Do you monitor and/or audit investment planning in transmission?  
Do you monitor and/or audit production/import activities?  
Do you monitor and/or audit quality standards and/or KPI in 
distribution  




Do you monitor and/or audit quality standards and/or KPI in 
transmission? 
Do you monitor and/or audit quality standards and/or KPI in 
transmission?  
Do you monitor and/or audit retail activities? 
Do you monitor and/or audit retail activities?  
Do you monitor and/or audit retail tariffs and/or prices? 
Do you monitor and/or audit retail tariffs and/or prices?  
Do you monitor and/or audit security of supply standards and/or KPI? 
Do you monitor and/or audit security of supply standards and/or KPI?  
Do you monitor and/or audit the way compliance with access rules to 
transmission networks is managed? 
Do you monitor and/or audit transmission activities? 
Do you monitor and/or audit transmission tariffs? 
Do you monitor and/or audit transmission tariffs?  
Do you monitor and/or audit unbundling of distribution activities? 
Do you monitor and/or audit unbundling of distribution activities?  
Do you monitor and/or audit unbundling of transmission activities? 
Do you monitor and/or audit unbundling of transmission activities?  
Do you monitor and/or audit wholesale gas prices/tariffs? 
Publication of letters and reports 
Request of information and data from regulated entities 
 
Competence: (2) assess 
Arbitration 
Hearing 
Issue of opinions 
Proposal of access rules 
Proposal of distribution tariffs 
Proposal of energy efficiency rules 
Proposal of investment planning rules 
Proposal of nomination rules 
Proposal of prices/tariffs 
Proposal of quality standards and/or KPI 
Proposal of retail tariffs and/or prices 
Proposal of rules/methodology 
Proposal of standards and/or KPI 
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Proposal of tariffs/prices 
Proposal of transmission tariffs 
Proposal of unbundling rules 
 
Competence: (3) approve 
Actual settlement 
Any other authorization procedure 
Approval of access rules 
Approval of distribution tariffs 
Approval of energy efficiency rules 
Approval of investment planning rules 
Approval of nomination rules 
Approval of prices/tariffs 
Approval of quality standards and/or KPI 
Approval of retail tariffs and/or prices 
Approval of rules/methodology 
Approval of standards and/or KPI 
Approval of tariffs/prices 
Approval of transmission tariffs 
Approval of unbundling rules 
Imposition of your decision 
Issue of nomination rules 
Rule-making power 
Setting investment planning rules 
Setting of access rules 
Setting of distribution tariffs 
Setting of energy efficiency rules 
Setting of investment planning rules 
Setting of prices/tariffs 
Setting of quality standards and/or KPI 
Setting of rules 
Setting of rules/methodology 
Setting of standards and/or KPI 
Setting of tariffs/prices 
Setting of transmission tariffs 
Setting of unbundling rules 




Competence: (4) penalize 
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Appendix 2 – Multilevel regressions 
The interactions of the variables are tested through the following 
econometric setups: 
soscsi = β1_SOS + β2_SOS*gridcsi + β3_SOS*indexsossi  
 + β4_SOS*gridcsi*indexsossi + εcsi_SOS 
εcsi_SOS  = (ζ1c_SOS+ζ1s_SOS+ζ1i_SOS) + (ζ2c_SOS+ζ2s_SOS+ζ2i_SOS)gridcsi  
 + (ζ3s_SOS+ζ3i_SOS)indexsossi  
 + (ζ4c_SOS+ζ4s_SOS+ζ4i_SOS)gridcsi*indexsossi + νcsi_SOS               (2) 
 
mkstcsi = β1_MKST + β2_MKST*gridcsi + β3_MKST*indexmkstsi  
 + β4_MKST*gridcsi * indexmkstsi + εcsi_MKST  
εcsi_MKST = (ζ1c_MKST+ζ1s_MKST+ζ1i_MKST) + (ζ2c_MKST+ζ2s_MKST+ζ2i_MKST)gridcsi  
 + (ζ3s_MKST+ζ3i_MKST)indexmkstsi  
 + (ζ4c_MKST+ζ4s_MKST+ζ4i_MKST)gridcsi*indexmkstsi + νcsi_MKST       (3) 
 
enefcsi = β1_ENEF + β2 ENEF*gridcsi + β3 ENEF*indexenefsi  
 + β4 ENEF*gridcsi * indexenefsi + εcsi ENEF  
εcsi_ENEF  = (ζ1c_ENEF+ζ1s_ENEF+ζ1i_ENEF) + (ζ2c_ENEF+ζ2s_ENEF+ζ2i_ENEF)gridcsi  
 + (ζ3s_ENEF +ζ3i_ENEF)indexenefsi  
 + (ζ4c_ENEF+ζ4s_ENEF+ζ4i_ENEF)gridcsi*indexenefsi + νcsi_ENEF          (4) 
 
carbcsi_CARB = β1_CARB + β2_CARB*gridcsi + β3_CARB*indexcarbsi  
 + β4_CARB*gridcsi * indexcarbsi + εcsi_CARB 
εcsi_CARB = (ζ1c_CARB+ζ1s_CARB+ζ1i_CARB) + (ζ2c_CARB+ζ2s_CARB+ζ2i_CARB)gridcsi  
 + (ζ3s_CARB+ζ3i_CARB)indexcarbsi  
 + (ζ4c_CARB+ζ4s_CARB+ζ4i_CARB)gridcsi*indexcarbsi + νcsi_CARB          (5)  
 
where, through a multilevel approach, the elements of the error terms (i.e., 
εcsi) are tested for their significance: the random intercepts at the 
competence (ζ1c), sector (ζ1s), and country levels (ζ1i), and the covariates at 
the competence (ζ2c,…,ζ5c), sector (ζ2s,…,ζ5s), and country levels (ζ2i,…,ζ5i).204 
Covariates at such nested levels are also called random coefficients.  
Moreover, through the interaction terms in equations (2) to (5) we 
can determine whether impacts from the energy scores (i.e., indexsossi to 
                                                        
204 The random coefficients depend on the random intercepts being significant. 
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indexcarbsi) change with different numbers of grid-related competences 
(i.e., gridcsi), and vice versa. Via these interactions we test these 
combinations for their possible impacts on the number of NRA 
competences (i.e., soscsi to carbcsi). 
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Table A.1: Standard Poisson with robust standard errors, multilevel 
Poisson regression (QR-decomposition) without robust standard errors, 
and fixed effects two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
`p' = respective Single level (standard) Poisson Multilevel Poisson 
variable sos mkst enef carb sos mkst enef carb 
(i) index`p' -0.001 -0.410 -0.145 1.367** 0.770 0.638 0.260* 2.058** 
 (0.672) (0.735) (0.486) (0.578) (0.518) (0.44) (0.195) (0.715) 
(ii) grid 0.034 0.030* 0.089*** 0.034 1.045* 1.032*** 1.070* 1.045** 
 (0.026) (0.016) (0.020) (0.026) (0.028) (0.015) (0.039) (0.022) 
(iii) index`p'*grid 0.007 0.040 -0.087*** -0.109*** 1.017 1.043 0.960 0.961* 
 (0.040) (0.037) (0.028) (0.041) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.023) 
constant -0.785* -0.520* -1.062*** -0.649* 0.358* 0.57* 0.554 0.326* 
 (0.420) (0.277) (0.383) (0.374) (0.165) (0.152) (0.385) (0.18) 
(iv) var(     0.069*** 0.728*** 0.001*** 
competence-type)     (0.064) (0.648) 0.001 
(v) var(sector)        
        
(vi) var(country)    0.214**    
    (0.140)    
(vii) var(grid)      0.001 0.001 
      (0.001) (0.001) 
(viii) cov(grid,      -0.029 -0.026 
constant)      (0.028) (0.022) 
N 200 188 196 200 197 188 192 198 
no. groups 1 1 1 1 28 4 4 4 
Joint significance:        
(i), (ii), (iii) 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.085 
(i), (iii) 0.940 0.323 0.000 0.027 0.898 0.461 0.0004 0.093 
(ii), (iii)  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.0001 0.001 0.140 0.099 
log-likelihood -221.245 -212.996 -164.136 -274.007 -201.049 -209.593 -142.811 -225.143 
AIC 450.491 433.992 336.272 556.014 412.098 429.186 299.622 464.286 
BIC 463.684 446.937 349.385 569.207 428.514 445.368 322.425 487.304 
'raw' R2 0.086 0.190 0.213 0.071 0.230 0.315 0.225 0.320 




The coefficients are marked with ***/**/* if they are significant at 
99%/95%/90%. The standard errors are between brackets. AIC and BIC 
are the Akaike and Bayesian Information Criterion, respectively, and 
‘raw’ R2 is {corr(y,yhat)}2. The response variables are the number of 
competences on: the security-of-supply (sos), consumer protection 
(mkst), energy efficiency (enef), carbon-neutrality (carb). The covariates 
are: the number of grid-related competences (grid), and the energy 
scores (abbreviated to index`p’) on security-of-supply (indexsos), market 
structure (indexmkst), energy efficiency (indexenef), and carbon-
neutrality (indexcarb). 
 
The first four columns of Table A.1 show the benchmark case of 
simple Poisson regressions, although statistical tests point out that 
clustered model specifications are required.205,206 To conserve table space, 
we named the energy scores index`p’si where `p’ represents the policy 
competence to which it corresponds (i.e., of soscsi, mkstcsi, enefcsi, and 
carbcsi). 
With multilevel regressions, the correlated nature of the hierarchical 
data can be taken into account. With multiple nests, the typical approach 
is to nest observations top-down: from the country (level-3), to sector 
(level-2), and competence level (level-1). Because the aim of this research 
is to determine the relationship between competences and energy scores, 
we did not follow such hierarchy but selected all possible combinations of 
random intercepts (i.e., the nests) and random coefficients.207 As in 
Hamilton (2013), we therefore applied likelihood-ratio tests on full versus 
restricted models. For example, for random intercepts we tested the 
likelihood of a setup with (i.e., full) versus without level-2 nests (i.e., 
restricted). In addition, for the random coefficients we applied setups 
                                                        
205 Breusch-Pagan and likelihood-ratio tests point towards significant random 
effects (available on request). Furthermore, there is more within than between-
subject variation, so that a panel data approach would be appropriate, such as a 
multilevel analysis as applied here. Moreover, "between individual associations 
are often more susceptible of confounding” (Vittinghoff et al., 2012). 
206 In the remaining regressions, standard errors are not made robust because 
these block analyses of the random intercepts and coefficients, and they may 
perform poorly in small samples (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012). 
207 With the multilevel Poisson regressions, unstructured co-variances are selected 
to allow for correlation between random effects. For aiding convergence, we apply 
the QR-decomposition multilevel version. In addition, with issues in the 
regressions, we enable Stata’s ‘difficult’ option, and/or integration points fewer 
than the Stata default (i.e., seven). 
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without random coefficients (i.e., restricted) versus setups with one or 
several included (i.e., full). We further checked for the Poisson model’s 
dispersion assumption (i.e., whether the expectation equals its variance). 
For this purpose, we selected ‘negative binomial’ models as Stata only 
supports these among multilevel models.208,209 Finally, we constructed a 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman (endogeneity) test by transforming the covariates 
into within and between effects, and testing whether their joint and 
separate differences were significantly different from zero.210 This 
approach led exogeneity to be violated for carbcsi. The subsequent 
                                                        
208 We test for both the mean and constant conditional over-dispersion 
parameters. Moreover, although zero-inflatedness is supported for pooled 
models, it is not for multilevel Poisson models. However, in a blog post on 
statisticalhorizons.com, Prof. Paul Allison argues that the "zero-inflated Poisson 
model is one way to allow for over-dispersion". In selecting zero-inflated as 
against negative binomial models, he proposes to check the model fit through AIC 
or BIC statistics. Prof. William Greene comments on this post by questioning the 
AIC and BIC measures in this regard. We therefore checked for the squared 
correlation of the response variable with the ‘y-hat’ (i.e., the response variable 
minus the raw residual). In all our multilevel setups, the multilevel squared 
correlations were higher. 
209 The initial result is that nest c (competence) is significant for all of the response 
variables, s (sector) is only so for sos, and i (country) only for sos, enef, and carb. 
Each setup had its own possible random coefficient(s). Several of these setups 
were disregarded, because multilevel models require a “correct specification of the 
mean structure, and lack of correlation between the random intercept [, the 
random coefficients,] and the covariates" (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012). 
For the correlation checks, we applied (standard) random effects panel 
regressions to test for the significance of these univariate combinations. For the 
mean specification checks, we obtained the Anscombe residuals, the standardized 
Pearson and squared deviance residuals and, via the ‘mltcooksd’-package, the 
‘dfbeta’ and Cook’s D values. The mltcooksd-package “estimates Cook’s D and 
dfbeta’s for the second level units in two-level mixed models”. This Stata ado-
package is written by Dr. Katja Möhring and Dr. Alexander Schmidt, and is 
available via SSC. Standardization is performed via the hat matrix (see Hilbe, 
2009, p. 275). 
Observations were detected as outliers if they exceed all of these critical 
values. From the regressions without these outliers we saved the (new) hat 
matrices, and included their higher order polynomials (2nd to 4th). Regressions 
were excluded where Ramsey RESET specification tests are rejected (i.e., the joint 
significance of these polynomials). Where we had multiple setups per response 
variable, we selected the one with the best model fit (i.e., via AIC, BIC, log-
likelihood, and the ‘raw R2’). 
210 If significant, these tests point towards endogenous time-varying covariates 
(Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012, pp. 251—252). The Hausman-Taylor 
approach cannot be applied since none of the covariates are time-invariant.  
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instrumental variable (2SLS) approach we applied rendered the carbcsi-
coefficients to be insignificant.211 
The last four columns of Table A.1 show the final multilevel 
regression setups of the response variables. Several coefficients are not 
significant separately, but their interaction terms (e.g., gridcsi with 
gridcsi*index`p’si) are jointly significant for most of the setups. The 
reported values of Table A.1 are ‘incidence rates’, whereby coefficients 
below (above) 1.0 imply that the average rate impact is negative (positive) 
on the response variables.212 With all intercepts and index`p’si coefficients 
below 1.0, a first inference is therefore that Hypothesis H4 holds, namely 
that the number of competences decreases (i.e., soscsi to carbcsi) with higher 
energy scores (i.e., index`p’si). However, this relationship varies due to the 
                                                        
211 For the instrumental variables, we selected two categories of competences 
which were not included in the analysis before, namely overturn and n.a. (see 
footnote 179 and Appendix 1). Both only vary at country and gas levels, not at the 
four levels of competences (i.e. inform to penalize). NRAs with high overturn-
rates are more likely to be overturned by their Ministry. The n.a.-scores capture 
the number of competences which did not fit into the categorization of the three 
policy areas (i.e. seccsi to carbcsi). With higher n.a. and overturn-scores, NRA 
competences are more and less likely to impact energy market performance, 
respectively.  
212 To provide a numerical example, the effect of increasing index`p’ by 10 basis 
points (e.g., from 0.4 to 0.5) is to reduce the expected number of energy efficiency 
competences by 0.554*0.2600.10 = 0.4842, corresponding to a 1 - 0.4842 = -
51.58% decrease.  
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interaction of index`p’si with grid-related competences (i.e., gridcsi).213,214 
Next to coefficients (i) to (iii), the ‘fixed’ effects, also the random effects 
(iv) to (viii) affect this relationship. Table A.1 shows that the random 
intercepts (i.e., (iv) to (vi)) are significant at the competence level (ζ1c) for 
consumer protection, energy efficiency, and carbon-neutrality, and at the 
country level (ζ1i) for security-of-supply.215 The random coefficient of gridcsi 
(i.e., (vii) and (viii)) is significant for energy efficiency (enefcsi).216 
Determined as variances, these random intercepts and random 
coefficients indicate the (competence or country-specific) range around 
the total average intercepts and gridcsi-coefficients, respectively. 
 
                                                        
213 Because the coefficients have a multiplicative interpretation, the impact at the 
average grid level (10.01) would amount to: 0.554 * 0.2600.10 * (0.9600.10)10.01 = 
0.4648, or a larger decrease of -53.52%. 
214 Regarding the previous footnote: we applied page 690 of Rabe-Hesketh and 
Skrondal (2012), so that the incidence rate ratio for two NRAs with covariate 
values xi and xi’ along with an interaction term β3xiyi will be:  
exp(β1)exp(β2xi)exp(β3xiyi)exp(β4yi) /  
exp(β1)exp(β2xi’)exp(β3xi’yi)exp(β4yi) = exp(β2(xi-xi’))exp(β3(xi-xi’)yi).  
 
Here the covariate increase (xi-xi’) equals 0.1, and yi equals 10.01. For this 
calculus, we applied page 701 of Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012), so that the 





where ψ11 and ψ33 is the variance of the random intercept and coefficient, 
respectively, and ψ31 is the covariance of the random intercept with the random 
coefficient. 
215 Random intercepts are not affected by covariate changes, so that the previous 
numerical example cannot be applied. If the competence-specific intercept of 
consumer protection (mkst) changes from zero to one standard deviation (0.2626 
= 0.0690.5) by shifting to another competence, the ceteris paribus effect will be 
0.5700.2626 (where 0.570 is the fixed intercept). 
216 Building on the previous numerical examples, the expected index`p’ effect can 
be obtained by further raising the interaction coefficient (0.9600.10)10.01 to the 
power of [cov(grid,cons) + ½ grid*var(grid)] = -0.029 + ½(10.01)0.001 = -
0,024, resulting in a total decrease of -51.53%. 
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Figure A.2: The random intercepts are at the country level of security-of-
supply (sos), and at the competence level for consumer protection (mkst), 
energy efficiency (enef), and carbon-neutrality (carb) 
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Figure A.3: The random grid-related competences (grid) coefficients are at 
the competence level of energy efficiency (enef) and carbon-neutrality 
(carb) 
 
As mentioned above, the econometric methodology enables us to 
scrutinize the impacts as channeled via the multiple levels (i.e., countries, 
sectors, and competence-types). The upper part of Figure A.2 shows the 
(random) intercepts at the country level for security-of-supply (i.e., ζ1i from 
Appendix 2 equation (2)). No obvious pattern can be discerned, as a bit 
more countries have positive security-of-supply random intercepts (15) 
rather than negative ones (13). The lower part of Figure A.2 shows the 
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random intercepts at the competence level (i.e., ζ1c) (i.e., from inform to 
penalize) for consumer protection, energy efficiency, and carbon-
neutrality. These follow the pattern as in Figure 4 and 5, namely that the 
intrusiveness of the intermediate assess and approve do not follow the 
‘optimal’ hierarchic ordering. If assess and approve had more positive and 
negative impacts, respectively, NRA competences would have been 
hierarchic and, as a result, in accordance with Hypothesis H1. 
Random coefficients are the other source which channels multilevel 
effects. Appendix 2 Table A.1 shows that these are only significant with the 
grid-related competences (gridcsi) for energy efficiency (enefcsi). Figure A.3 
shows that, due to these random coefficients, the total effects from the 
grid-related competences (gridcsi) vary per competence-type (i.e., the 
random intercept). The strongest negative effects are found with inform 
(i.e., smallest relative to the 1.0 incidence rate), and the weakest with 
assess. These results thus indicate that with more liberalization (i.e., more 
grid-related competences) there are fewer soft competences (i.e., inform). 
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Conclusions and recommendations 
This section interprets the empirical findings through the theoretical 
framework of Chapter 2, namely the economics of property rights and 
transaction costs. These inferences will then serve to answer the central 
research question: Are property rights regarding EU carbon and energy 
markets valued, used and traded, and restricted in an economically 
efficient way? The recommendation section describes suggestions for 
policy changes and future research. 
1. Data: Emissions trading registries and data 
problems 
The EU ETS registry, the EU Transaction Log (EUTL), is the key data 
source for the first two empirical studies. Chapter 3 discusses data 
problems that arise when monitoring transactions and checking 
compliance with the EUTL. Particular attention is paid to the difficulty of 
linking data from this registry to other relevant data, such as firm 
ownership information. Recommendations for improvement of the EU 
registry are also provided. 
1.1 Policy recommendations 
One of the data issues Chapter 3 reveals is that it cannot consistently 
be found out via the EUTL whether and how transactions with national EU 
allowance registries add up to the (annually provided) statistics on 
allowance allocations and surrenders. Another is that transactions 
downloads do not reveal historical transactions from registry accounts 
which have been closed. Moreover, this chapter focuses particularly on 
firm ownership. Firms are the actual owners and users of EUTL accounts 
and, therefore, influence how the EU ETS is run. However, company 
information from the EUTL is both inconsistent and ambiguous. 
The issues have their roots in one main aspect: the EUTL lacks 
crucial variables or identifiers, such as the previous names of the 
installation operators and of the accountholders, the (country-specific) 
identifier of the installations accounts, or the date when accounts have 
been closed. Moreover, for some identifiers the value is either too generic 
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or not available, making it equivocal by whom or for what purpose the 
transaction was conducted. 
Not only can this extra information mitigate the above mentioned 
issues. It can also make the EUTL robust against recurring updates, which 
have resulted in retroactive data changes. However, the EUTL cannot 
provide these identifiers because they are limited by the EU ETS registry 
regulation. Moreover, the information the EUTL provides is exactly what 
has been received from EU Member States. The recommendations of this 
chapter are therefore primarily relevant for the European Commission and 
the EU Member States. They are in the position to change the regulations 
that determine which information the EUTL can provide. 
As of end-December 2011, the EU energy market has a counterpart 
to the EUTL, namely the Regulation on Wholesale Energy Market Integrity 
and Transparency (REMIT). Although its basic purpose is to monitor 
“energy markets to detect and deter market manipulation and insider 
trading” (ACER, 2015), its functioning is primarily based on transactions 
as is the case for the EUTL.217 Even more so, upon enforcement of the 
second Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (EC, 2014), or MiFID 
II, authorities will need to estimate market shares, for which they (also) 
need to start linking firm ownership to the accounts. This EUTL chapter 
can therefore be informative for the possible data issues involved. 
1.2 Research recommendations 
The EU ETS part of this research focuses on Phase I (2005-2007). It 
is considered to be the EU ETS pilot or learning phase for participants, 
attested by the fact that allowances could not be banked to the subsequent 
Phase. Phase I was not subject to the Kyoto Protocol, unlike Phase II 
(2008-2012). In addition, the EU ETS is almost 10 years further, has 
gained in market liquidity, and improved its financial market regulations, 
while at the start of this research only transactions data from the earlier 
years were available. The EU ETS functioning is fundamentally the same 
and, once more, faces a surplus of banked or accumulated allowances. 
Moreover, the Phase I perspective enables us to see how firms closed their 
allowance books. Research on later periods will need to accurately account 
                                                        
217 Yet, ACER will also obtain information on outstanding orders, the (only yet 
crucial) virtual data element. 
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for the fact that firms do not have uniform but differing or overlapping 
time horizons (i.e., across EU ETS Phases).218 
Working with the actual and (non-anonymous) transactions data 
allows the examination of several issues. For example, do the transactions 
attest the VAT fraud, the allowance theft, or the renewable policy 
differences among EU Member States? And given the latest EU ETS policy 
change: do firms transact more for idiosyncratic or systematic risks, do 
they effectively cope with the volatility of the carbon market, and will the 
EU ETS Market Stability Reserve support or hinder firms in coping with 
this volatility?  
2. Case I: Property valuation 
The first study, Jong et al. (2014), analyses the value-relevance of the 
property rights restriction as imposed by the EU ETS. From the theoretical 
framework in Chapter 2, we can derive the hypothesis that if some 
shareholders have a higher valuation on the property restriction as 
imposed by the EU ETS than other shareholders, they will base their higher 
valuations on more attributes of this property (e.g., Barzel, 1997). 
Carbon allowances can be used as inputs for emissions, for trading 
and/or backup purposes. A drastically lower carbon price is thus expected 
to be more valuable for firms which need them more (i.e., with higher 
carbon-intensities of production) and which hold few of them (i.e., given 
the assets’ worth). Based on the April 2006 carbon price drop, we instead 
found that shareholders consider firms with such characteristics to be less 
valuable. Such firms are indeed less profitable given the decreasing 
emissions cap. We therefore concluded that the EU ETS is valued by 
investors as restricting pollution. 
This conclusion supports the first research question element, namely 
that property rights from EU carbon markets are valued in an economically 
efficient way. However, we also tested for another property attribute, 
namely the information advantage in the market of firms which actively 
trade allowances. Its insignificance may be the result from investors 
limitedly valuing the profit impact of the EU ETS on firms, so that the first 
two attributes already capture most of the impact. Its insignificance may 
                                                        
218 However, we show that in Phase I (2005-2007) we cannot exactly pinpoint 
which allowances refer to which Phase I or II or to which calendar year within 
Phase I. Chapter 3 provides recommendations how this issue can be solved. 
160 
 
also emanate from investors lacking insufficient information on the firms’ 
allowance trade activity. 
Indeed, share prices reflect how market participants discount all 
publicly available information into their expectations on the profitability 
of firms. If information is lacking, shareholder profitability estimates are 
less precise. This constrains markets in realizing their valuable allocation 
properties (i.e., to channel capital where return relative to risk is highest). 
For example, valuations will be impeded when it is not known whether 
firms, for example, stockpiled unused allowances or borrowed them. 
2.1 Policy recommendations 
The European Commission can improve the functioning of the EU 
ETS market by administering a more detailed and gradual feed-in of 
information. A key information constraint originates from the compliance 
timing as laid out in the EU ETS Directives (EC, 2003; EC, 2009a). While 
(currently) allowance auctions are spread over the calendar year and thus 
ensure a gradual feed-in of information, there is just one moment in the 
year that all firms surrender their allowances. It will be conducive to 
market certainty if there are more of such moments during the year (e.g., 
Holland and Moore, 2012; Lucia et al., 2015) and that the European 
Commission subsequently reports on these compliance moments. For 
example, instead of the default annual EU-wide compliance cycle, firms or 
sectors may then opt for their own preferred cycle (which may be quarterly 
or even more frequent). This could have prevented or at least reduced the 
severity of the April 2006 shock. The more that signals on scarcity are held 
up, the more difficult it becomes for firms to forecast whether they have 
planned enough emission-reduction projects. Uncertainty around the 
carbon price will therefore be limited if the release of information on the 
scarcity in the EU ETS is stepped up. 
2.2 Research recommendations 
In answering the research question, not all sources of property rights 
valuation have been considered. For example, this study applied public-
based information. The literature includes several private-based sources, 
such as survey-based estimates from expert respondents, companies, or 
industry associations (e.g., Borghesi et al., 2015). Future research can 
therefore consider how inferences from private sources exactly differ from 
public ones. A deeper understanding of the size and distribution of 
externalities among stakeholders can be attained through a systematic 
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identification of the value impact of contractual (i.e., typically private) and 
property right (i.e., typically public) restrictions. Such an analysis of 
externalities can be a fruitful research contribution to the current 
European Commission’s aim for Better Regulation, the law-making 
framework which designs and evaluates EU policies and laws.219 
3. Case II: Property use and trade  
According to the ‘make-or-buy decision’, transactions take place 
within firm boundaries when transaction costs are lower vis-à-vis the 
market. For example, energy firms, when meeting contracted demand, can 
dispatch their own plants but also tap into other firms' production capacity 
by purchasing energy on the market (i.e., via spot or derivative markets). 
This sourcing flexibility also holds for the carbon market. Instead of 
trading on the carbon market and mobilizing other firms’ pollution 
abatement capacity, allowances can be transacted within firm boundaries 
with existing or newly integrated entities.220 
Analyzing EU ETS transactions, Jong and Zeitlberger (2017) 
examine whether firms behave ‘self-sufficiently’ by first allocating 
production, emissions, and, hence, allowances within firm boundaries 
before opting for the carbon market. Self-sufficient firms’ external or 
carbon market trades are therefore expected to be less responsive to 
allowance demand factors because they are better able to absorb shocks 
within the firm. 
Contrary to our expectations, we find that firms with highest 
potential to be self-sufficient conducted fewer allowance trades across 
their subsidiaries than on the carbon market – as opposed to less self-
sufficient firms. Inferring from the ‘make-or-buy’ theoretical framework, 
this result may suggest, within firm boundaries, that 1) their pollution 
abatement capacity is more expensive and/or 2) their carbon-related 
transaction costs (e.g., information costs) are higher than on the carbon 
market. This finding therefore affirms that, similar to the US Acid Rain 
                                                        
219 For example, see the European Commission’s Better Regulation website: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/democratic-change/better-
regulation_en 
220 Indeed, in the literature ‘transactions’ do not only regard the exchange of 
property. It encompasses a wider range of interactions, many of which revolve 




Program (e.g., Ellerman et al., 2000), for self-sufficient firms, the EU ETS 
leads to relative cost savings. Indeed, because their allowance trades point 
to carbon risk hedging, self-sufficient firms can reap further cost savings 
through the carbon market. 
3.1 Policy recommendations 
For the policy recommendations we focus on the less self-sufficient 
firms, since their market-based (within-firm) transaction costs were 
higher (lower) (i.e., they traded more among subsidiaries). We mention 
two ways through which the market-based transaction costs can be 
lowered. The first is taken up in the information provision 
recommendation already discussed above in Section 7.1.  
The second is that allowance property rights have not been clearly 
excluded. Although regulations have increasingly treated carbon 
allowances as financial instruments, there are still several exceptions 
through which firms are able to externalize their risks or costs. For 
example, the Transparency Directive (EC, 2013) and the Financial 
Collateral Directive (EC, 2002) are still not applicable to allowance spot 
trades. Moreover, the future version of the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (EC, 2014), or MiFID II, is contested by market 
stakeholders for its impacts on market liquidity. Policymakers should 
therefore take into consideration how property right restrictions or 
exemptions through such policies affect allowance trade across time (i.e., 
carbon hedging) or place (i.e., within-firm versus the market). 
3.2 Research recommendations 
Through our choice of the ‘make-or-buy’ theory we selected one 
perspective on the research question, namely whether the usage and trade 
of EU carbon property rights is economically efficient. A wider scope could 
have included more varieties of the main property rights aspects, such as 
the right to transfer some or all of the rights to others (transferability), the 
right to use the assets (usus), the right to its returns (usus fructus), the 
right to change their form and substance (usus abusus), the right to 
exclude others (excludability), and the right to sell or lease some or all of 
these rights to others (alienation) (e.g., Müller and Tietzel, 2005).  
The choice to ‘make-or-buy’ is a function of transaction costs. From 
these transaction costs, inferences can be made on the allocation of 
property rights, of which carbon allowances are an example. The outcome 
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of our ‘make-or-buy’ analysis therefore ‘only’ indirectly relates to the 
pollution abatement. 
Our research did not delve into the reasons for the higher (lower) 
transaction costs within self-sufficient firms (on the market). For example, 
as put in Kasper et al. (2012):  
Where market institutions are poor and create high transaction 
costs, for example because of poor regulation, legislation and law 
enforcement, one can observe a tendency to integrate many 
activities within organizations. A high degree of vertical 
integration is, for example, typical of dysfunctional markets for 
inputs where genuine prices are not formed, so that much valuable 
information is never communicated.” (Kasper et al. , 2012, page 
294) 
 
Given that our analysis shows that self-sufficient firms favour the carbon 
market to within-firm trade, this may support the claim that the EU ETS 
as a market institution is functioning well. For example, instead of a 
within-firm central coordination of carbon demand, lower transaction 
costs enable firm-owned business units to act separately on market 
parameters (e.g., the carbon price) rather than within-firm ones. 
Moreover, several refinements to our analysis can be mentioned. 
First, we approached the ‘make-or-buy’ principle only through a binary 
selection, namely the potential of being ‘less’ and ‘more’ self-sufficient. 
Although ‘make-or-buy’ is phrased as a binary principle, it actually 
encompasses a spectre; firms operate as hybrids (e.g., Ménard, 2010). 
Long-term contracts, for instance, are considered a hybrid form in 
between the ‘make’ and ‘buy’ dichotomy.221 In addition, high within-firm 
transaction costs can “give rise to numerous specialized sub-contractors to 
whom producers can delegate specific tasks, not least in information 
gathering” (Kasper et al., 2012). Future research can therefore explicitly 
account for EU ETS intermediaries in the ‘make-or-buy’ topic, for example, 
by including banks and brokers.222 Second, the make-or-buy literature 
                                                        
221 Our data sample does not tell through which contract types transactions have 
occurred. 
222 The approach taken in Jaraitė and Kažukauskas (2014) is to consider trades to 
be ‘third-party’ if these are from Operator Holdings Accounts (OHAs) to Person 
Holding Accounts (PHAs) and the OHAs and PHAs are not company-affiliated 
(more on OHAs and PHAs in Chapter 3).  
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typically analyses the (Williamsonian) transaction characteristics of ‘asset-
specificity’, ‘uncertainty’, and ‘frequency’. Our data did not allow us to 
account for ‘asset-specificity’ and ‘uncertainty’ – although we accounted 
for ‘frequency’. Future research may be able to fill this gap. 
4. Case III: Property restrictions  
To approach the third part of the research question, namely whether 
property rights regarding EU carbon and energy markets are restricted in 
an economically efficient way, we check for the alignment of policy 
objectives and their enforcement. The main EU energy policy objectives or 
public interests at stake are a (1) secure, (2) competitive, and (3) carbon-
neutral energy supply. Because the enforcement of European gas and 
electricity regulation has increasingly been allocated to National 
Regulatory Authorities (NRAs), Chapter 6 analyzes whether EU Member 
States have aligned the legal competences of their gas and electricity NRAs 
with the divergent realizations of their energy policy objectives. 
4.1 Policy recommendations  
In the study, we hypothesized that NRAs have fewer competences 
when energy policy objectives are sufficiently met, because the realization 
of the objectives reduces the need for regulatory intervention. From the 
results it appears that this does not hold for most of the policy objectives.  
For energy efficiency, the indicators on policy objectives and 
competences move oppositely as hypothesized, but definitive conclusions 
cannot be drawn because only few NRAs have competences in this policy 
area. One explanation can be that energy efficiency has not received as 
much attention as the other policy areas, or that these competences are 
exercised by Ministries.  
For carbon-neutrality, we obtained mixed (and insignificant) results 
on the relationship between policy objectives and NRA competences. 
Although generally the largest, the energy sector is not the only contributor 
to carbon emissions. This may have led governments to delegate some 
competences to other policy-specific NRAs or Ministries. However, such 
shared responsibilities need to be accurately delineated so that NRAs can 
still sufficiently monitor “corporations that operate or have interests in 
different sectors and industries” (Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2010). 
Effectiveness may therefore improve if the sampled countries reconsider 
the regulatory scope of their NRAs, for example, by enabling NRAs to 
CHAPTER 7 
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jointly exercise their competences when obtaining information from the 
regulated firms. 
Moreover, the policy objectives and competence indicators on 
security-of-supply and consumer protection move similarly, contrary to 
what we hypothesized. These policy-competence interactions may be 
driven by a regulatory ‘lock-in’ effect. Higher policy scores are then 
matched with stricter rules and enforcement. Rather than via the path of 
ever stricter regulations, policymakers should implement regulation such 
that it is in the firms’ own interest to arrive at the (socially) optimal levels 
of security-of-supply and consumer protection. 
Finally, we recommend correcting the intrusiveness of the NRAs’ 
legal powers. The legal competences do not follow the ‘optimal’ 
competence arrangement for regulatory authorities; compared with a 
theoretical benchmark there are relatively more ‘tough’ than ‘soft’ 
competences, while the latter are less costly to exercise.  
4.2 Research recommendations 
Transactions within the energy industry are generally characterized 
by high levels of uncertainty, frequency, and asset-specificity (e.g., 
Spanjer, 2009).223 The higher these levels, the more the energy market 
governance should move away from being market-based to one involving 
vertical integration, long-term contracts, and government involvement 
(e.g., Williamson, 1979; Mulder, 2011). The primary rationale hereof is to 
mitigate contractual hazards (e.g., the hold-up problem) which prevent 
socially inefficient behavior and sustain competition and innovation. 
This research focuses on government involvement via the legal 
competences of NRAs. These competences can be considered as 
contractual restrictions on property rights. However, the above indicates 
that such restrictions appear in varieties, for example, vertical integration 
and public ownership. Analyzing these along with the legal competences 
                                                        
223 Kasper et al. (2012) provides the following clear description of asset-specificity:  
“Asset-specificity is a condition of a productive asset – such as an item of capital 
equipment or a body of specialized knowledge – which does not allow it to be 
switched to alternative uses. […] The costs of converting out of specific capital 
investments are often high, so that capital owners become vulnerable to the 
exercise of power by the owners of complementary and supposedly more 
fungible production factors. […] This explains why owners of specific assets have 
a keen interest in binding complementary inputs providers in organizations (or 
in obtaining strong institutional controls).” 
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will be a useful improvement for future research. Moreover, from private 
via common to public ownership, these varieties imply a decreased 
exclusiveness or sharing of property. Extra coordination costs are then 
incurred to mitigate the value-capturing incentives of the shared property, 
and to accommodate (semi-)public interests besides the (private) profit 
maximization objective. The ‘tough’-to-‘soft’ competences method of this 
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The “trilemma” facing energy markets is that it is challenging if not 
impossible to simultaneously 1) guarantee the supply of energy, while 2) 
production, trade, and consumption occurs efficiently (e.g., at the lowest 
possible transaction costs), and 3) scarce resources are used optimally 
(e.g., that emissions of greenhouse gases are equal to its absorption). 
This Ph.D. research applies Law and Economics, a sub-discipline of 
both law and economics. It analyzes the economic causes and effects of 
laws and regulations on EU energy and carbon markets – which, as the 
“trilemma” shows, are increasingly complex and intertwined. After 
hypotheses are derived from property rights theory, they are tested using 
econometric techniques. The overall research question is: Are property 
rights regarding EU carbon and energy markets valued, used and traded, 
and restricted in an economically efficient way? To that end, three EU-
wide empirical studies have been conducted:  
1) How shareholders value the EU ETS impact on firms;  
2) How energy firms used and traded carbon allowances; and  
3) Whether the legal competences of National Regulatory Agencies (NRAs) 
are aligned to the public interests of the energy markets they supervise. 
 
Data: Emissions trading registries and data problems 
Any emissions trading scheme needs an emissions registry. The EU 
Transaction Log (EUTL) is the registry for the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS), and at the same time the key data source for two 
empirical studies in this Ph.D. research. 
Chapter 3 discusses data problems that arise when monitoring 
transactions and checking compliance with the EUTL. Particular attention 
is paid to the difficulty of linking registry data to other relevant data, such 
as firm ownership information. Firms are the actual owners and users of 
EUTL accounts and, therefore, influence how the EU ETS is run. However, 
company information from the EUTL is both inconsistent and ambiguous. 
These issues have their roots in one main aspect: the EUTL lacks 
crucial variables or identifiers. However, the EUTL cannot provide these 
because they are limited by the EU ETS registry regulation. Moreover, the 
information the EUTL provides is exactly what has been received from EU 
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Member States. The recommendations of this chapter are therefore 
primarily relevant for the European Commission and the EU Member 
States. They are in the position to change the data to the EUTL and the 
regulations that determine which information the EUTL can provide.  
 
Case 1. Property valuation 
According to property rights theory, valuations and restrictions 
mutually affect property rights. Higher valuations lead to more 
comprehensive restrictions on property, and more aspects of property 
being priced. 
The first study, Jong et al. (2014), analyses the value relevance of the 
property rights restriction as imposed by the EU ETS. Carbon allowances 
can be used as inputs for emissions, for trading and/or backup purposes. 
A drastically lower carbon price is thus expected to be more valuable for 
firms which need them more (i.e., with higher carbon-intensities of 
production) and which hold few of them (i.e., given the assets’ worth).  
Based on the April 2006 carbon price drop, we instead found that 
shareholders consider firms with such characteristics to be less valuable. 
Such firms are indeed less profitable given the decreasing emissions cap. 
We therefore concluded that the EU ETS is valued by investors as 
restricting pollution. 
However, we also tested for the information advantage of firms 
which actively trade allowances in the carbon market. We find an 
insignificant impact from this aspect, which may emanate from investors 
lacking insufficient information on the firms’ allowance trade activity.  
Indeed, share prices reflect how market participants discount all 
publicly available information into their expectations on the profitability 
of firms. If information is lacking, shareholder profitability estimates are 
less precise. This constrains markets in realizing their valuable allocation 
properties (i.e., to channel capital where return relative to risk is highest).  
Our main policy recommendation is therefore for the European 
Commission to administer a more detailed and gradual feed-in of 
information. For example, there is just one moment in the year that all 
firms surrender their allowances. It will be conducive to the functioning of 
the carbon market if there are more of such moments during the year, in 





Case II: Property use and trade 
According to the ‘make-or-buy decision’ principle within property 
rights theory, transactions take place within firm boundaries when 
transaction costs are lower vis-à-vis the market. For example, energy 
firms, when meeting contracted demand, can dispatch their own plants but 
also tap into other firms' production capacity by purchasing energy on the 
market (i.e., via spot or derivative markets). This sourcing flexibility also 
holds for the carbon market. Instead of trading on the carbon market and 
mobilizing other firms’ pollution abatement capacity, allowances can be 
transacted within firm boundaries in order to spread the reduction of 
carbon emissions over multiple subsidiaries. 
The second study, Jong and Zeitlberger (2017), examines whether 
firms behave ‘self-sufficiently’ by first allocating production, emissions, 
and, hence, allowances within firm boundaries before opting for the 
carbon market. Contrary to our expectations, we find that firms with the 
highest potential to be self-sufficient conducted fewer allowance trades 
across their subsidiaries than on the carbon market – as opposed to less 
self-sufficient firms. Inferring from the ‘make-or-buy’ theoretical 
framework this result may suggest, within firm boundaries, that 1) their 
pollution abatement capacity is more expensive and/or 2) their carbon-
related transaction costs (e.g., information costs) are higher than on the 
carbon market. This finding therefore affirms that, for self-sufficient firms, 
the EU ETS leads to relative cost savings.  
 
Case III: Property restrictions 
According to property rights theory, socially inefficient behavior by 
firms can be prevented by contractual restrictions on property (e.g., 
regulation) to sustain policy objectives such as competition and 
innovation. 
For this purpose, the third study, Jong and Woerdman (2016), 
checks for the alignment of policy objectives and their enforcement in 
European gas and electricity markets. For the objectives, we consider the 
corresponding countries’ divergent levels of 1) security, 2) 
competitiveness, and 3) carbon-neutrality of energy supply. Since 
European gas and electricity regulation has increasingly been allocated to 
European National Regulatory Authorities, for the enforcement we 
consider the legal competences of NRAs. We then derived scores (a) on the 
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extent to which these energy supply characteristics are realized and (b) on 
the weight and number of competences NRAs have regarding these policy 
objectives.  
Although higher energy scores should reduce the need for regulatory 
intervention and thus legal competences, it appears that this does not hold 
for most policy objectives. With security-of-supply and consumer 
protection, higher policy scores are matched with stricter rules and 
enforcement. Rather than via the path of ever stricter regulations, these 
regulations may improve if designed such that it is in the firms’ own 
interest to arrive at the (socially) optimal levels of security-of-supply and 
consumer protection. 
No definite conclusions can be drawn for the objectives on carbon-
neutrality and energy efficiency. One explanation can be that these 
competences are delegated to other policy-specific NRAs or Ministries. 
Effectiveness may then improve if the sampled countries reconsider the 
regulatory scope of their NRAs, for example, by enabling NRAs to jointly 
exercise their competences when obtaining information from the 
regulated firms.  
Finally, the legal competences do not completely follow the ‘optimal’ 
competence arrangement for regulatory authorities; compared with a 
theoretical benchmark there are relatively more ‘tough’ than ‘soft’ 
competences, while the latter are less costly to exercise. These potential 
regulatory ‘mismatches’ could be corrected by adjusting the intrusiveness 






Het “trilemma” van energiemarkten gaat over de uitdaging dan niet 
de onmogelijkheid om voor energie 1) de voorziening te garanderen, 2) 
efficiënte productie, handel, en consumptie te hebben (bijv. tegen de 
laagste transactiekosten) en 3) een optimaal gebruik van schaarse bronnen 
te hebben (bijv. een toename die gelijk is aan de afname van CO2). 
Dit promotieonderzoek past rechtseconomie toe, een sub-discipline 
van zowel rechten als economie. Het onderzoek analyseert de economische 
oorzaken en gevolgen van wet- en regelgeving van EU energie en CO2 
markten – die, gegeven het “trilemma” steeds complexer en vervlochten 
worden. Na opstellen van hypotheses uit de eigendomsrechten theorie 
hebben we deze met econometrische methodieken getest. De algemene 
onderzoeksvraag luidt: Worden eigendomsrechten in de EU markten van 
CO2 en energie op een economisch efficiënte wijze gewaardeerd, gebruikt, 
verhandeld, en beperkt? Drie empirische studies zijn hiertoe uitgevoerd:  
1) Hoe aandeelhouders het EU ETS waarderen;  
2) Hoe energiebedrijven emissierechten gebruiken en verhandelen; en  
3) In hoeverre de wettelijke bevoegdheden van Nationale Regulerende 
Instanties op één lijn liggen met de beleidsdoelstellingen op de 
energiemarkten waar ze toezicht op houden. 
 
Data: Data kwesties binnen het EU emissierechten 
handelsregister 
Ieder systeem van emissierechten handel heeft een emissierechten 
register nodig. Het ‘EU Transaction Log’ (EUTL) is het register voor het 
Europese emissierechten systeem, het ‘EU ETS’, en een voorname 
databron voor twee studies in dit promotieonderzoek. 
Hoofdstuk 3 behandelt data kwesties bij het nagaan van de EUTL 
geregistreerde transacties en de naleving van de gereguleerde entiteiten. 
Bijzondere aandacht krijgt het koppelen van de registerdata met andere 
relevante data, zoals wie eigenaar is van deze rechten. Voornamelijk 
bedrijven zijn gebruikers van emissierechten, en bepalen hiermee de 
werking van het EU ETS, maar het EUTL stelt de informatie van het 
eigendom van deze rechten niet consistent of eenduidig beschikbaar. 
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Deze kwesties hebben hun oorsprong in één hoofdaspect: dat het 
EUTL ontbreekt aan cruciale variabelen. Het EUTL kan hier niet in 
voorzien door beperkingen vanuit de EUTL regelgeving. Daarnaast 
fungeert het EUTL grofweg als een data-doorgeefluik vanuit EU lidstaten. 
De aanbevelingen van dit hoofdstuk zijn daardoor vooral relevant voor de 
Europese Commissie en EU lidstaten. Zij zijn in de positie om de data aan 
het EUTL en de regelgeving van het EUTL te wijzigen.  
 
Case I: Waardering van eigendom 
Volgens de eigendomsrechten theorie vindt er een wederzijdse 
beïnvloeding plaats tussen waarderingen en beperkingen op eigendom. 
Hogere waarderingen leiden tot uitgebreidere beperkingen op eigendom, 
en tot meer aspecten van het eigendom die beprijsd worden. 
Het eerste onderzoek, Jong et al. (2014), analyseert de waarde van 
de eigendomsrechten beperking door toedoen van het EU ETS. 
Emissierechten kan men gebruiken ter compensatie van de uitstoot, om 
mee te handelen, en om als reserve aan te houden. Een drastisch lagere 
CO2 prijs zal dus naar verwachting goed nieuws zijn voor bedrijven die 
meer emissierechten nodig hebben (bijv. met een hogere uitstoot) en die 
weinig emissierechten op voorraad hebben.  
Op basis van de CO2-prijsval van april 2006, zien we dat 
aandeelhouders bedrijven met deze eigenschappen juist lager waarderen. 
Deze bedrijven zijn geacht minder winstgevend te zijn gezien het dalend 
emissierechten plafond. We concluderen dat het EU ETS door 
investeerders gewaardeerd wordt als een beperking op vervuiling. 
We hebben daarnaast getest of bedrijven die actief handelen in 
emissierechten ook informatievoordelen behalen in de CO2-markt. Dat we 
een insignificante impact vinden kan het gevolg zijn dat investeerders niet 
beschikken over voldoende informatie op deze handelsactiviteiten.  
Door dit tekort aan informatie kunnen aandeelhouders minder 
accurate inschattingen maken van de winstgevendheid van bedrijven, die 
ze vervolgens vertalen naar aandelenprijzen. Informatietekorten kunnen 
dan markten beperken in hun waardevolle allocatie rol (bijv. in het 
alloceren van kapitaal naar investeringen met een hoog rendement t.o.v. 
de risico’s). 
Onze voorname aanbeveling is dat de Europese Commissie 




gedetailleerde en gelijkmatige informatie voorziening. Er is nu 
bijvoorbeeld slechts één moment per jaar dat bedrijven hun 
emissierechten in dienen te leveren. Het is bevorderlijk voor de 
marktwerking als er meer van zulke momenten zijn per jaar, zodat de 
markt vaker signalen ontvangt over de schaarste in het EU ETS. 
 
Case II: Gebruik van en handel in eigendom 
Volgens het ‘make-or-buy decision’ principe binnen de theorie van 
eigendomsrechten vinden transacties plaats wanneer de transactiekosten 
binnen bedrijfsgrenzen lager zijn t.o.v. de markt. Om de gecontracteerde 
vraag te voorzien kunnen energiebedrijven bijvoorbeeld hun eigen 
installaties draaien, maar ook gebruik maken van de productiecapaciteit 
van andere bedrijven door energie op de markt in te kopen (bijv. via spot 
of derivaten markten). Deze flexibiliteit in bronnen is ook van toepassing 
op de CO2 markt. Naast handel op de CO2 markt en het gebruik van 
andermans capaciteit in het verminderen van CO2 vervuiling, kan men 
emissierechten binnen bedrijfsgrenzen verhandelen om de CO2 
vermindering uit te smeren over meerdere dochterondernemingen. 
Het tweede onderzoek, Jong en Zeitlberger (2017), bekijkt of 
bedrijven ‘autarkisch’ gedragen door eerst productie, emissies en dus 
emissierechten binnen bedrijfsgrenzen uit te wisselen voordat ze de CO2 
markt op gaan. In tegenstelling tot onze verwachtingen vinden we dat 
bedrijven met het hoogst potentieel om autarkisch te zijn minder 
emissierechten uitwisselen binnen bedrijfsgrenzen dan op de CO2 markt – 
dan bedrijven met een lager autarkie potentieel. Gegeven het ‘make-or-
buy’ principe maken we uit deze bevinding op dat, binnen bedrijfsgrenzen, 
1) hun capaciteit om CO2 te verminderen duurder is en/of 2) hun CO2-
gerelateerde transactiekosten (bijv. informationkosten) hoger zijn dan op 
de CO2 markt. Deze bevinding bekrachtigt dat, voor autarkische bedrijven, 
het EU ETS kostenbesparingen heeft gerealiseerd.  
 
Case III: Restricties op eigendom 
Volgens de eigendomsrechten theorie kunnen beperkingen op de 
contractuele vrijheid op eigendom (bijv. via wet- en regelgeving) 
maatschappelijk inefficiënt gedrag van bedrijven voorkomen, om daarmee 
beleidsdoelstellingen te ondersteunen zoals competitie en innovatie. 
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Het derde onderzoek, Jong en Woerdman (2016), bekijkt of 
beleidsdoelstellingen op één lijn liggen met de uitvoering in Europese gas- 
en elektriciteitsmarkten. Voor de doelstellingen nemen we van Europese 
lidstaten de verschillende niveaus m.b.t. 1) de zekerheid van hun 
energievoorziening, 2) het concurrentievermogen en 3) de CO2-
neutraliteit. Aangezien de uitvoering van Europese regelgeving op gas- en 
elektriciteitsmarkten veelal overgedragen is aan Europese Nationale 
Regulerende Instanties (NRI’s), analyseren we de wettelijke 
bevoegdheden van NRI’s. We leiden vervolgens scores af (a) in hoeverre 
deze energie doelstellingen gerealiseerd zijn en (b) wat de hoeveelheid en 
zwaarte is van de bevoegdheden van NRI’s omtrent deze doelstellingen.  
Hoewel de noodzaak tot regulatoire interventie lager is bij hogere 
scores op de doelstellingen, vinden we dit niet terug in het merendeel van 
de gevallen. De regulatoire interventie is bijvoorbeeld hoger in het geval 
van de zekerheid van de energievoorziening en van de consumenten-
bescherming. In plaats van steeds strengere regelgeving, is onze 
aanbeveling dat het ontwerp van deze regelgeving er meer voor dient te 
zorgen dat bedrijven, bij het behartigen van hun eigen belangen, tegelijk 
het (maatschappelijk) optimaal niveau van deze doelstellingen bereiken. 
We kunnen geen duidelijke conclusies trekken voor de doelstellingen 
op het gebied van CO2-neutraliteit en energie efficiëntie. Een mogelijke 
verklaring is dat deze bevoegdheden bij andere beleids-specifieke NRI’s of 
ministeries liggen. Het zou de effectiviteit ten goede kunnen komen als de 
lidstaten uit de steekproef de regulatoire reikwijdte van hun NRI’s herzien. 
Dit kan bijvoorbeeld door toe te staan dat NRI’s gezamenlijk hun 
bevoegdheden gebruiken bij het ontvangen van informatie van de onder 
toezicht gestelden.  
Ten slotte bevinden we dat NRI’s niet volledig de ‘optimale’ 
rangschikking van bevoegdheden hebben. In vergelijking met een 
theoretisch criterium zijn er relatief meer ‘harde’ dan ‘zachte’ 
bevoegdheden, hoewel laatstgenoemden goedkoper zijn om uit te voeren. 
Deze mogelijk verkeerde regulatoire combinaties kan men corrigeren door 







I still remember the day I got in the train for a three hours ride to 
Groningen. This was the first time for me I went to “the North”, in my 
thoughts one large no-man’s-land “above Amersfoort”, where the few 
people, who are able to live there, are stiff and never heard of carnival. It 
was a crazy rainy day and, to make it more challenging, I had a job 
interview for the Ph.D. position for which I applied.  
Yet, the warmth and cheeriness from this job interview completely 
undid this blue and stressful mental state. This moment symbolized for me 
how “Groningen” would stand as an entity against the tons of focus and 
perseverance that is necessary when “doing a Ph.D.”. My supervisors, 
Oscar and Edwin, really were a team, each with complementary roles to 
keep me going. Oscar is no-nonsense and sharp, both in fun and business 
terms. Edwin is an excellent wordsmith, and goes to considerable lengths 
to get me involved with and connected to “the outside world”. I am very 
grateful for their endless patience, their multifaceted support, and their 
guidance into the academic world. 
Fortunately, for me Groningen was really littered with cornerstones. 
Fitsum is one of the brightest and warmest persons I have ever known. 
During lunch or coffee breaks, we were able to find solutions to all world 
problems. Ela, always present at the notorious Ph.D. council drinks or 
other social events, precisely knows when and how to make fun of the 
things I am saying (and in case you did not know, I can be outspoken 
occasionally). Surya often shared us with his fascinating law and non-law 
perspectives, which resulted in some vortex which boggled our minds. 
Many of the Groningen cornerstones could be found during 
lunchtime. On the way to abduct Teo for lunch, chances were high to be 
caught by the cheerfulness from the Graduate Office: Ela, Marjolijn, and 
Barbara. When standing (but also when not standing) in front of the 
Graduate Office door, Anneke could also take part in her warm 
determination to relieve me from all “purple crocodiles” the University 
brought forth. The lunch procession thereafter passed by Charis, Stefan, 
Zeeshan, Adam, Björn, and Enrique, where we were testing our powers of 
190 
 
persuasion that both God and the universe required them to join. During 
lunch, it was always a joy with Teo to switch on the (rude) Dutch-mode, 
and to tell our foreign-born colleagues this rudeness helped them to 
integrate into Dutch society. At first, Yingying thought we were serious, 
but she is a quick learner and now can win this game hands down. After 
lunch it was time for coffee to immediately suppress the tiredness from 
digesting lunch, where we often encountered more fellow Ph.D. students. 
This daily lunch ceremony enabled me to get reborn, in order to continue 
battling away on Excel and STATA for the remainder of the working day. 
After taking on Excel and STATA alone, I was joined by brother-in-
arms from the European University Institute who were like-minded in 
cracking the EU ETS data vault: Jūratė Jaraitė-Kažukauskė, Andrius 
Kažukauskas, Aleksandar Zaklan, and Alexander Zeitlberger. I was happily 
surprised and grateful that Alexander was willing to join me in the endless 
search for a bunch of needles in the EU ETS haystack, even with other more 
pressing things on his mind. I am further indebted to the EUI in providing 
me with the opportunity to work together with Stefano Verde, Claudio 
Marcantonini, and Christoph Graf, and to get to know many others in the 
EU ETS domain. 
Not only am I indebted to the Energy Delta Gas Research (EDGaR) 
consortium in its contribution to realize this Ph.D. research project, I have 
learned much from the interesting meetings and conferences with my 
EDGaR project partners from: DNV GL (Karen van Bloemendaal, Bert 
Kiewiet, Maurice Vos), ECN (Marit van Hout, Jeroen de Joode (currently: 
ACM), and Özge Özdemir), and TU Delft (Christopher Davis (currently: 
RuG), Gerard Dijkema (R.I.P.), Bas Gerben (currently: Widget Brain), 
Zofia Lukszo, and Ahmad Mir Mohammadi Kooshknow (currently: RuG)). 
Since I considered myself an expat in this country within my first 
months in Groningen, I wanted to explore the “real Groningen” and so I 
joined the soccer club “Groen Geel”. With the team, including the Thomas-
duo, Jos, and Joseph, all ‘three halves’ of the match were a delight. We had 
no real “Grunnegers”; luckily I had the chance to encounter them as 
opponents in our soccer matches. It was the splendid “Groen Geel” team 
spirit and ambiance which made me got out of bed on time, for those early 




The Groningen time in its purest went by rapidly. I sent my Ph.D. 
manuscript the day before I started working at the Energy Directorate of 
the Authority for Consumers and Markets (‘ACM’). And so after a while I 
had to run two lives: one on the rewarding work at the ACM on electricity 
markets, and one on processing the Ph.D. reviews. I could not have 
finished these Ph.D. reviews without the many pats on my back from my 
warm ACM-colleagues: Hannah, Jacco, Johan, Jorieke, Lisanne, Max, 
Paul, Pauline, Robert, Roy (the list is longer, I had to stop at ten). I also 
could not have completed it without being able to kick some balls at my 
soccer team, SVC ‘08 (including the moment of glory at Lisse), and without 
the regular reminders that I must have “lived in a cave” during the pub 
quizzes with Lydwine, Hannah, Lena, Rieks and Ingrid. 
I consider myself lucky that, during my adventure to and from 
Groningen, at many people’s places the coffee was still hot and the beer 
was still cold: my family (my mother; Lydwine; Willeke, Roelant and Paul; 
Ada, Oscar, Lauren and Louise; Klaas and Annelies; Thom and Annelies; 
Frans and Truus, Camiel and Kim), Serge, Stefan, Verbs 26 (David, Arjan, 
Fred, Evert-Jan, Benedikt), The BitterBall Boys (Jochem, Justin, Louis, 
Rob), the VITE-rans and Finals (Rob, Thomas, Shiao Li, Meike, Eline, 
Lotte, Ilse, Sanja, Koen), and the München Münsters (Bart, Eelco, Jasper, 
Krijn, Pim, Willem, Winand). You guys know how to get me out of my daily 
grind. Thanks for always being around, and for your sincere interest in 
what I am doing and what is up my mind. 
Very special thanks go to Lydwine. It was painful to wave each other 
goodbye at the end of every weekend, in The Hague or Groningen. And 
when finally living together in The Hague, my evenings and weekends were 
often spent on the Ph.D. reviews. I am thankful she looked further than the 
horizon; we both knew the Ph.D. research was temporary, but not exactly 
“how temporary” it was going to be. 
Finally, I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my parents. 
When I started this Ph.D. research, my father was already about a year in 
hospital after a heavy brain hemorrhage. From that incident until he 
passed away, he fought a battle he could not win, only to have more time 
with his wife and children. My mother, in return, almost set herself 
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completely aside in shining her bright light in the latest and darkest 
chapters of his book. 
My mother and my father, when he was still alive, often made the 
joke that LDP was the secret ingredient in their meals. In the same breath, 
they immediately told the secret what LDP stands for: Love, Dedication, 
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